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Thesis Abstract 
The fast-growing reliance of our daily life upon online information services often demands 
an appropriate level of privacy protection as well as highly available service provision. 
However, most existing solutions have attempted to address these problems separately. This 
thesis investigates and presents a solution that provides both privacy protection and fault 
tolerance for online information retrieval. A new approach to Attack-Tolerant Information 
Retrieval (ATIR) is developed based on an extension of existing theoretical results for 
Private Information Retrieval (PIR). ATIR uses replicated services to protect a user's privacy 
and to ensure service availability. In particular, ATIR can tolerate any collusion of up to t 
servers for privacy violation and up to / faulty (either crashed or malicious) servers in a 
system with k replicated servers, provided that k>t+f+ I where ^ > 1 and/< .^ In contrast 
to other related approaches, ATIR relies on neither enforced trust assiunptions, such as the 
use of tanq)er-resistant hardware and trusted third parties, nor an increased number of 
replicated servers. While the best solution known so far requires A: (> 3/ + 1) replicated 
servers to cope with t malicious servers and any collusion of up to t servers with an 
(5(„L(*-i)/3.jj communication complexity, ATIR uses fewer servers with a much improved 
commimication cost, 0(n^) (where n is the size of a database managed by a server). 
The majority of current FIR research resides on a theoretical level. This thesis provides both 
theoretical schemes and their practical iir^ jlementations with good performance results. In a 
LAN enviroimient, it takes well under half a second to use an ATIR service for calculations 
over data sets with a size of up to 1MB. The performance of the ATIR systems remains at 
the same level even in the presence of server crashes and malicious attacks. Both analytical 
results and experimental evaluation show that ATIR offers an attractive and practical 
solution for ever-increasing online information applications. 
Keywords: active attacks, attack tolerance, fault tolerance, malicious attacks, performance, 
private information retrieval, privacy protection, query services, and security. 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis officially marks the end of my five-year long study in Durham, a 
wonderful place in north east England where I will always be happy to go back to 
walk around. The river, the woods, the castle, and the Cathedral, I miss you all. 
Going to Durham is probably one of the most important career decisions I have ever 
made. It was there that I met so many nice people who have transformed my life all 
the way along. Among many, I would like to first express my gratitude to my 
supervisor, Professor Jie Xu, who made a great effort to secure me the funding in the 
first place, trained me to be a professional researcher, believed in me, and always 
inspired me to be the best. I would like to express my deep appreciation for his 
supervision, guidance, patience, and inspiration. These are the valuable gifts I shall 
enjoy for the rest of my life. 
My appreciation also goes to Professor Malcohn Munro, for kindly being my 
supervisor during the last stage of my study, and for his encouragement and support. 
Thanks to all the members of the Distributed Systems and Services Group, the 
Department of Computer Science, and my fiiends in Durham for numerous research 
discussions, jokes, trips, meals, and support. It was you guys who have made my life 
colourful, rich and enjoyable for the past five years. 
I would also like to express deep thanks to my family, who have always been there 
helping, encouraging, loving, and being proud of me. Special thanks to Andrew, for 
putting up with me, for always being there for me, and for your belief in me, which I 
appreciate so much. 
Table of Content 
The§is Abstract " 
Acknowledgements ^ 
Table of Content 
List of Figures vi 
List of Tables vii 
Acronyms 
Declaration 
Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
1.1 Problem Statement 1 
1.2 Research Challenges 3 
1.3 Contributions 5 
1.4 Thesis Organisation 6 
Chapter 2 Background: Coping with Attacks 8 
2.1 Basic Concepts and Terminologies 8 
2.1.1 Systems, Services, and Components 8 
2.1.2 The Client/Server System Model 9 
2.1.3 Security Failures 10 
2.2 Attack Models 11 
2.2.1 Classification of Attacks 11 
2.2.2 Relations between Attack Models 12 
2.2.3 Attacks on Systems and Cryptanalysis 13 
2.3 Privacy Protection: Defending against Passive Attacks 14 
2.3.1 Defining Privacy 14 
2.3.2 Privacy through Encryption 14 
2.3.3 Privacy through Anonymity 16 
2.3.4 Privacy through Delegation 17 
2.3.5 Privacy through Pseudonym 17 
2.3.6 Privacy through Negotiation 18 
2.3.7 Privacy through Secret Sharing 18 
2.4 Private Information Retrieval (PIR): Model, Schemes, and Extensions 19 
2.4.1 The PIR Problem 19 
2.4.2 The PIR Model 19 
2.4.3 Information Theoretic PIR Schemes 20 
2.4.4 Computational Pffi. Schemes 21 
2.4.5 PIR Extensions 22 
2.4.6 PIR and Active Attacks 24 
2.4.7 Hardware-based PIR Schemes 24 
m 
2.5 Attack Tolerance: Thwarting Active Attacks 26 
2.5.1 Defining Attack Tolerance 27 
2.5.2 Attack Tolerance through Secret Sharing 27 
2.5.3 Attack Tolerance through Threshold Cryptography 28 
2.5.4 Attack Tolerance through Proactive Security 29 
2.5.5 Commonly Used Assumptions 30 
2.6 Summary 33 
Chapter 3 Attack-Tolerant Information Retrieval (ATM) 35 
3.1 Introduction 35 
3.2 Preliminaries 36 
3.2.1 Basic System Model 36 
3.2.2 Servers and Attack Models 39 
3.2.3 System Assunq)tions 39 
3.2.4 Requirements of ATIR 40 
3.2.5 Definitions of ATIR 42 
3.3 Attack-Tolerant Information Retrieval Schemes 44 
3.3.1 Basic Algorithms 45 
3.3.2 Characterisations of Fault Tolerance 48 
3.3.3 Why is Error Detection Difficult in ATIR? 50 
3.3.4 Error Detection 52 
3.3.5 Two Result Verification Algorithms 56 
3.3.6 Proofs for the ATIR Schemes 59 
3.3.7 Communication Conq)lexity 63 
3.4 Comparisons of ATIR with Existing PIR Schemes 64 
3.4.1 Comparing with Robust PIR Schemes 64 
3.4.2 Comparing with Hardware-based PIR Schemes 65 
3.4.3 A Summary of Comparison Results 67 
3.5 Discussions 68 
3.5.1 Validity of ATIR System Assumptions 68 
3.5.2 Con j^arison with Existing Secure and Fault Tolerant Schemes 69 
3.6 Summary 70 
Chapter 4 System Architecture and Implementation 72 
4.1 System Architecture 72 
4.2 Design Issues 75 
4.2.1 The Character-String Database Model 75 
4.2.2 Core Components 78 
4.2.3 Message Formats 84 
4.2.4 Optimizations 86 
4.3 Implementation Issues 87 
4.3.1 Circumventing the Index Knowledge Assumption 87 
4.3.2 Full-length Processing versus View Processing 88 
4.4 Summary 88 
Chapter 5 Empirical Evaluation 89 
5.1 Performance Models 89 
IV 
5.1.1 Preliminaries 89 
5.1.2 Performance Modelling 91 
5.2 Experimental Setting 96 
5.2.1 Experimental Objectives 96 
5.2.2 Experimental Environment 96 
5.2.3 Primitive Component Model Parameters 98 
5.3 ATIR Experiments in a Fault-free Environment 103 
5.3.1 ATIR Component Model Parameters 103 
5.3.2 Varying View Sizes 108 
5.3.3 Varying Result Sizes 109 
5.3.4 Varying Undetected Error Rates 111 
5.3.5 Performance Proportion of Each Component 113 
5.3.6 Performance of Deterministic ATIR 114 
5.4 ATIR Experiments in a Simulated Faulty Environment 116 
5.4.1 ATIR Performance in the Presence of Crash Faults 116 
5.4.2 ATIR Performance in the Presence of MaUcious Faults 117 
5.5 Performance Comparisons among SQL Query, PIR and ATIR 121 
5.6 Summary 122 
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Work. 123 
6.1 Main Contributions 123 
6.2 Future Research Directions 125 
6.2.1 Reducing Computation Conqjiexity 125 
6.2.2 Reducing Communication Complexity 126 
6.2.3 The Importance of Design Diversity and Assumptions 126 
6.2.4 Exploring Other Applications 127 
6.2.5 Defending against Denial-Of-Service Attacks 127 
6.3 In Conclusion 128 
Glossary 129 
Reference* • ••••••• •••••«•••••••••••••••••••••••••••*••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••«••••••••••••••*••••••••••• 130 
List of Figures 
Figure 2-1 A Generalised Conceptual System Model (Adapted fi-om [Xu04]) 9 
Figure 2-2 A System Model of a CUent/Server Distributed System 10 
Figure 2-3 An Architectural Overview of Hardware-based PIR Schemes 26 
Figure 3-1 A Query Algorithm for ATIR Schemes 46 
Figure 3-2 An Answer Algorithm for Replica Sj 47 
Figure 3-3 A Reconstruction Algorithm 48 
Figure 3-4 A Probabilistic ResuU Verification Algorithm 57 
Figure 3-5 A Deterministic Result Verification Algorithm 58 
Figure 4-1 The ATIR System and Network Layers 73 
Figure 4-2 An ATIR System Architecture in a Replication Setting 74 
Figure 4-3 The ATIR Library Main APIs 78 
Figure 4-4 Message Format for Queries 85 
Figure 4-5 Message Format for Answers 85 
Figure 5-1 A Timing Diagram for ATIR Services 93 
Figure 5-2 Measured and Predicted One-way Host Processing 100 
Figure 5-3 Measured and Predicted One-way Communication 102 
Figure 5-4 Measured and Predicted TPQ vs. Query Sizes 104 
Figure 5-5 Measured and Predicted TPA vs. View Sizes 104 
Figure 5-6 Measured and Predicated TCV vs. View Size 106 
Figure 5-7 Measured and Predicted TRV vs. Optimised Result Sizes 107 
Figure 5-8 Measure and Predicted TTPs of pATIR 107 
Figure 5-9 Relative Prediction Error of the TTPs of pATIR 109 
Figure 5-10 Measured TTPs of pATIR vs. Original Result Sizes 110 
Figure 5-11 TTPs of pATIR with Varying Undetected Error Rates 112 
Figure 5-12 Performance Proportion of Each Component in TTP of ATIR 114 
Figure 5-13 dATDR vs. pATIR (Small Data Sizes) 115 
Figure 5-14 dATIR vs pATIR (Large Data Sizes) 116 
Figure 5-15 ATIR in Normal vs. Crashed Situations 117 
Figure 5-16 Undetected Error Rate vs. Number of Flipped Characters 120 
Figure 5-17 TTP of pATIR in Normal and Malicious Faults 120 
Figure 5-18 TTPs of PIR-256, pATIR-257, and SQL 121 
V I 
List of Tables 
Table 3-1 A Comparison of PIR Schemes 68 
Table 5-1 Notations for Performance Models 90 
Table 5-2 Measured Host Processing Time (^ is) 100 
Table 5-3 Parameters of One-way HPT 100 
Table 5-4 Measured Roimdtrip Time and One-way Communication Time 101 
Table 5-5 Parameters of One-way Network Communication Time 102 
Table 5-6 Protocol Constants 102 
Table 5-7 Message Preparation Parameters (ATIR) 103 
Table 5-8 Query Sizes, View Sizes, Message Sizes and Communication Time of ATIR... 106 
Table 5-9 Parameters of TCV 106 
Table 5-10 Reconstruction and Verification (ATIR): parameters 107 
Table 5-11 The Mapping between UER and p 112 
V l l 
Acronyms 
ATIR Attack Tolerant Information Retrieval 
cPIR computational Private Information Retrieval 
dATIR deterministic Attack Tolerant Information Retrieval 
hPIR hardware-based Private Information Retrieval 
LAN Local Area Network 
pATIR probabilistic Attack Tolerant Information Retrieval 
PIR Private Information Retrieval 
rPIR robust Private Information Retrieval 
vm 
The material contained within this thesis has not previously been submitted for a 
degree at the University of Ehirham or any other university. The research reported 
within this thesis has been conducted by the author tmless indicated otherwise. 
Some parts of the work presented in this thesis have previously appeared in the 
following papers: 
[YXBOl] E. Y. Yang, J. Xu and K. H. Bennett, "The SeCode Approach: 
Towards Fault-tolerant and Secure Execution of Mobile Code", in 
Proc. lEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems 
and Networks (DSN'Ol), Goteborg, July 2001, Fast Abstract, 
Supplement, Goteborg, Sweden, 1-4 July 2001, pp. B74-B75. 
[YXB02a] E. Y. Yang, J. Xu and K. H. Bennett, ''Private Information Retrieval 
in the Presence of Malicious Faults", in Proc. 26 IEEE hitemational 
Symposium on Computer Software and Applications (COMPSAC 
2002), Oxford, UK, Aug. 2002, pp. 805-810. 
[YXB02b] E. Y. Yang, J. Xu and K. H. Bennett, "A Fault-Tolerant Approach to 
Secure Information Retrieval, in Proc. 21st IEEE International 
Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS2002), Suita, 
Osaka, Japan, Oct. 2002, pp. 12-21. 
[YXB03] E. Y. Yang, J. Xu, and K. H. Bennett, "Sharing with Limited Trust: 
An Attack-Tolerant Service in Durham e-Demand Project", in Proc. 
UK eScience 2""* All-Hands Meeting, Simon J. Cox Eds., Sept. 2nd-
4th, 2003, Nottingham, U.K., ISBN 1-904425-11-9. 
[YXB04] E. Y. Yang, J. Xu, and K. H. Bennett, "Privacy-Enhanced 
Transactions for Virtual Organisations", in Proc. UK e-Science 3"^  
All-Hands Meeting, Simon J. Cox Eds., 31'' August - 3*^  September, 
2004, Nottingham, UK, ISBN 1-904425-21-6. 
Copyright © Yunwen (Erica) Yang 2004 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without 
their prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. 
IX 
CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
"Even when it is possible to build them, highly trustworthy components are costly." 
Trust in Cyberspace 
Fred B. Schneider, Editor 
Committee on Information Systems Trustworthiness 
National Research Council (USA), 1999. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Querying online information services has gradually become an integral part of our 
daily life and work. The fast-growing development along this direction gives rise to 
significant security and rehability issues, hidividuals become much more concerned 
about online privacy issues than ever. Our society, as a whole, becomes increasingly 
vuhierable to service disruptions. At the same time, the ever-increasing number of 
malicious attacks makes it even more difficult to maintain privacy protection and 
service provision in online services. There is an urgent need for techniques which 
can protect users' privacy as well as simultaneously ensure highly available services 
even in the presence of malicious attacks. 
There has been considerable research effort put into online privacy protection. 
One such effort is Private Information Retrieval (PIR), an approach aiming to protect 
a user's privacy by keeping the intention of queries secret fi-om curious database 
servers [CGKS95]. The principle of PIR is simple: instead of asking for one specific 
data item, a user queries an entire database. As a result, each data item is equally 
likely to be the one of interest, rendering the server unable to figure out the user's 
actual intention. PER. is based on a passive attack model where the server is deemed 
to be controlled by an attacker. In this model, an attacker only passively observes 
queries without modifying the execution flow of PIR protocols. This simplified 
assumption about attackers can easily be invalid due to the ever-increasing presence 
of malicious attacks. Once occupying the server (i.e. inside the trust perimeter of a 
system) and having gathered private information, a benign attacker can easily turn 
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into a malicious one. For example, due to the ease of gathering inside information, 
the attacker can easily forge bogus requests and cause denial-of-service attacks. This 
type of attacks is very difficult to detect and eliminate because such requests are not 
distinguishable from legitimate ones. The attacker may even control the server to 
deliver purposefully manipulated answers. Again, such answers are also 
indistinguishable from what a server is supposed to return in normal circumstances. 
The majority of progress made along the line of FIR is based on a passive attack 
model [CGKS95, Amb97, BIMOO, BIOl, BIKR02, SSOl, IS03, Aso04, IS04]. 
Various communication efficient schemes have been proposed to solve the PIR 
problem. In confrast, little is known about extending PIR in an active attack model, a 
more realistic model making little assumptions on the behaviours of faulty 
components. There are basically two approaches of dealing with malicious attackers: 
attack detection/prevention and attack tolerance. Traditionally, attack 
detection/prevention is heavily used to keep attackers outside a system, such as using 
cryptographic algorithms and firewalls. EKie to the increasing size and complexity of 
computer systems, preventing attackers from hacking into a system becomes more 
costly and very difficult. Another approach for dealing with attacks is through the 
tolerance paradigm. Instead of purely preventing every single attack, a system is 
designed to tolerate attacks by allowing some components to be compromised and 
trigger mechanisms to ensure the delivery of correct services despite attacks 
[VNC03]. For example, by replicating a set of servers and using fault tolerant 
algorithms to identify correct results, the system can still deliver a correct service as 
promised in spite of the corruption of some of the servers. BFT [CasOl], COCA 
[ZRS02], and SINTRA [CP02] are three representative systems. All three systems 
are based on the state machine replication approach [Sch90] along the tolerance 
paradigm. 
The majority of PIR research aims to demonsfrate theoretical feasibilities and 
many obstacles preclude them from being used in practice. This is mainly due to two 
reasons: i) the standard database model of PIR schemes is only of theoretical interest 
(e.g. [SSOl, YXB02a, YXB02b, IS03, Aso04, IS04]); hence, it is difficult to 
implement PIR schemes; and ii) PIR schemes are perceived to be computationally 
expensive (e.g. [BIMOO, Kus03]). Initiated by IBM research in 2001 [SSOl], 
researchers have begun to investigate practical PIR schemes such as those presented 
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in [YXB02a, YXB02b, YXB03, IS03, Aso04, IS04]. However, some of these 
systems [IS03, Aso04, IS04] build on the assumption that the database server will 
use secure hardware to correctly perform PIR operations. This assimiption 
significantly restricts the scalability of these solutions and aggravates the 
computation problem of PIR. Some early performance studies (e.g. [SSOl, IS03, 
Aso04]) show that this approach is expensive which in turn limits its practicability. 
The thesis aims to tackle the Attack Tolerant Information Retrieval (ATIR) 
problem which is an extension of the FIR problem by taking malicious attacks into 
account. 
1.2 Research Challenges 
This section outlines the general research challenges of achieving ATIR while 
remaining practical to be implemented and be reasonably deployable. This will help 
to draw the research boundary of this thesis. Based on our understanding of the 
existing research on PIR and research on attack tolerance, the following five ATIR 
research challenges are derived. 
1) Communication Complexity 
Considerable research has been conducted on deriving communication efficient PIR 
schemes, such as those presented at [CGKS95, Amb97, BIOl, BIKR02, BIMOO, 
BS02]. This is a well-explored area. The problem and the basic approaches for 
tackling the challenge are relatively well understood. Recent studies show that some 
existing PIR schemes already have close to optimal communication complexity 
[WW04, Cha04]. In contrast, many other aspects of PIR, for example, the practical 
aspects, remain much less understood. Our research is focussed on those aspects by 
build on existing PIR schemes which already have a reasonable level of 
communication complexity. 
2) Trust Assumptions 
Existing PIR schemes often rely on unrealistic trust assumptions before and during 
the processing of PIR queries. The use of unrealistic trust assumptions restricts the 
applicability of these schemes. Existing attack-tolerant systems also make various 
degrees of trust assumptions on external trusted parties: a trusted third party is often 
required to securely and manually set up these systems. Trust assumptions are also 
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placed during the processing stages of all hardware-based PIR systems. For example, 
computation with secure hardware [SSOl, IS03, AF02] in the system and the reliance 
on an external avixiUary server [GGM98] are the typical trust assumptions in current 
PIR research. With the use of these trust assimiptions at various stages of deploying a 
system, the system is restiicted to a static group membership. Dynamic addition and 
removal of members is cosfly and requires the involvement of trusted third parties 
(e.g. human operators). Consequentiy, such a system cannot cope with the 
dynamicity membership requirement of its environment. 
3) Use of Replication 
In PIR, replication is introduced as a fundamental means to reduce the 
conununication complexity of unconditionally secure PIR schemes [CGKS95]. PIR 
schemes themselves do not provide mechanisms to support replication but rely on 
existing well-established replications protocols to disseminate updates and manage 
consistency among replicated servers. An inherent problem with replication is 
scalability, because replication protocols heavily rely on message passing to 
coordinate and synchronise among replicas. Replication should be used with care. In 
principle, the more rephcated servers a PIR scheme uses the better communication 
complexity it can achieve. It becomes a challenge to find a balanced degree of 
replication which can provide reduced communication complexity while not being 
too costiy. 
4) Implementation 
The standard PIR database model is too restrictive to be integrated with commercial 
database technologies. Most existing PIR schemes only demonstrate the theoretical 
feasibility of constructing such schemes, and littie practical unplementations of these 
schemes have been attempted. Extending the model is mandatory i f the technique is 
to be used to implement a real service. Some PIR schemes and corresponding 
implementations use secure hardware to perform PIR operations. Due to its 
processing limitation, the performance shown by the secure-hardware based 
implementations [SSOl, IS03, Aso04] is not satisfactory. 
5) Processing Costs 
It is often envisaged that PIR processing is computationally expensive, which is the 
main motivation for the work presented in [KusOB, IS03, SSOl, AF02, BIMOO]). Pre-
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processing was introduced into various PIR schemes as a means to reduce online 
processing costs [BIMOO, IS03, AF02, IS04, Aso04]. However, pre-processing is still 
costly: some recent experimental results show that the pre-processing time for secin-e 
hardware-based PIR schemes is in the order of several hours whereas the online 
processing time for retrieving one single record is in the order of several minutes 
[IS03, AF02, Aso04]. Hence, fi-om a practical point of view, processing cost is still a 
major decisive factor determining the real impact of ATIR technologies. Although 
these implementations demonstrate the practicability of such PIR schemes, the 
performance shown by the results is far worse than the performance of state of the art 
database technologies. 
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to tiie state-of-the-art security and fault tolerance research by 
presenting a new approach for achieving an adjustable level of privacy protection 
whilst maintaining a high level of service provision in the presence of malicious 
attacks. Specifically, the thesis tackles a number of less tmderstood open research 
challenges (challenges 2-5 presented in the previous section) in PIR research and 
provides a satisfactory answer to these challenges. In particular, this thesis 
contributes to the state-of-the-art PIR research and the state-of-the-practice practical 
PIR implementation in the following aspects. 
ATIR requires limited trust assumptions on remote execution environment. With 
neither relying on secure hardware nor trusted third parties on remote execution 
environment, replication-based ATIR schemes are developed to protect the privacy 
of a user and ensure the provision of an information retrieval service. Unlike existing 
practical PIR approaches, the ATIR approach does not require databases to be pre-
processed by encryption or be periodically shuffled. 
Compared with the best solution known so far, the number of replicated servers 
required by ATIR is reduced to be optimal in the sense that no additional servers are 
required to satisfy the privacy property of ATIR. To tolerate any collusion of up to 
/ servers and up to / faulty (crashed or malicious) servers in a system with k 
replicated servers, ATIR ensures the privacy and correctness properties, provided 
ihai k> t+f+ \ where f > I and/< ^ The best solution (i.e. [BS02]) with an 
0(«^<*-'""J) communication complexity requires k(>3t+\) repUcated servers to cope 
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with the same situation. In confrast, ATIR uses fewer servers with a much improved 
communication cost, 0(n^) (where n is the size of a database managed by a server). 
The usefiihiess and practicability of ATIR is proved by practical implementation 
on realistic databases with good performance. The implemented systems are purely 
based on software. Neither secure hardware nor trusted third parties are needed to 
implement and deploy these systems. Experimental results show that the 
implemented systems also perform well in both normal and simulated faulty 
circxraistances. The PIR and ATIR implementations build upon widely used database 
technologies (MySQL). No modification of the underlying database servers is 
required to support the deployment of the services. 
Moreover, the experimental results show that the Total Time for Processing (TTP) 
of using PIR and ATIR services are both well imder half a second for calculating 
over data sets of a size ranging from 100KB to 1MB in normal circumstances. The 
ATIR services maintain the same level of performance even in the presence of the 
simulated attacks. 
1.4 Thesis Organisation 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. 
Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive survey on the following topics. The basic 
concepts and terminologies used by this thesis are presented first. A classification of 
attack models and a discussion on the relationship between these models are then 
followed. As a first line of defence against attacks, privacy protection techniques are 
categorised and their principles are described. We then present a survey of the PIR 
model, schemes and extensions which is followed by a review and discussion of 
attack tolerant techniques used in defending against active attacks. A review of 
common assumptions used by attack-tolerant approaches in designing and deploying 
distributed systems is given. 
Chapter 3 presents the system model, and construction of ATIR schemes. In 
particular, we show the link among three basic sfrategies used in ATIR schemes, 
which are privacy protection, error detection and attack tolerance. We analyse the 
intrinsic difficulties of using conventional error detection techniques in the settings 
of ATIR. We also present two ATIR schemes: one deterministic and one 
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probabilistic for ensuring information theoretic privacy protection and service 
correctness even in the presence of malicious attacks. Both schemes are replication-
based. This chapter also offers a thorough comparison between ATIR and related 
PIR schemes. 
Chapter 4 describes the architecture of ATIR systems and the realisation of ATIR 
schemes. Several important design and implementation issues are discussed. In 
particular, we describe how to extend the database model for performing ATIR 
computations. 
Chapter 5 presents experimental results of this thesis. This chapter is organised 
into three parts. At first, we develop an analytic model for the performance of the 
ATIR service implemented. The model is used to validate the performance 
measurements of the experiments conducted. We then examine the impacts of 
various major parameters on the total processing time of an ATIR service in normal 
circumstances. The performance comparison between a probabilistic ATER and a 
deterministic ATIR is then presented. Finally, we investigate the performance of an 
ATIR service in the presence of various simulated (crashed and malicious) faults. 
Chapter 6 recaps the main contributions made by this thesis, discusses the future 
work, and concludes the thesis. 
CHAPTER TWO. COPING wimATTACKS 
Chapter 2 Backgrounds Coping with 
This chapter reviews the state-of-the-art research efforts for coping with attacks in 
distributed systems. When attacks against computer systems are discussed, we 
should clearly state the following: i) types of systems being considered; ii) 
assumptions about system design, implementation, and deployment; iii) types of 
attacks that are defended. The first three sections of this chapter examine these issues 
in turn, hi Section 2.1 we describe a general model for distributed systems and a 
cUent/server system model. In Section 2.2 we present and discuss two attack models: 
a passive and an active attack model, hi Section 2.3 we review privacy protection 
techniques for defending against passive attacks and in Section 2.4 we present a 
survey on PIR research, hi section 2.5, we focus on attack-tolerant techniques and 
systems for coping with active attacks. 
2.1 Basic Concepts and Terminologies 
This section describes a conceptual system model which will be used throughout this 
thesis. We will then emphasize the client/server design paradigm, a widely used 
structuring technique for designing distributed systems. 
2.1.1 Systems, Services, and Components 
A system is an entity composed of multiple interacting components which are under 
the control of a system design to deliver a service to other entities, i.e. other systems 
[PSOl]. The other entities make up the environment for the system considered. A 
system design can be viewed as a special component of the system which not only 
defines the interactions among the components in the system but the interactions 
between the system and the environment that the system services [Xu04]. 








Figure 2-1 A Generalised Conceptual System Model (Adapted from [Xu04]) 
Figure 2-1 depicts a generalised conceptual model of a system and the system 
environment it services. From the diagram, we can see that the systems in the 
environment are loosely coupled since they may or may not interact with each other. 
The system model is recursive in nature. The components in the system can be 
decomposed into sub-components. These sub-components in turn can be fiirther 
decomposed, and so on. The decomposition stops when the component is atomic (i.e. 
not divisible). The divisibility depends on the level of abstraction needed [HW92]. 
2.1.2 The Client/Server System Model 
Distributed systems usually are structured into one of the following four design 
paradigms: client/server, remote evaluation, code on demand, and mobile agent 
[FPV98]. It is important to note that design paradigms are independent of any 
particular programming languages, message transportation mechanisms and 
implementation technologies. The principle of our thesis applies to all of these 
paradigms. However, for simplicity of presentation, the client/server design 
paradigm will be emphasized. 
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system 






Figure 2-2 A System Model of a Client/Server Distributed System 
As illustrated in Figure 2-2, a client/server distributed system is structured into 
two components: a client and a server. The client and the server interact with each 
other following a pre-defined protocol specified in the system design. The client and 
the server often run on separate processing nodes in a communication network. The 
server manages resources and defines operations that are exported to the client. The 
chent sends a request message to invoke the operations provided by the server and 
receives a reply message in the opposite direction. The system can interact with the 
system (execution) environment in at least two ways. First, the system delivers a 
service to the environment by taking inputs firom a system user and returning outputs 
back. The user is a special system in the environment that the system considered 
aims to service. Second, the interactions between the client and the server are built 
on top of a conmiunication network which is also a part of the system environment. 
In this case, there is no interaction between the user and the network. 
2.1.3 Security FaUures 
When being deployed in an error-prone environment, the system is often required to 
be dependable. A dependable system continues to deliver the intended service 
despite the occurrence of faults. Dependability is defined as the property of a 
computer system such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service the 
system delivers [Lap92]. A dependable system needs to ensure that the service is 
available, reliable, safe, and secure. When a service delivered by a system derivates 
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fi-om what it intends for (e.g. firom the design specification), this event is defined as a 
system failure [Lap95]. An error is that part of the system state liable to l e ^ to the 
failure [Lap92]. A fault is a hypothesised cause of an error [Lap92]. 
This dissertation focuses on security failures. Security is dependability with 
respect to the prevention of unauthorised access and/or handling of information 
[Lap92]. Security consists of three properties: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability. A security failure occurs when one or more of these properties are 
violated. A security error is that part of the system state leading to the security failvire. 
A security fault is the hypothesised cause of a security error. A security failure may 
be neither detectable, nor observable. For example, when the confidentiality of a 
piece of information is breached, a security failure occurs. However, due to the 
passive nature of information leakage, such a fault may not manifest itself as a 
detectable/observable failure. 
2.2 Attack Models 
We now examine how security properties of a service can be violated and the effects 
of such violations to the service fi-om a security perspective. Security violations are 
often caused by attacks. An attack is defined as an intentional fault aiming to violate 
security properties of a service. Therefore, an attack is a type of fault. Consequently, 
attack models are a subset of fault models. Attack models are often used to categorise 
the aspects (e.g. types and assumptions) of attacks considered in a system design, 
implementation and deployment. 
2.2.1 Classification of Attacks 
The degree of security violations that may be caused by attackers is often used to 
characterise the power of attackers. As a result of the characterisation, system-level 
attacks are classified following two types of attack model: 
® Passive attack model: passive attacks only involve monitoring, intercepting, or 
eavesdropping on information. Passive attacks often lead to the violation of the 
confidentiality property, or traffic analysis attacks. 
« Active attack model: active attacks often build on passive attacks and involve 
intercepting, modifying, and probably fabricating information. Active attacks 
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often lead to the violation of all security properties (i.e. confidentiality, 
mtegrity and availability), 
hi real world, attackers often rely on the information gained through passive 
attacks to laimch active attacks. Successive active attacks can also involve 
information disclosure, hence, causing the violation of confidentiality property. 
Therefore, the active attack model subsumes the passive one. 
Classified by their effect (i.e. severity) on the components of the system, active 
attacks can lead to two types of failures: benign failures and maUcious (also referred 
as Byzantine) failures [CDKOl pp. 56, Mul93 pp. 100]. Examples of benign failures 
include fail-stop, crash, and omission failures. Examples of malicious failures 
include arbitrary execution of a predefined protocol and/or malicious corruption of 
databases. The component that exhibits failures is described as a faulty component. 
The purpose of having two attack models is to simplify the design of security 
protocols and to make realistic assumptions against attacks. Protocols with weak 
assumptions are often too expensive to be deployed. Therefore protocols design 
typically rehes on certain assumptions [AndOl]. Assumptions are a double-edged 
sword. Without making assumptions, it is impossible to derive effective and useful 
protocols. Protocols can be made simple with certain assumptions. However, by 
invalidating assumptions of a system, the system will fail easily. The key issue is 
what are the vaUd assumptions, and under what circumstances. 
2.2.2 Relations between Attack Models 
Active attacks are often built upon findings through passive attacks because 
information collected during passive attacks is useful for conducting active attacks in 
the later stage. Both attack models apply to individual components, interactions 
among components, and a system as a whole. Consider a hospital database system 
which provides information about patients to authorised doctors. A doctor uses the 
client software installed on his desktop to access the database server. There is a 
communication network connecting the client and the server. In its simplest form, the 
system is composed of two components: the client software and the database server. 
I f the operator only steals patients' information, the operator only conducts a passive 
attack which targets an individual component. I f someone only manages to 
eavesdrop on the communication network, this is an attack against the interaction 
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between the client and the server. The system administrator can easily launch attacks 
against the entire system. 
From a system's point of view, attackers can be classified into two categories: 
outsiders and insiders. In this thesis, we only consider closed systems. A closed 
system is defined as a system which has a clearly defined system boxmdary. 
According to the MAFTIA [PSOl] report, an outsider is defined as "a person who has 
no privilege, i.e. no rights to any object in the system" whereas an insider is "any 
individual who has some privileges, i.e. some rights on objects in the system". 
Attacks launched by insiders are insider attacks whereas attacks launched by 
outsiders are outsider attacks. 
2.2.3 Attacks on Systems and Cryptanalysis 
There are differences between attacks on systems and those on cryptographic 
algorithms. Attacks on systems are the topic we have discussed in this section and 
are the main concern of this thesis. Cryptanalysis is the science and art of finding the 
weakness in cryptographic algorithms. The aims of attackers, targets and methods of 
attacks are different. Although a successful attack on cryptographic algorithms can 
lead to successful attacks on systems (i.e. those use these algorithms), current 
research tends to treat them separately. Cryptographic algorithms are building blocks 
of secure computer systems and often are assumed to be secure. Therefore, there is a 
need to clarify the common security assumptions made when designing and 
implementing computer systems. 
A successful attack often leads to information disclosure. Considerable research 
has been done on understanding the effects and deriving effective countermeasures 
against information disclosure caused by the leakage of confidential information. The 
next section focuses on the concepts and approaches of information disclosure 
caused by the violation of personal private information. 
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2.3 Privacy Protection: Defending against Passive Attacks 
The notion of "privacy" is central to many arguments about defending against attacks. 
In security, this term is often used inconsistently and/or loosely defined. For example, 
in [AndOl], Anderson defines the term privacy as follows: 
"Privacy is the ability and/or right to protect your personal secrets; it 
extends to the ability and/or right to prevent invasions of your personal 
space (the exact definition varies quite sharply fi-om one country to 
another). Privacy can extend to fiimilies but not to legal persons such as 
corporations." 
Security Engineering 
- A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems 
Ross Anderson 
2.3.1 Defining Privacy 
In this thesis, our definition of privacy is based on a restricted version of Anderson's 
definition. Privacy is defined as the ability/right to protect one's personal information, 
including secrets, fi:om unsanctioned scrutiny. Examples of private information are 
identity, preference, location, and intention. 
Privacy protection technologies aim at preventing unsanctioned information 
collection of individuals and protecting data that has been collected. This aim should 
be considered in a broad sense. Individuals should have the ownership to their 
private information: it should be up to them to decide who is allowed to access the 
information and how the information is distributed. That is, they should have the 
ability/right to control private information. However, it is often up to others to 
maintain the confidentiality of the information. For example, patient medical records 
are private information of the patient. However, it is often up to the hospital or health 
care personnel to keep them secret. 
In the next section, we present privacy protection techniques which are 
categorised into the following approaches: encryption, anonymity, delegation, 
pseudonym, and poUcy negotiation. 
2.3.2 Privacy througli Encryption 
Encryption is a method of information transformation in which the process 
transforms a piece of private information into an unintelligent form so that the exact 
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content is masked. The design of an inverse process (i.e., decryption) is important to 
the success of encryption. Decryption provides a way to recover scrambled 
information to its original form. Often, this reverse transformation is controlled by 
secret information (e.g., decryption keys) which is only accessible to authorised 
parties. Encryption often relies on number theoretic assumptions, such as the 
computational difficulty of factormg large prime numbers in cryptographic 
algorithms [RSA78]. 
By encrypting private information, its exact content can be hidden fi-om attackers. 
However, once the information is decrypted, few technical measures can prevent 
further dissemination of the information. Performing encrypted computation is the 
approach for protecting the privacy of users without decrypting the content of 
computation. 
There has been a large body of research on encrypted computation. Three methods 
are often used to perform encrypted computation: processing encrypted data [Fei85, 
ALN87, AFK87, BF90], computing with encrypted functions via privacy 
homomoiphism [RAD78, ST98a, ST98b, BreOl], and processing obfiascated 
programs [WDHKOl, ZGZ03]. Unlike normal computation/processing, encrypted 
computation does not need to be decrypted before processing. 
This property is highly attractive because it means that users can utilize resources 
without information about their input data, functions, or program logic, being 
revealed. For certaui applications, such as bioinformatics, proprietary and patented 
programs, this is an appealing feature because these applications often require a large 
amount of computational resources and have significant privacy concerns. 
Currentiy, the first two methods (i.e. processing encrypted data and computing 
with encrypted functions) are restricted to limited types of functions and these 
functions often rely on computational assumptions, such as the difficulty of factoring 
large numbers. The major obstacle to adopting such methods is that there are not 
many functions that can be executed in an encrypted form. The general appHcability 
of constructing and executing obfuscated programs, i.e. the third method, for real 
application also remains to be explored. 
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As a whole, all the research in this area largely focuses on demonstrating the 
theoretical feasibility of using these methods for solving restricted types of problems. 
Although there are potentially huge practical motivations and demand for methods 
that support encrypted computation, it remains to be seen how to extend and apply 
these methods for use in real applications. The state of the art results in this area still 
reside on a theoretical level. Little is known on how to apply them in real 
applications. 
Moreover, all existing work using any of these methods assumes the passive 
attack model, where attackers will execute the predefined protocols correctly. This 
assumption becomes shaky when these methods are appUed to solve privacy 
problems arising in large scale distributed computing, such as mobile code 
applications and Grid applications. The scale and dynamicity of these applications 
demand solutions which do not only protect privacy, but also guarantee the integrity 
of the computation. 
2.3.3 Privacy through Anonymity 
In order to protect the identities and locations of users, anonymity techniques involve 
the use of a large number of intermediate nodes (e.g. computers) to cooperate 
together to perform an operation. When a user sends a request, the request is often 
routed through these intermediate nodes. It is therefore difficult for an observer to 
determine the exact information (e.g. the sending location) of the request. 
For example, by routing an email through a large number of intermediated nodes 
before sending it to the receiver, the identity and location of the sender can be hidden. 
Anyone in the participant set can be the one who sends the request and the initial 
origin of the request. Initiated by Chaum in 1981 [ChaSl], there has been a large 
body of work (e.g. [ChaSS, Wai89, RR98, MCOO]) in this area. This work can be 
classified into two categories: anonymous remailers and anonymous web browsing. 
Anonymous remailers (e.g. MIX networks [Cha81, Cha88] and MIXMASTER 
[MCOO]) aim to protect the identity and original location of email senders. 
Anonymous web browsing techniques protect the identity and/or location of web 
users and examples of such are CROWS [RR98], onion routing [GRS99], and Web 
MEXes [BFKOO]. The research in this area is relatively well developed and systems 
(e.g. Zero-Knowledge System's Freedom Network [BSGQO]) with varying degrees of 
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privacy properties and involvement fi-om commercial companies have been 
developed. 
In theory, the larger the population is, the harder it becomes to identify and pin-
point the identity and exact location of the originator. Usually, the provision of 
anonymity-based techniques heavily relies on the availability of a large number of 
trusted intermediaries. These techniques are also coupled with encryption to fiirther 
protect otiier private information of users, such as authorships and censorship. 
Recently, research has been begun to look at the privacy protection issues in the 
presence of certain types of attacks on anonymous networks (e.g. [Dan03]). 
2.3.4 Privacy througli Delegation 
Some examples of this approach are Anonymizer [Ano04] and Rewebber [Rew04]. 
These web sites act as a "proxy server" to request senders. Using these websites, the 
identity, IP address, and other private information of a requestor can be hidden fi-om 
web site owners. The retrieved pages are routed through these servers back to 
senders. One distinct feature about Rewebber.com is that it masks the location of 
documents requested fi-om the request sender. This approach can protect the privacy 
of the documait publisher. Both techniques rely on the trustworthiness of proxy 
servers to provide privacy protection. 
A special form of privacy protection through delegation is the use of secure 
hardware. In this case, privacy protection is delegated to a maintainer or operator of a 
piece of trusted hardware which is assumed to be tamper-resistant (i.e. no secrets will 
be leaked even i f the hardware itself has been damaged). Secure co-processors are 
often used to store private information and/or perform security critical operations. 
There remain several problems with the use of secure co-processors (for details, 
readers are referred to Section 2.5.5). Also, the memory and processing capability of 
secure hardware is limited, which means that they may not be applicable for 
computationally intensive applications. 
2.3.5 Privacy through Pseudonym 
Identity privacy has become one of the major security issues of Internet applications 
because of the rapidly emerging threat of identity theft [DOJOO]. To combat identity 
theft and reduce the damaging consequences of misusing personal information, 
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pseudonym techniques have been used for depersonalise uniquely identifiable 
information fi-om transactions. To hide the exact information about a user, 
pseudonym systems replace the personal information with randomly generated 
pseudo-information. 
Without using a user's real identity, the design and unplementation of 
authentication and authorisation services for pseudonym systems become a challenge. 
Currently, there are two basic approaches to address this problem. Both do rely on a 
universally trusted authority to implement these services. For example, this is exactly 
the strategy adopted by the IBM's IDEMDC system [CH02]. Alternatively, one can 
employ a distiibuted solution, such as the one used by tiie Shibboleth framework 
[CE02]. Shibboleth, by itself, does not tie application developers to any specific 
authentication mechanisms. Authentication in Shibboleth relies on the existing 
security mfrastructure provided by individual participating organisations. After a 
user has been authenticated by its origin organisation, depersonalised information is 
sent to a foreign organisation to authorise the user to certain resources. In this sense. 
Shibboleth provides a privacy-preserving authorisation to users. 
2.3.6 Privacy through Negotiation 
There are other approaches for privacy protection, such as using privacy policy 
negotiation mechanisms. The focus of existing work aims to automate the policy 
checking and negotiation processes. The success of these techniques often depends 
on the "good faith" of service providers. In this approach, a user can specify their 
privacy preference and negotiate with servers before a transaction begins. Currentiy, 
the work in this area aims to provide standard ways for achieving policy negotiations 
and examples using this approach include P3P [P3P01] and Appel [Appel02]. 
2.3.7 Privacy through Secret Sharing 
Secret Sharing [Sha79, Bla79] is a classical security approach for ensuring the 
confidentiality and availability of private information, such as long term signing keys 
and personal private keys. With the use of secret sharing techniques, a secret, in its 
simplest form - a number - is split into randomly generated shares which are 
distributed to mutually independent participants. A threshold number of shares can 
be used to reconstruct the original secret. The loss of secrets usually causes 
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catastrophic consequence. For example, the loss of signing keys of a Certification 
Authority invalidates all the certificates issued whereas the compromise of the latter 
leads to the potential for invasion of private/confidential conmiunication or data. For 
example, tiie COCA system [ZSR02] and SINTRA system [CP02] use secret sharing 
techniques to protect service private key(s). 
Secret sharing has also been used to protect the privacy of authors in the 
application of online pubUcations. For example, Publius [WRCOO] uses secret 
sharing to provide privacy protection for authors when they publish documents 
through the Publius system. 
2.4 Private Information Retrieval (PIR): Model, Schemes, and 
Extensions 
This section presents the background on the PIR problem [CGKS95] and a survey of 
PER schemes. 
2.4.1 The PIR Problem 
Consider a database query scenario [CGKS95]. An investor queries a stock share 
database for the value of a stock share but s/he doesn't want to disclose the identity 
of the specific stock of interest. This is the classical motivating example of the PIR 
problem which is concerned with querying databases privately - without revealing 
the identity (i.e. intention) of the specific data item of interest to the database owner. 
2.4.2 The PIR Model 
The PIR problem is often considered in the following model. The database is 
modelled as a binary string x = x\...x„, where each bit represents a data item in the 
database, the suffix is the index of each data item, and n is the size of the database. 
The user knows an index / of a data item jc, and is interested in getting Xi. With a 
single server, in order to protect the privacy of the user without leaking any 
information about the identity to the database server, the user has to download the 
entire database and perform the query locally [CGKS95]. Essentially, this result 
states that it is impossible to obtain unconditional privacy protection with the use of a 
single server. The communication complexity of this solution is 0(n). When a PIR 
scheme has communication complexity 0(/i), it is a tiivial solution [CGKS95]. The 
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communication overhead of this solution prohibits its practical usage. Also, 
downloading is simply not a practical choice in some circumstances (e.g. patients' 
data or paid services) due to the proprietary nature of data and/or cost issues. 
Therefore, reducing communication complexity becomes one of the major issues in 
the PIR research, that is, achieving non-trivial communication complexity becomes 
one of the main goals in current PIR research. 
PIR schemes are concerned about hiding the user's intention (i.e. the index /) firom 
the server. PIR schemes should have less than 0(n) communication complexity. 
From a practical point of view, the PIR problem has a wide range of applications in 
tiie traditional security and privacy sensitive domains, such as banking, insurance, 
and e-govemment. In such domains, a vast amount of research has been done in 
protecting servers' privacy whilst users' privacy protection problems remain largely 
open. 
All PIR schemes consider a passive server attack model where the attacker who 
controls the server (s) can only passively observe the processing on the server(s) and 
messages exchanged between the user and the server (s). In the passive attack model, 
PIR schemes need to consider only the privacy of users. However, as indicated in 
Section 2.2, the passive attack model is a restiicted version of an active attack model, 
where an attacker is assumed to be only interested in finding out the identity of the 
data item but follows the protocol correctly. 
2.4.3 Information Theoretic PIR Schemes 
A high level overview of a PIR scheme is described as follows to explain tiie 
principle of PIR schemes. A PIR scheme consists of three algorithms: a query 
algorithm, an answer algorithm, and a reconstruction algorithm. At first, the index of 
the data item - an integer - is first transformed into a sequence of numbers following 
the query algorithm by the user. The sequence is then sent to the server and used as 
inputs for the answer algorithm. The answer algorithm processes through each record 
in the entire database and produces an answer. Based on the answer returned, the 
user executes the reconstruction algorithm to produce a result. Since every record in 
the database is involved in the server side processing, the server has no way to figure 
out the information about the intended data item. Therefore, in principle, all PIR 
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schemes are based on the privacy through anonymity approach for protecting users' 
privacy. 
In order to achieve non-trivial communication complexity, two approaches have 
been derived to achieve better communication complexity while still maintaining 
privacy protection for users. The first approach is to relax the single server 
requirement to the use of multiple servers. Usmg this approach, the PIR research has 
been explored along two directions. One can either use multiple replicated servers 
(i.e. replicas) to store identical copies of data. This is the approach used by [CGKS95, 
Amb97, BIOl, BIKR02]). Also, auxiliary servers have been introduced to store 
randomised data before a PIR scheme begms. This is the approach used by [GGM98]. 
hi the repUcation based PIR schemes, such as [CGKS95, IK99, BIOl, BIKR02, 
Amb97], identical database servers are replicated on separate nodes of a distiibuted 
system. It is assumed that communication between the repUcated servers is restiicted. 
No more than ^ (/ ^  1) servers are allowed to communicate with each other so that the 
servers cannot collude together in trymg to violate the user's privacy. Except in one 
case [CG97], all replication based PIR schemes provide privacy guarantee 
vinconditionally. No information about the user' intention can be obtained by the 
servers. 
In the replicated-server setting, Beimel et. al. in [BIKR02] construct several 
information theoretic PIR schemes with less than 0(n'^ ^^*''^ ) communication 
complexify for ^  > 3. These are the best PIR schemes in a repHcation setting when 
this thesis is written. However, a small number of replicated servers is particular 
interesting because they place less demand on the deployment setting. At the time 
this thesis is written (i.e. September 2004), the minimum number of servers required 
by PIR schemes is two. The best communication complexity of two-server PIR 
schemes is 0{n^'\ which is achieved in [CGKS95, BIKR02]. 
2.4.4 Computational PIR Schemes 
Alternatively, the second approach relaxes the privacy requirement from 
unconditionally secure to computationally secure. Hence, computational PIR (cPIR) 
schemes are constiaicted based on computational assumptions. With this approach, 
one can construct single-server PER. schemes to protect the users' privacy. Loosely 
speaking, unconditional privacy means the queries cannot provide any useful 
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information to computational unbounded servers with respect to the intention of the 
user. The implication of this approach is that the attacker who controls the server has 
to be assumed to be computationally bounded. 
Chor and Gilboa [CG97] proposed the first cPIR scheme with the use of (at least) 
two non-communicating servers and this scheme assimies the existence of pseudo 
random number generators. The communication complexity of this scheme is 0(n^ 
communication complexity for any positive real number £> 0. The communication 
restriction and the use of multiple servers are essential in the first cPIR scheme since 
the collusion between servers can completely reveal the user's privacy. 
In the same year, Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [K097] proposed the first single-
server cPIR scheme based on Quadratic Residuosity Assumption [GM84]. The work 
first shows the possibility of getting rid of the multiple-server setting with the use of 
a well estabUshed cryptographic problem. The communication complexity of their 
scheme is also 0(n% Yamamura and Saito in [YS03] propose a single-server cPIR 
scheme of communication complexity 0(n% where c > 0, based on the subgroup 
membership problem. 
Subsequently, Cachin, Micali, and Stadler [CMS99] presented the first single-
server cPIR scheme of polylogarithm communication complexity based on a 
somehow less well-known number theoretic assvimption O-hiding assumption. 
Recent studies show that some existing single-server PIR schemes already have 
close to optimal communication complexity [WW04]. As long as these problems are 
still hard to solve in a computational sense, the user's privacy is preserved. The 
relaxation of the privacy requirement in computational PIR schemes is an important 
step towards a single server PIR scheme which is more interesting in practice due to 
the replication setting of unconditionally secure PIR schemes. 
2.4.5 PIR Extensions 
The PIR model has been extended along several directions. Symmetric PIR schemes 
(SPIR) [GIK+98] were proposed to protect both the privacy of database servers and 
users. SPIR schemes ensure that a curious user (even not correctly executing a SPIR 
scheme) cannot obtain extra information firom the database except the single bit of 
the data item originally intended for. 
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Gertner et. al. in [GGM98] propose a random server model for achieving 
unconditional privacy protection without using replication. Secret sharing schemes 
[Sha79] are used to generate the contents of a number of auxiliary databases 
randomly based on the content of the original database. Even an attacker can observe 
the processing on all auxiliary databases; no information about the user's privacy 
wil l be revealed. However, the attacker is assumed to not be able to access the 
original database. To complete a PIR scheme, the user needs to access all databases, 
including the original and auxiliary ones. 
The PIR model assumes that the user knows the index of the data item of interest. 
In practice, the index information is not always readily available. A database is 
typically presented by keywords. Chor et. al. [CGN98] extends the PIR model with 
added keyword search capability. In their schemes, the database owner is required to 
insert a sequence of keywords (binary strings) into a data structure which supports 
the search fimction. The user and the database collaboratively finish a sequence of 
computations in a fixed number of rounds. The result of each computation 
determines the address of the keyword to be fetched in the next round. The address is 
used to perform a PIR scheme to fetch the data item accordingly. No modification of 
the database and underlying data structures is required to support these schemes. 
These extensions are based on the standard binary bit model and a passive server 
attack model. Consequently, all database servers are assumed to execute protocols 
correctly. They all add a constant level of complexities (botii conomunication and 
computation) to the standard PIR schemes. However, the levels of complexities are 
added at different stages of PIR processing. The random server model based PIR 
schemes require an introduction of a number of additional auxiliary servers with 
restricted communication among them before the PIR processing begins. 
The keyword-based PIR schemes need a modification of the original database to 
support the search facility and a constant number of execution rounds is needed to 
complete a keyword-based PIR scheme. Finally, the databases in SPIR schemes do 
not need to be pre-processed. However, the communication and computation 
complexity of information-theoretic SPIR schemes are much better than those of 
computational SPIR schemes [MalOO pp. 111]. But computational SPIR schemes are 
more attractive in practice due to their single server setting. 
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Al l these extensions introduce complexities on top of those of standard PIR 
schemes, such as those presented in [CGKS95]. Hence, they may be too costly to be 
implemented. 
2.4.6 P M amd Active Attacks 
The standard PIR model assumes a passive server attack model. In the multiple-
server PIR schemes, only up to a threshold number of servers are allowed to collude 
together to perform passive attacks. In the single-server PIR schemes, the server is 
also restricted to a passive attack model. In reality, once an attacker occupies a server 
or a threshold number of servers, active attacks may be conducted. With the use of an 
active server attack model, PIR schemes need to consider not only the privacy of 
users but also tiie correctness of results. 
The PER. problem has been extended to deal with two types of effects on the 
servers caused by active attacks: crash failures and maUcious (Byzantine) failures. 
Beimel and Stahl in [BS02] refer to the PIR schemes in these failure models as 
robust PIR schemes. Yang, Xu, and Bennett in [YXB02a, YXB02b, YXB03] also 
consider the same problem under these failure models, and the PIR schemes 
developed are called attack-tolerant (fault-tolerant) information retrieval schemes. 
Due to the use of the active attack model, these PIR scheme are required to guarantee 
the privacy of users and ensure the availability and correctness of results even in the 
presence of failures. 
2.4.7 Hardware-toased PIR Schemes 
In [SSOO, SSOl], two researchers Smith and Safford from the IBM Watson 
research centre initiate hardware-based PIR research and propose several PIR 
schemes based on secure co-processors. With the same goal as the research 
conducted in this thesis, hardware-based PER also aims at practical implementation 
and deployment of PIR schemes. This section only provides an overview of 
hardware-based PIR and a comparison between these schemes and the ATIR 
schemes presented in this thesis appear in Section 3.4.2. 
A typical architecture of hardware-based PIR schemes is depicted in Figure 2-3, 
which is adapted from the system architecture presented in [IS03]. In order to hide 
the identity of the intended data item, a host is required to execute the proposed PIR 
schemes inside secure co-processors which are responsible for two tasks: shuffling 
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the database regularly and performing retrieval operations. In some other 
implementations [Aso04], all the tasks are assumed to be performed within one 
single co-processor. 
There are conceptually two types of secure co-processors: a shuffler and a PIR 
server. A shuffler periodically shuffles the records in the database. The shuffled 
records are subsequently encrypted and put back to the database by the shuffler. 
During shuffling, no PIR operations are allowed to be performed on the database. 
The PIR server accepts users' queries, retrieves information from the database, 
and returns encrypted results back to the client. Each record in the database needs to 
be iterated through. (Otherwise, it is clear that the intended data item is not those 
"untouched" records.) 
Encryption keys have to be shared among each pair of secure co-processors and 
between the client and the PIR server. The shadowed boxes in the figure depict the 
places where data is encrypted. The dotted boxes represent the places that 
encryption/decryption operations take place. The information exchanged between the 
client and the secvire co-processors are encrypted so that the server cannot obtain the 
information exchanged. The users' privacy is preserved given that the secure co-
processor(s) is tamper-resistant. 
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Figure 2-3 An Architectural Overview of Hardware-based PIR Schemes 
2.5 Attack Tolerance: Thwarting Active Attacks 
Prevention-based approaches, such as the privacy protection techniques discussed in 
Section 2.3 and 2.4, are not suflBcient to solve the problems caused by attacks, hi 
most real world scenarios, the information collected through passive attacks is often 
used to launch active attacks against a system [Shi04]. To effectively deal with 
attacks, another approach - attack tolerance is therefore introduced and applied to 
system design to prevent the security properties of a system being violated. 
This section is organised as follows, hi Section 2.5.1, the term attack tolerance is 
defined. From Section 2.5.2 to Section 2.5.4, we review three commonly used 
approaches for achieving attack tolerance in designing and deploying distributed 
systems, hi reality, the effectiveness of these approaches heavily relies on the 
validity of the assumptions these approaches make about the deployment 
environment. Hence, in Section 2.5.5, a number of commonly used assumptions 
made by attack tolerant systems are examined and critically discussed. The aim is to 
highlight the risks of making invalid assumptions and to understand the limitations of 
the existing attack tolerance approaches. 
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2.5.1 Definmg Attack Tolerance 
Attack tolerance is a systematic approach for ensuring the delivery of correct 
services in spite of attacks. Specifically, the aim of using attack tolerance approaches 
is to guarantee the security properties of a system despite the occurrences of attacks. 
The aim of an attack-tolerant system is to prevent security faults within some 
components in the system from manifesting themselves as a system security failure. 
Particular emphasis within attack tolerance is placed on the measures of dealing with 
attacks. As indicated in the attack models presented in Section 2.2, passive attacks 
violate the confidentiality property. Hence, they lead to information disclosure. In 
contrast, active attacks may violate all security properties and render service 
disruptions (e.g. unavailability of correct results). The design goal of such systems is 
to provide continued availability and gracefial degradation of system services in the 
presence of attacks, maximising the residual capacity available to legitimate users. 
Attack tolerance research represents an effort in combining and unifying existing 
security and fault tolerance techniques. 
2.5.2 Attack Tolerance through Secret Sharing 
Apart from being used to defend against passive attacks. Secret Sharing techniques 
[Sha79, Bla79] have been widely used in the design of attack-tolerant systems to 
protect secret information, such as long-term encryption keys and private data 
storage, and to ensure service availability in the presence of attacks. 
The security and availability of the information is assured so long as the number 
of corrupted parties does not exceed a predefined threshold. Secret sharing is a 
cryptographic primitive having been widely used to protect the security and 
availability of secret information (see, for example, [Cac03, ZSR02, CP02, CS03]). 
Secret sharing consists of three parts: secret splitting, secret distribution, and 
secret reconstruction. In its simplest form, a secret sharing scheme is a threshold 
scheme by which a secret is randomly split into mutually independent shares which 
can be distributed to mutually suspicious participants. A standard setting of secret 
sharing is to employ a trusted dealer who performs the secret splitting. 
Secure channels are required by secret sharing schemes to ensiire that each share 
remains secret to other participants during transit. Since participants do not trust each 
other, shares are kept secret until secret reconstruction. When the shares are 
disfaibuted, the original secret wi l l be destroyed. Since each share is independent 
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from each other and the splitting is random, each individvial share reveals no 
information about other shares or the secret. That is, none of the participants has any 
knowledge of what other people have. 
There is a reverse process - secret reconstruction. This process is usually done by 
another trusted agent who pulls all the shares from an authorised set of participants 
for recovering the secret. 
Most of existing secret sharing schemes rely on a synchronous communication 
model [Mul03]. Due to the increasing popularity of Internet based attacks, recent 
research in this area focuses on extending the previous techniques in an 
asynchronous setting, such as the Intemet. Secret sharing techniques, in particular 
verifiable secret sharing techniques [Fel87], have been extended to an asynchronous 
setting to deal with active attacks in an asynchronous environment. 
The COCA system [ZRS02], an online certification authority designed and 
developed in the University of Cornell, first propose the Asynchronoxis Proactive 
Secret Sharing (APSS) protocol. The aim of the COCA system is to protect the 
confidentiality of the signing key of an online certification authority and ensure the 
service availability even in the presence of active attacks to an asynchronous system. 
The Delta-4 project developed a distributed fault tolerance framework using secret 
sharing protocol to store sensitive information into non-trusted sites/servers for open 
distributed systems [DBF91]. The Fragmentation-Redundancy-Scattering (FRS) 
technique was developed for tolerating both accidental and intentional faults 
[FDR95]. 
2.5.3 Attack Tolerance through Threshold Cryptography 
Threshold cryptography is a non-trivial extension of secret sharing by allowing the 
cooperation of a number of mutually suspicious participants to complete a task (e.g. 
signature signing) without revealing the secret (e.g. a signing key). For example, in a 
tiireshold signature scheme, a secret signing key is shared among n participants and 
each of them can generate shares of signatures given a message. A valid digital 
signature can be generated from any t+ I valid signature shares and its validity can 
be verified by a publicly known verification key. 
The Stanford's Intrusion Tolerance via Threshold Cryptography project provided 
tools and infrastructure for building intrusion tolerance applications, specifically a 
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Certificate Authority based on distributed RSA signatures, embedded into a web 
server [WMB99]. 
The IDA algorithm [Rab89] has been appUed to protect document integrity in the 
e-Vault system [ICG+98], an online, distributed data repository developed at IBM 
Watson Research. Shared distributed digital signatures are generated by the e-Vault 
system and given to users as a proof of proper storage of documents. The design goal 
of the e-Vault system is to guarantee the secure storage and retrieval of data in a 
distributed storage system. 
In the EU MAFTIA project, the SINTRA system [CP02, CS03] is designed and 
implemented to protect critical online services such as DNS. SINTRA is based on a 
variant of threshold cryptography. 
2.5.4 Attack Tolerance through Proactive Security 
Traditional security mechanisms often assumed that all the security-critical 
components of a system must be secure throughout the hfetime of a system. This 
goal is extremely hard to achieve in real world applications. Instead, the proactive 
security techniques, as proposed in [Jar95, FGM+96, CGH+97, HJJ+97], are based 
on the assumption that an attacker can never compromise more than t components 
during a time period. Provided a sufficient number of critical components in the 
system are secure, the overall system security can be guaranteed even when some 
components have been compromised. Proactive security mechanisms consist of two 
operation stages: distribution of secrets, and periodic refreshment of secrets. For 
example, with the use of secret sharing, shares of a secret can be randomly generated 
and distributed to a set of components in a system. These shares can be refreshed 
periodically without the need to reconstruct the original secret. Notable examples of 
using proactive security include AT&T's Omega project [RFL+96], Byzantine Fault 
Tolerance (BFT) [CL99], and COCA [ZSR02]. 
In the AT&T's Omega project [RFL+96], the principle of proactive security was 
used to build a highly resiHent and distributed key management service - the Rampart 
Toolkit - which can tolerate the arbifrary corruption of some of the servers by an 
attacker. 
Casfro and Liskov [CL99] present a practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) 
algorithm in an asynchronous setting with the use of symmetric key cryptography. 
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BFS - an implementation of BFT on NFS performs very well i f no failures occur. 
BFT heavily rehes on proactive security to recover compromised servers. Periodic 
refi-eshment of secret keys mvalid the information obtained by attackers. 
The Cornell Online Certification Authority (COCA) [ZSR02] also uses the 
principle of proactive security to thwart against active attacks. A l l these systems use 
the proactive security mechanisms to recover compromised components. 
The implementation of proactive security in all these systems relies on the 
availability of tamper-resistant hardware (e.g. secure co-processors) to store 
encryption and signing keys. A l l cryptographic keys are stored within the co-
processors and all security sensitive operations are assumed to be performed by the 
hardware. Hence, even i f a server is compromised, the security of the keys, such as 
the confidentiality of encryption keys and the integrity of verification keys, can still 
be maintained. 
An alternative approach is suggested by Zhou [ZhoOl] to enable proactive security 
without the use of secure hardware, hi this approach, trusted operators are employed 
to manually propagate security keys through secure offline channels. However, this 
approach seems even more restrictive than the secure-hardware approach due to the 
compulsory involvement of regular manual reconfiguration. 
2.5.5 Commonly Used Assumptions 
This section examines some common assumptions made by attack-tolerant systems, 
and aims to highlight the risks of making invalid assumptions and point out the 
limitations of existing attack-tolerant approaches. 
The Soundness of Security Parameters 
When a system incorporates cryptographic algorithms in its design, two assumptions 
are often considered. The first assumption is to assume the security parameters 
chosen for these protocols are sufficient, and that these protocols have been 
implemented properly to ensure the validity of tiieir security properties. It is known 
that some cryptographic algorithms can become vulnerable due to badly chosen 
security parameters and/or poorly implemented algorithms [AndOl, Cop84]. This 
assumption is only justifiable when parameters are carefiiUy chosen and algorithms 
are properly implemented. 
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The Use of Probabilistic Cryptographic Algorithms 
The second assumption assumes cryptographic algorithms employed in the system 
design are perfectiy secure, which is referred to as secure cryptographic algoritiim 
assumption. This is probably the most commonly used security assumption with 
which numerous distributed systems are designed. By perfectly secure, it means that 
cryptographic algorithms ensure security properties with a probability one. In reality, 
tiiese algorithms are often probabiUstic because most of them are based on number 
theoretic assumptions which are probabilistic in nature. For example, all systems 
employing digital signatures rely on this assumption to check message integrity. 
Corrupted messages can only be identified within a certain probability, and there is a 
probability that a corrupted message cannot be identified. Therefore, this assumption 
is also referred to as a perfect failure detector assumption, because probabilistic 
cryptographic algorithms are freated as deterministic. Some example systems using 
tills assumption include COCA [ZSR02], EFT [CL99], and SINTRA [CP02]. 
However, the soundness of this assumption depends on the validity of 
computational assumptions made about signature algorithms. When an assumption of 
such becomes no longer valid, the corresponding cryptographic algorithm wil l not be 
secure. Hence, it is necessary to know the risk of relying on this assumption. 
Risks of Using the Secure Cryptographic Algorithm Assumption 
The rapid development of cryptanalysis often has great implications of invalidating 
previously known-to-be sound cryptographic assumptions. Two examples of 
commonly used cryptographic assumptions are the difficulty of factorising integers 
and the collision-resistant property of hash functions. The popular RSA cryptosystem 
[RSA78] is based on the former whereas MD5 and SHA hash functions are based on 
the latter. 
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In the past, it was believed that the probability of producing collided hashes was 
negligible and it took millions of years to break the computational assumptions i f 
parameters were chosen properly. But now, Wang et. al. [WLF+04] have 
demonsfrated that breaking MD5 takes just a matter of hours using a standard laptop 
computer in the CRYPTO'04 conference! According to a report on CRYPTO'04 
written by Edward W. Felten, 
"Where does this leave us? MD5 is fatally wounded; its use will be 
phased out. SHA-1 is still alive but the vultures are circling. A gradual 
transition away from SHA-1 will now start." 
This latest breakthrough in cryptanalysis of hash functions certainly shakes the 
foundation of collision-resistant property of hash fimctions [McC04] because hash 
functions are widely used in numerous practical secxirity protocols. For example, the 
Apache web server products and Sun Microsystem's Solaris products use MD5 to 
verify the integrity of their software distributions. 
Hash fimctions are the foundation of many areas of modem cryptography, such as 
digital signatures, encryption, authentication, and file integrity checking. For 
example, digital signatures heavily rely on hash functions to produce collision-free 
digests of different messages. Nearly all secure and fault tolerant systems rely on 
digital signatures to detect message corruption during transmission, or to prevent 
corrupted parties from modifying messages sent by correct parties in group 
conmiunication protocols. The importance of the cryptanalysis result means that 
attackers may be able to fabricate a piece of corrupted message to be validated as a 
correct one and hence the authenticity of the message may no longer be guaranteed. 
Therefore, the second assumption is not always sound and it should be often revisited 
when designing computer systems. 
Secure Bootstrapping Assumption 
Assumptions are also made in the implementation stage of a system. For example, 
the implementation of security services often relies upon the off band (i.e. cruiser 
service) distribution of security keys (e.g. encryption and signing keys). When a 
system is setup, a secure bootstrapping process is often assumed to exist to distribute 
a set of secret information (e.g. private keys) to each participant. Examples include 
COCA [ZSR02], BFT [CasOl], and SINTRA [CP02]. A l l these systems assume a 
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secure bootstrapping process to perform initialisation. The consequence of this 
assimiption is that the system assumes a static membership among its participants. 
Extira services are needed to support dynamic addition and removal of members. 
Currently, there is no known way to do that without reinitialising the system [Cac04]. 
Secure Hardware Assumption 
The secure bootstrapping assumption sometimes is replaced by the secure hardware 
assumption. Secure hardware (e.g. tamper-resistant secure co-processors) is used to 
process critical security operations and store cryptographic keys (e.g. long term keys). 
This assumption is often required for the purpose of proactive security in order to 
defend against malicious attackers. After rebooting the system from scratch, the 
confidentiality and integrity of the secret information are still preserved because of 
secure hardware. 
However, a system still needs a way to distribute secrete information to secure 
hardware when the system initialises. This is often achieved with the employment of 
trusted human operators who manually set up the system. Once initial keys are 
distributed securely, fiuther keys can be generated via various authentication and key 
agreement protocols. There remain many possible attacks which may invalidate the 
security of tamper-resistant hardware when they are used in practice (for a 
comprehensive description of these attacks against secure co-processors, see 
[AndOl]). 
2.6 Summary 
The quest for dependable services was, is, and wil l continue to be a major focal point 
in designing, implementing, and deploying modem distributed systems. However, as 
the scale of a distributed system increases, so does the number of components in the 
system, therefore, so does tiie probability that some components wi l l fail [Sch93]. 
Due to the ever rising number of malicious attacks against computer systems, 
delivering dependable services has never been so challenging. To understand the new 
challenges and limitations of existing approaches, this chapter takes a snapshot of the 
state-of-the-art techniques and systems for coping with attacks. 
To set the context of the thesis, we first present a generalised conceptual system 
model for distributed systems. The model is absfract enough to capture the essence of 
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a distributed system despite its size and dynamicity. This is followed by an in-depth 
discussion on two types of attack model: a passive attack model and an active attack 
model. To defend against passive attacks, a prevention-based approach - privacy 
protection - can be used. 
However, in most realistic execution environments, active attacks wil l be 
encountered. Due to the size, complexity, and dynamicity of modem distributed 
systems, a prevention-based approach is not always effective and is often costly for 
keeping attackers outside the system. Hence, the attack tolerance design paradigm is 
needed to cope with the situation by leveraging a combined use of secure and fault 
tolerant techniques. 
Hence, the last part of this chapter reviews the common attack-tolerant techniques 
and critically examines some commonly used assumptions by attack tolerant systems. 
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Chapter 3 Attack-Tolerant 
[nformation Retrieval (ATIR) 
This chapter presents two rephcation-based Attack Tolerant Information Retrieval 
(ATIR) schemes which are the theoretical core of this thesis, hi Section 3.1 we 
highlight the major considerations for constructing a practical ATIR scheme. In 
Section 3.2 we describe the system model that ATIR schemes aim to deploy and 
formally define ATIR schemes. In Section 3.3, the detailed algorithms of the ATIR 
schemes are described together with their communication complexity analysis and 
formal proofs. Section 3.4 compares ATIR and several relevant PIR schemes. 
Section 3.5 discusses the validity of ATIR assumptions, and compares ATIR with 
other secure and fault tolerant schemes. 
3.1 Introduction 
The core of the PIR problem is about privacy protection with non-trivial 
communication complexity. The use of multiple servers (e.g. repUcated servers) is 
needed for any PER. schemes i f information theoretic privacy is required [CGKS95]. 
In all existing multiple-server PIR schemes (e.g. [CGKS95, Amb97, IK99, GGM98, 
BIOl, BIKR02, BIMOO]), the availability of all servers is needed to ensure the 
correctness of a result. Hence, the standard PIR problem has to use passive attack 
models. Such a model basically assumes that all servers are available all the time and 
execute predefined protocols correctly. This assumption places significant 
restrictions on the types of attacks that an attacker may perform. 
Once occupying a PIR server, an attacker may conduct active attacks against a 
PIR service. The types of active attacks may include a combination of the following: 
crashing servers, blocking communication links, sending wrong replies, or simply 
deviating firom predefined protocols in an arbitrary way. Unlike traditional replies 
fi-om servers, PIR replies are not straight answers (otherwise, a server knows the 
user's intention) and a reconstruction algorithm is needed to "recover" the actual 
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results. Hence, the consequence of successful attacks may not be easily detectable 
using traditional error detection techniques because attacks are usually assumed to 
occur during message fransmission rather than server side processing. 
The ATIR schemes, introduced in this chapter, aim to solve the PIR problem 
based on an active attack model. In these schemes, apart from reducing 
communication complexity, replication is also used as a means for dealing with 
active attacks. ATIR schemes have two main requirements. First, since an ATIR 
scheme is a generalisation of a PIR scheme (when there is no faulty server in an 
ATIR system), it should have a non-trivial communication complexity (i.e. less than 
0(n), where n is the size of the database). A trivial solution (i.e. through database 
downloading) would be sufficient. In theory, the communication complexity of a 
replication-based PIR scheme can be reduced when more servers are used. 
In practice, replication is always associated with deployment issues. The need for 
a large number of replicated servers often restricts the scalability of a system and 
limits the applicable application domains of a PIR scheme. Moreover, as the number 
of rephcated servers increases, the actual number of bits exchanged over the network 
also increases, which, to some extend, contradicts with the original motivation of 
using replication. To a great extent, the practicability of ATIR schemes is inversely 
proportional to the number of servers required. Therefore, we are particularly 
interested in ATIR schemes which can provide non-trivial communication 
complexity with a small number of servers, which is the second requirement. 
Before presenting the ATIR schemes, we introduce the preliminaries. Specifically, 
we describe the system model of tiiese schemes and formally define ATIR schemes 
in the next section. 
3.2 Preliminaries 
3.2.1 Basic System Model 
Consider a distiibuted system implementing a database query service. The system is 
comprised of one client and k repUcated servers ^ i , . . . , 5*. There can be more clients 
but tiiey invoke the service independentiy from each otiier. For simplicity of 
presentation, we assume there is only one client in the system. These components run 
on separated processing nodes connected by a communication network: there are k 
pairs of one-to-one independent communication channels between the client and 
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each server. The client and the servers communicate with each other by exchanging 
messages. The message from a client to a server is called a query whereas the 
message in the opposite direction is called an answer. 
These channels are authenticated but are not assumed to be secure. That is, two 
commimicating parties in this network are certain of the identities of each other. But 
neither message confidentiality nor integrity exchanged through these channels is 
assumed. The state of a channel is determined by the state of the server it attaches to. 
The possible states of a server shall be elaborated in Section 3.2.2. 
The system assumes a synchronous model of computation, that is, there exist 
known boimds for both the execution speeds of the servers and message delays. 
Specifically, we assume that each message is received within < t^ime units after being 
sent. 
Database Model 
In normal circumstances, each server has an identical copy of a database. The 
database is modelled as a character string x = x\X2.. .x„, where n is the number of 
records in the database. Representing a record in the database, each character is 
considered to be an integer taken from a certain integer set {0, 1, X), that is, 
Xj & {0, \, X), where j = 1, n. The subscripts represent the index of the 
records in the database. For example, in extended ASCII encoding scheme 
[IS08895], each character is associated with an integer taken from the set 
{0 ,1 , . . . ,255} . 
An Overview 
Before going any fiirther, we present an overview of how an ATIR scheme works. 
Suppose a user has an index / and is interested in obtaining the character jc„ where 
I e { 1 , n}. The user invokes the service through a client by giving i as an input 
and then awaiting a result res. The service should have two properties. First, it 
protects the privacy of the user (i.e. the intention) through keeping the input / secret 
from the servers. Second, it ensures the delivered resuU to be correct, that is, res is 
indeed the intended character. 
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Let r denote a set of local random integers generated by the cUent and Lr be the 
number of integers in the set. Based on i and r, the client produces k sets of random 
and independent numbers to form queries, using k query algorithms Q\, ...,Qk- The 
queries are denoted hy q\, ...,qk- Let 9 be the query which has a maximum number 
of numbers and we denote this number be Lg. The randomness and independency of 
the queries ensure that the servers carmot derive usefiil information about the input. 
The queries are sent to the servers, respectively. Based on x and qj, the server Sj 
produces an answer a, by executing an answer algorithm Aj, where j e {I, k}. 
aj is sent back to tiie client. Similarly, let a be the answer which has a maximum 
number of numbers and we denote this number be La. 
Based on r, i, and some of the answers, the client repeatedly executes a 
reconstruction algorithm 9t to produce results until a result is deemed to be valid. A 
result can be in either of the two states: valid or invalid. A vahd result is in the set 
{0, 1, X}. Otherwise, it is invalid. Valid results are fiirther divided into two 
groups: correct results and incorrect results. The possibility of reconstructing valid 
but incorrect results is characterised by a parameter - undetected error rate £ £ is the 
probabiUty of the occurrence of valid but incorrect results. An error detection 
function is employed to distinguish valid results fi-om the invalid ones. Together, the 
reconstruction algorithm and the error detection fimction constitute a result 
verification algorithm 3 which verifies the correctness of the results and produces an 
output for the user. 
Computation 
Al l the computations involved in the above algorithms are performed over a finite 
field Zp, where is a prime number and p > max{Xle, k, X\, where e> 0. Combined 
with the database model, we also have x e {0, 1, X}" c Zp". As a finite prime 
field, Zp can be denoted by the set {0, 1, ...,p - 1}. It is known that the operations 
over a finite field are closed, i.e. the results of addition, multiplication, subtiraction, 
and division, are still elements of the finite field [LN83]. 
ATIR schemes are based on tiie arithmetic of finite fields. The client calculates the 
order of the field, i.e., p, based on the e specified by the user and the valid range of 
database characters, i.e., X. p is determined before the query algorithm starts and is 
used by all the finite field computations in ATIR schemes. Since £is specified by the 
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user, p can be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the user's 
requirements. The client informs the servers about p along with the queries. For 
clarity of presentation, the algorithm for calculating p is deferred to Section 3.3.4 
along with the presentation of an error detection function. Before that, we assume p 
has been chosen properly. 
3.2.2 Servers and At tack Models 
We consider an active attack model for our system. In the system, a server can be in 
one of the four possible states: correct, curious, faulty, and curious-and-faulty. 
A correct server follows predefined algorithms correctly and is not interested in 
finding out the identity of the item being retrieving. A curious server executes 
predefined algorithms correctly but attempts to violate the user's privacy. A faulty 
server exhibits failures by not following the algorithms. The answer returned fi-om a 
faulty server is refereed to as corrupted. A curious-and-faulty server exhibits failures 
and attempts to violate the user's privacy. As akeady mentioned, the state of a 
commimication link is determined by the state of the server it attaches to. For 
example, an attacker may attack a link through eavesdropping. But because the 
server it attaches to also is curious, we can simpUfy the presentation by treating the 
link and the server as one. In our system model, there are little differences between 
the effects caused attacks during transit and those caused by attacks during server 
side processing. For simplicity of presentation, we assume the conmiunication links 
are reliable and secure hereafter. Therefore, we ignore the description of 
communication links in the remaining parts of the presentation when no confiision 
can be caused. 
3.2.3 System Assumptions 
In this system, three assumptions are made: 1) there are no more than /, where t>\, 
curious servers who collude together to violate the privacy of the user; and 2) the 
number of faulty servers is bounded by / where k > t + f + \, f < t\ ?>) Hoe client 
remains trusted throughout the lifetime of the system: the client does not collude with 
any servers and performs operations correctly. In Section 3.5, we shall discuss the 
issues of how to realise these assumptions and the validity of making these 
assumptions. These assumptions govern all aspects of our system model in the 
remaining discussion. A curious-and-faulty server coiuits as one curious server and 
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one faulty server. The first assumption implies that there can be many independent 
groups of colluding servers in the system so long as the maximum number of servers 
in each group does not exceed t. As a special case, each individual server in the 
system can be curious. The second assumption defines the fault tolerance capacity of 
the system. When/is zero, the system provides a PIR service. 
A faulty server may exhibit coordinated arbitrary and/or malicious behaviours 
with other faulty servers under the control of an active attacker. For example, an 
attack may control the faulty servers to: crash, stop responding, modify the content of 
controlled databases in a coordinated way, and/or deliver purposefixlly manipulated 
answers. Apart fi-om conducting the above attacks, the attacker may control curious-
and-faulty servers to exchange messages with other curious servers, attempting to 
find out the user's intention. There is no restriction on the computational capability 
of the attacker. Hence, the user's privacy is guaranteed in an information theoretic 
sense. In short, the attacker can choose whatever strategies they like to attack the 
servers and perform attacks in the way they decide so long as the assumptions of the 
system are satisfied. 
IXie to the synchronous system model considered, timeouts can be used to detect 
the benign behaviours (e.g. crashed servers, send/receive omission) of faulty servers. 
In particular, i f a cUent does not receive a response to a query message within 
2^time imits after sending it, the client can conclude that the server is crashed. 
Having defined the system model the ATIR aims to deploy, we are now ready to 
define ATIR schemes. 
3.2.4 Requirements of A T I R 
Based on the system model, this section presents two definitions of an ATIR scheme. 
Before going any fiorther, we first describe five requirements of an ATIR scheme as 
follows: 
1) Efficiency. ATIR schemes should have a non-trivial commimication 
complexity. 
2) Privacy: ATIR schemes should maintain the privacy of the user in an 
information theoretic sense. 
3) Availability: ATIR schemes should ensure the availability of a correct result. 
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4) Safety : ATIR schemes should ensure the correctness of an output i f there is an 
output. 
5) Liveness: ATIR schemes eventually terminate. 
The efficiency requirement is a fiindamental requirement for constructing ATIR 
schemes. Without satisfying the efficiency requirement, a trivial but inefficient 
solution with the use of k servers can be derived as follows, where k>2t+ 1. The 
client can download all k databases and perform all operations locally without using 
any other services. In this case, the privacy of the user is ensured because every 
client operation is performed locally. Also, the client can identify the correct result, 
for example, using majority voting techniques even in the presence of up to 
t maliciously faulty servers. Due to the condition A: > 2? + 1, the client is guaranteed 
to be able to get the correct result. Hence, the availability and safety requirements are 
met. Because of the synchronous setting, the system eventually terminates. 
The number of communicating bits this trivial solution is A: x n x log2X and the 
communication complexity is 0(n). The communication complexity of the solution 
grows linearly as the number of records increases. Therefore, to have a better 
solution, ATIR schemes should have a lower than 0(«) communication complexity, 
i.e., sub-linear communication complexity. In other words, using ATIR schemes 
should be better than downloading all databases and executing the queries locally. 
The privacy and availability requirements should be satisfied in normal and faulty 
circumstances. In the system, the user's private input i is the information that the 
scheme aims to protect. The privacy requirement ensures that the system keeps 
I secret fi-om all rephcas whereas the availability requirement ensure that at least a 
correct result can be reconstructed. 
The safety requirement is important for fault tolerant schemes [Sch93]. In some 
circumstances, no output is better than a wrong result because wrong results may 
lead to disastrous and unpredictable outcomes. The Uveness requirement is essential 
for any distributed schemes [Sch93]. Without satisfying this requirement, the system 
may not stop and the user may wait forever for a result to be returned. 
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3.2.5 DefmitSonsof A T I R 
This section presents two different definitions of ATIR schemes. The first definition 
is probabilistic which ensures the safety requirement within a predefined probability. 
The second definition ensures the safety requirement with a probability of one; hence 
it is deterministic. 
Definition 3.1 (probabilistic A T I R - pATIR) A {k, U / , e) pATIR scheme is an 
algorithm tuple {Qu Qk, A\, A^, % 3), where k, t , f , efollow the definitions 
given in Section 3.2.1. The algorithms are formally detailed as follows: 
k Query Algorithms Q\,..., Qk'. 
{ l , 2 , . . . , n } x Z / ^ h ^ Z p ^ 
k Answer Algorithms A\,...,Ak'. 
{ 0 , l , . . . , ^ " x Z p ^ h^Zp^ 
A Reconstruction Algorithm 51: 
z / ' - x ( Z p ^ y " ' 
A Result Verification Algorithm 3: 
( Z / h ^ { 0 , l , . . . , ^ 
The scheme should have the following properties: 
a) Availability: For V x e { 0 , 1 , . . . , J f ] , i e { 1 , 2 , . . . , « } , and r e Z^^", 
3 J i , . . . , € {1,2, ...,k) 
9t(r, I , As\{x, Qsi(r, i)),..., Ast + Qs, +i(r, 0)) = 
b) Privacy: For V z,ye {1,2 n} and V si,..., St e { 1 , 2 , k ) , mdQe 
PKiQsxii, r ) , . . Q s i i , r)) = Q)= Pr{{Qsx{j, r),..., QM, r)) = 0 , 
where the probabilities Pr's are taken over uniformly and randomly chosen r € Z^. 
c) Safety: The scheme outputs with a probability no less than \-e. 
d) Liveness: The scheme eventually terminates. 
Except the description of safety property, the definition of a deterministic ATIR 
scheme repeats most parts of that of the probabilistic one. For completeness of 
presentation, we include the whole definition of a deterministic ATIR scheme here. 
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Definition 3.2 (deterministic A T I R - dATIR) A (k, t, f ) dTIR scheme is an 
algorithm tuple (Qi, Qk, Au A^, % 3), where k, follow the definitions 
given in Section 3.2.1. The algorithms are formally described as follows. 
k Query Algorithms Qu Qk'. 
{ l , 2 , . . . , / l } X Z p ^ h ^ Z ; , ^ 
k Answer Algorithms ^ i , A k ' . 
{0 , l , . . . , Jn"xZp^ i ^ Z p ^ 
A Reconstruction Algorithm 91: 
Z / ' - x ( Z p ^ ) ' " ' H>Zp 
A Result Verification Algorithm 3: 
( Z p ) * H > { O , l , . . . , Z , 0 } 
The scheme should have the following properties: 
a) AvaUabiUty: For V x €{0 , 1, X}, i e { 1 , 2, n}, and r € Zp 
3s i , . . . e {1,2, ...,k) 
9l(r, i, As\{x, Qs\{r, i)),..., As, + Qs, +i(r, /))) = Xi. 
b) Privacy: For V / , j e { 1 , 2 , n } and V s i , . . . , Si e { 1 , 2 , k } , and g e Z ^ ^ 
/'KCaiO', r),..., r)) = 0 = /'raaiO', r ) , . . . , a^-, r)) = 0, 
where the probabilities Pr's are taken over uniformly and randomly chosen r e Zp^'^. 
c) Safety: The scheme outputs, i f there is an output, the intended result JC, with a 
probability one. 
d) Liveness: The scheme eventually terminates. 
Similar to traditional definitions of PIR schemes (e.g. the ones presented in 
[CGKS98] and [BS02]), the above definitions of ATIR schemes use information 
theoretic privacy property, where a computationally unbounded attacker can gain no 
information about the user's intention. However, ATIR schemes differ from existing 
PER schemes in three major ways. First, the former is based on an active attack 
model whereas the latter is based on a passive attack model. Second, the former uses 
a generalised character string database model rather than the standard bit database 
model. The generalisation is trivial in theory but important in practice. The 
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generalised model paves the way for implementing ATIR schemes on existing 
database technologies. Third, ATIR schemes are required to satisfy safety and 
liveness properties, which are not the requirements in defining PIR schemes. 
We now explain the implications of the above properties for both definitions of 
ATIR schemes. The availability property states that there exists at least one set of 
servers whose answers can be used to reconstruct the correct result. It is important to 
note that this property only ensures the existence of at least one correct result. In the 
worse case circumstances (i .e. , / = t), there is only one correct result. 
The privacy property means that fi-om any set of t queries, it is impossible to 
decide which specific record the user is interested in since the joint distribution of 
random variables Qsiii, r), Qs^i, r) is independent of i . hi other words, fi-om t or 
less queries, it is theoretically impossible for a server or a group of servers to gain 
any information about /. The privacy property of both ATIR schemes stems fi-om 
existing PER. definitions (e.g., tiie one in [CGKS98]). 
The result verification algorithms in pATIR and dATIR guarantee the safety 
property. For a pATIR scheme, this property guarantees that the scheme can always 
deliver a result and the result is the intended one with a probability of no less than 
1 - £ Whereas for a dATIR scheme, it ensures that the outputted result, i f there is 
one, is jc, with a probability of one. 
The liveness property holds provided that k>t+l+f. 
Definition 3.3 (Communication Complexity) The communication complexity C of 
an ATIR scheme is defined as the total number of bits exchanged between the client 
and all servers. Let Cq be the number of bits sent from the client to a server and Q be 
the number of bits sent from a server back to the chent. The communication 
complexity of an ATIR scheme is k (Cq + Cg). 
3.3 Attack-Tolerant Information Retrieval Schemes 
In this section, two ATIR schemes are presented, and the presentation is organised as 
follows: Section 3.3.1 presents three basic algorithms for both schemes. Section 3.3.2 
characterises the fault tolerance conditions for these schemes. Section 3.3.3 explains 
the difficulties of applying conventional error detection mechanisms in ATIR. 
Section 3.3.4 presents a probabilistic error detection fimction that is used to detect 
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incorrect results. Section 3.3.5 describes two result verification algorithms for 
identifying correct results. Section 3.3.6 presents the formal proofs for both ATIR 
schemes. Section 3.3.7 appUes a generic balancing technique to reduce the 
communication complexity to 0{n^^). 
Both ATIR schemes are one-round. That is, a client sends queries to k servers 
respectively and each server replies with an answer. Based on some of the answers, 
the client outputs a result. Both ATIR schemes are an extension of the polynomial 
interpolation based PIR schemes presented by Chor et. al. [CGKS95] in an active 
attack model. 
3.3.1 Basic Algorithms 
This section presents three basic algorithms used by both ATIR schemes: a query 
algorithm, an answer algorithm, and a reconstruction algorithm. These algorithms are 
based on the polynomial-interpolation PIR schemes presented in [CGKS95]. 
A Query Algorithm 
This section describes a query algorithm which is repeatedly used to create k random 
and independent queries. The core of the algorithm is the creation and evaluation of 
polynomial-based query functions. The algorithm consists of four steps. In the first 
step, the client transforms the user's input into a sequence of bits. In the second step, 
these bits subsequently are used as the constant terms of the query functions. Note 
that the other coefficiencies of the polynomials are random elements chosen fi-om the 
finite field Zp. Once the query fimctions are ready, the polynomials are evaluated at a 
set of distinct points independentiy chosen fi-om Zp. This is step three. Along with p, 
the evaluated results are grouped into k sets of query tuples and these tuples are 
subsequently sent to the servers, respectively. Figure 3-1 presents the details of the 
query algorithm. 
An Answer Algorithm 
Upon receiving a query, a server executes the answer algorithm to calculate an 
answer based on the answer function. Each answer function calculates the scalar 
products of two tuples: a query tuple and a database tuple. Since the query tuple is 
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the query function evaluated at various points, an answer fimction can be expressed 
as the following: 
n 
A(z) = ^Qjiz) • Xj(modp), where z is an indeterminate over Zp. 
The answer functions are identical for all servers. Figure 3-2 presents an answer 
algorithm for server Sd. 
A Query Algoritl im for ATIR 
Input: a prime number p\ an integer i , where / G { 1 , ..., n}; a set randomly and 
uniformly chosen numbers r= { r n , ..., ru, .. . , . . . , r„,}, where r e Zp"'; and k 
randomly and uniformly selected non-zero distinct numbers m = {mi, mj, 
ntk} from Zp. 
Output: ^ random and independent sets with elements in Zp as queries 
1. Map / into a sequence of numbers. For every i e { 1 , n}, we define a 
mapping fimction A,: { 1 , . . . , «} i-> {0, 1}, so that for every / e { 1 , n}, 
hiil) = l,ifl=i; otherwise, h,{l) = 0. 
2. Generate n degree-/ polynomials as query functions: 
Q^z) = h,il) + m-z + ra-^ + .. . + r/,z' (mod/?) for / = 1 , . . . , n, 
where the constant term of the /-th polynomial is /i,(/) and z is an indeterminate 
over Zp. 
3. Evaluate the polynomials at point m\,m2,ntk and group the results into k 
tuples: < Q\{md), Qiima),..., Qn{md)>, where d=\,...,k. 
4. Sendp and the tuple < Qiintd), Qiinid), Q„imd)> as a query to replica Sd 
fOTd=\,2, ...,k. 
Figure 3-1 A Query Algorithm for A T I R Scliemes 
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A n Answer Algorithm for replica Sd 
Input: a prime number p, a tuple Qd = <Q\d, ••, Qnd> e Zp" and a tuple x e {0, 
I, ...,X}", where Qd is an tuple exfracted from the query for 5,;. 
Output: an element in Zp as an answer. 
1. Calculate the scalar product of the tuples Qd and x: ad=^ Qjj • Xj (mod p). 
7=1 
2. Send the element Ud to the cUent as the answer of Sd-
Figure 3-2 An Answer Algorithm for Replica Sj 
A technical lemma about the randomness of answers is proved as follows. In 
Section 3.3.6, this lemma wil l be used to prove that the error detection fimction 
satisfies certain properties. 
Lemma 3.1 Answers in ATIR schemes are randomly and uniformly distiibuted 
over Zp. 
Proof. First, we show that answers are randomly and uniformly distributed over Zp^. 
Using the query fimctions, we expand the answer fijnction as follows: 
A{z)='^Qjiz)xjimodp) = 
n n n 
X ' 0 ' ) - X j + z - C ^ 0 , •Xj) + ... + z'-(^r.-Xj)(mod;?), 
y=i 7=1 j=i 
n n 
when z is fixed, A(z) is a fimction of the variables ^r^.^" • • •' Xo,' • 
7=1 ' 7=1 
Since all these variables are composed by random variables uniformly chosen 
from Zp, A(z) is therefore a fimction randomly and uniformly distributed over Zp. As 
a result, answers are randomly and uniformly distributed over Zp. Q.E.D. 
A Reconstruction Algorithm 
From the servers, the client receives at least f + 1 answers ai, ...,at+\. Based on any 
^ + 1 out of the k answers from the servers, the client can perform a reconstruction 
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algorithm using the polynomial interpolation technique [CLRSOl, pp. 826]. Figure 
3-3 presents the reconstruction algorithm. 
Without loss of generality, let ai, ..., 0 , + 1 be a set of f + 1 answers that the client 
chooses to reconsti:uct a result from. Correspondingly, the cUent chooses the t + I 
distinct points mi, m,+1 that have been used to evaluate the query functions for 
the servers 5 i , . . . , 5, +1. Then, we have the following set of point-value paks: 
(mi, a i ) , . . . , (m/+i , a,+ i). 
Based on the polynomial interpolation technique, the reconstruction function 
can be constructed as follows: 
^ ^ z-m. 
^(mod; , ) . 
7=1 P=l "^j ~ 
The reconstructed value is the evaluation of the reconstruction flmction at point 
zero, i.e., 91(0). 
A Reconstruction Algorithm 
Input: a set of r + 1 non-zero independent and distinct elements mi, ..., m, +1 e Zp 
and a separated set of ? + 1 elements a i , . . . , a,+1 e Zp. 
Output: an element in Zp as a result. 
1. Evaluate the reconstruction function at zero point: 
/+i /+i 0 — m 
5R(0)=Xfl , -n ^ ( m o d p ) . 
y=i p=i -
p*j 
2. Output 91(0) as a result. 
Figure 3-3 A Reconstruction Algorithm 
3.3.2 Characterisations off Fault Tolerance 
This section explains why the existing PIR schemes cannot cope with failures and 
presents the characterisations of fault tolerance properties of ATIR schemes. 
The correctness condition for the polynomial interpolation PIR schemes 
[CGKS95] \sk>t+ 1, where f ^ 1. It is both necessary and sufficient for passive 
server models because an attacker does not change the data and the answers returned. 
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This condition, however, implies only the existence of a correct result under a 
passive attack model. 
For crashed servers, it follows immediately that 
A : > ( r + l ) + y ; w h e r e / > l and/>0. 
In the above condition, the parameter t is independent of / This condition 
guarantees both the existence of a correct result and tolerance up to/crashed servers. 
It is also necessary and sufficient when up to / servers do not response (or up to / 
answers from the servers are lost or intercepted by an attacker during 
conmiunication). However, based on / + 1 or more answers returned, a client could 
still reconstruct an incorrect resuh i f the faulty servers are malicious. In order to be 
able to reconstruct a correct result we consider two mutually exclusive hypothesises 
respectively. 
Assumption 1: A l l the incorrect results derived from the wrong answers returned 
disagree mutually. 
This hypothesis is based on the fact that the wrong answers do not have fiiU 
confrol over a reconstructed result provided that f<t. That is because t + \ answers 
are required for a reconstruction, when/< /, at least one correct answer wil l be used 
in the reconstruction. In the worse case scenario, t out of / + 1 answers are wrong and 
the remaining one is correct. Hence, it is not possible that a result is reconstructed 
from the wrong answers only. In other words, any reconstructed result is derived 
fix>m at least a correct answer from a fault-free server. Hence, tiie probability that 
two incorrect results are identical is significantiy low. Under Assumption 1, it 
follows imder the maUcious server condition that i f two reconstructed results are 
identical, they must be correct, provided that 
k>{t + 2) + /where /< t. 
Assumption 2: Incorrect results derived from the wrong answers returned may be 
identical. 
This hypothesis states the most general situation and in the worst case all the 
incorrect results may be identical, hi order to tolerate up to / malicious faults, the 
number of correct results must be always greater than that of potentially incorrect 
results. We have thus the following theorem. 
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Theorem 3.1 Under Assumption 2 and the malicious server condition, an ATIR 
scheme is / faul t tolerant i f ^, / and/satisfy that 
ic':!f>cf. 
Proof: Note that C*^}^ is the number of correct results and C'^^ - C'^}^ is the number 
of incorrect results. The number of correct results must be always greater than that of 
incorrect results, i.e. C^t/ > C{*' - C^t/ • Hence, this proves the theorem. Q.E.D. 
In the worse case, a large number of replicas (approximately in the order of 5/) 
are required. This is too costiy in practice. However, we notice that the condition 
k>{t+\)+f where t >f, holds for the malicious server condition and Assumption 2 
i f a perfect error detection algorithm exists and can be used to identify any incorrect 
result. The next section explores the construction of such algorithms. 
3.3.3 Why is E r r o r Detection Difficult in A T I R ? 
In fault tolerance, the erroneous state of a system can be identified through 
acceptance test techniques and/or comparison techniques [HW92]. The goal of error 
detection is to prevent errors manifesting themselves as system failures. In an 
acceptance test, a program is executed and its output is subject to a test. I f the test is 
successfiil, the program continues as normal. Otherwise, an error is signalled. A 
failed acceptance test is an indication of the presence of a fault. However, the use of 
acceptance tests alone cannot identify what goes wrong. Combining with other 
techniques, such as fault masking techniques, correct outputs can be identified and 
the detected errors can be eliminated. 
Traditionally, comparison techniques are mainly used to detect errors caused by 
software design faults. Errors are detected through comparing the results produced 
by two or more versions of a piece of software developed by independent organised 
programming teams implementing a common system specification. 
In security, an error often manifests itself as corrupted data. Digital signature 
techniques, such as the RSA signature [RSA78], can be used to validate whether data 
has been corrupted during transit. In data communication, garbled messages are 
detected through error detection codes which typically include checksums and Cyclic 
Redundancy Checks (CRC) techniques [Bla83]. 
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A l l these techniques have their own limitations and not all these techniques can be 
directly apphed to the ATIR setting. Acceptance test techniques are general in the 
sense that they can be applied even i f there is only one single component in the 
system. However, deriving generic acceptance tests is often difficult because the 
design costs and the effectiveness of acceptance tests are apphcation dependent 
[Kim95]. 
Comparison techniques are appUcation independent. For example, voting is a 
typical comparison technique that can be applied to virtually any appUcations. But 
voting is often perceived to be costiy due to multiple copies/versions of executions 
required. Furthermore, the effectiveness of voting is subject to the elimination of 
common mode failures [AK84]. In an ATIR setting, answers cannot be directly voted 
on because they are boxmd to be different even for retrieving the same information. 
Digital signatures alone cannot defend against malicious attackers. Besides, the 
validity of digital signatures relies on the availability of a trusted third party (e.g. 
certification authorities) before any interactions begin. I f messages are corrupted 
before transmission, digital signatures cannot detect such errors. Finally, error 
detection codes are designed for identifying errors (e.g., corruption or loss of data) 
caused during message transition. The challenge of using coding techniques is to 
overcome the large number of redundancy required. 
Designing an effective error detection method has been a great challenge in 
constructing ATIR schemes. On the one hand, identifying what is correct is hard, 
given that databases can store arbiti-ary information. On the other hand, although 
voting techniques and error detection codes can be employed by ATIR for the 
purpose of error detection, these techniques are often costly due to the large number 
of repUcas required. 
However, error detection helps to identify erroneous statuses but cannot guarantee 
the delivery of correct results. In order to tolerate malicious attacks, redundancy has 
to be introduced into the design of an ATIR scheme. Based on existing PIR schemes, 
our strategy for ATIR is through a combined use of acceptance tests with redundant 
servers. In our ATIR schemes, acceptance tests identify corrupted results while 
redundant servers guarantee the existence of correct results. Compared with the 
techniques described above, this strategy reduces the number of replicas required for 
error detection and result verification. 
51 
CHAPTER THREE. ATTACK-TOLERANT INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 
3.3.4 E r r o r Detection 
It is necessary to emphasise that the condition k>t+f + 1, where t>f, implies only 
the existence of a correct result. In order to identify the correct result as the system 
output, we have to design a perfect error detection fimction for ATIR schemes. 
Alternatively, as Assumption 2 suggests, more rephcas can be used to ensure that the 
client can find a correct result. Correspondingly, more message exchanges are 
needed and the communication complexity of an ATIR scheme increases. But these 
solutions are costly. 
The polynomial interpolation-based PIR schemes and our ATIR schemes 
essentially are Shamir's secret sharing scheme [Sha79]. Secret sharing exploits the 
properties of polynomials (i.e. perfect secrecy and interpolation uniqueness) for 
providing privacy protection and fault-tolerant operations [GB99]. Our ATIR 
schemes are based on the same principle. It is therefore possible to apply and extend 
the existing results of secret sharing, verifiable secret sharing (e.g. [Fel87, 
CGMA85]), to both PIR and ATIR schemes. In the following, a probabilistic error 
detection fimction is developed for ATIR based on the polynomial properties. We 
now explain the principle of error detection in ATIR. 
Principles 
The main idea of the probabilistic error detection fimction is to limit the vahd range 
of reconstinjcted results. Because a character xj, where y e { 1 , 2, ..., n}, is viewed as 
an integer taken from a pre-known set {0, 1, ...,X}, for every xj, tiiere are exactiy 
X candidates of valid results. And because all computations are performed over the 
finite field Zp, there wil l be p possible reconstiiicted results for xj over the set 
{0, 1, p - 1}. It follows immediately that i f a reconstructed resuh is witiiin 
{ 0 , 1 , . . . , Z } , it is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid. 
It is desirable that the client has such an error detection capabiUty. That is, when 
a reconstruction algorithm uses one or more corrupted answers to reconstiuct a resuh, 
the result becomes invalid. This property of the error detection fimction is fiirther 
described in details as follows. 
In the following, let us use the worse case circumstance for our analysis. Suppose 
( / M l , a ' l ) , (m,, a't), (m/+1, a,+1) be / + 1 point-values pairs that a cHent uses for 
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the reconstruction algorithm. For simplicity of presentation, we assume the first t of 
out the r + 1 pairs are corrupted. But in the realistic circumstances, the client does not 
know which ones are corrupted in advance. In terms of the number of faulty servers, 
this is the worse case situation because the number of faulty servers is maximimi 
( i . e . / = t). It is desirable for the scheme to have the property that there is only a small 
probability e> 0 that the output of the reconstiiiction algorithm is valid but corrupted. 
Recall that {0, 1, ...,X] e Zp. We can increase the size of Zp such that most of 
incorrect results appear in the set Zp - { 0 , 1 , . . . , h i other words, the probability of 
undetected errors can be confined within a pre-defined bound, i.e. undetected error 
rate £; for e> 0. An error is defined as the acceptance of a valid but corrupted result. 
The error detection fimction only identifies correct results with a certain probability. 
Therefore, it is possible that a valid resuU in { 0 , 1 , . . . , JiT} is in fact a corrupted result 
(i.e. not the intended result). However, the user can adjust the probability which is 
therefore can be arbiti-arily close to zero. 
The error detection fimction is simple. I f an input element a e is also an 
element in the set { 0 , 1 , . . . , X), the fimction outputs one (i.e. it is valid); otherwise, it 
outputs zero (i.e. it is invalid). This fimction detects corrupted results with a 
probability. By itself, it does not guarantee perfect error detection, namely the 
correctness of a reconstructed result is not always guaranteed. Together with the 
result verification algorithms (which we shall present in the next section), a perfect 
error detection capability can be obtained. 
The possible causes leading for a corrupted result are endless. Here is a list of 
possibiUties: a query or an answer is tampered with in fransit or a server does not 
execute the Answer algorithm properly, one or more answers are corrupted by a 
malicious attacker. The list is mcomplete. In fact it is impossible to enumerate all the 
possibilities. However, despite the actual causes of corrupted results, the outcome is 
the same: a result is modified so that it is different from the original one. Hence, for 
simplicity of presentation, we assume that all corrupted results are caused by using 
corrupted answers in the following proofs. 
Determining Zp 
We now can describe how to determine p for both ATIR schemes based on the error 
detection requirement. 
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Lemma 3.2 For a (k, t, f ) ATIR scheme, suppose p is the smallest prime number 
and £ > 0 such that the following inequality is satisfied: 
p > max[X/£, k]. 
There is only a small probability f > 0 that the error detection function accepts a 
valid but corrupted result. 
Proof. Suppose a client receives t corrupted answers a'l, a't from replicas 
Si, ...,St and receives one correct a<+1 answer from replica 5,+1. That is, the client 
uses (mi, a'l), (m/, a't), {nit i) point-value pairs as inputs for the 
reconstruction algorithm: 
'^ ^ m„ . ^ m„ ^ m 
9l(0) = aVn '—+...+a'fY{ '—+at.rX[ 
p*t 
From Lemma 3.1, we know that answers are randomly and imiformly distributed 
over Zp. Despite that a'\, ...,a't may be chosen purposefully by an attacker, 91(0) is a 
function of a random variable a, + i uniformly distributed over Zp. Since there are 
X+ \ valid results and only one of them is xi, there X out of p possibilities that the 
client reconstructs a valid but corrupted result. By the meaning of e, the probability 
of accepting a valid but corrupted results XIp should be at most £; i.e. XIp < e. 
Therefore, we have p > XIe. 
On the other hand, because ATER schemes also require at least k non-zero points 
to evaluate the query functions, p should also be greater than k. Hence, this proves 
the lemma. Q. E. D. 
It should be made certain that p is large enough to reveal incorrect results with an 
arbitrarily high probabiHty (1 - e), e.g. 99.99%. 
E r r o r Detection and Secret Sharing 
The principle of the error detection function is the same as the Tompa and WoU's 
modification [TW88] on the Shamir's secret sharing scheme. Both methods aim to 
"force" a reconstruction algorithm to reconstruct invahd outputs i f the algorithm uses 
any corrupted inputs. The input in ATIR schemes is called an answer whereas the 
input in Secret Sharing schemes is called a share. There are differences between both 
schemes. In ATIR, a client keeps evaluation points locally. Therefore, corrupted 
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servers can at best guess this information randomly. But in Shamir's scheme, an 
evaluation point is a part of a share. Hence, corrupted participants have the full 
information about evaluation points of corrupted shares. Intuitively, an attacker can 
obtain more information in secret sharing schemes than in ATIR schemes. 
Block E r r o r Detection 
So far, the error detection function is performed on an individual character basis, hi 
practice a result usually contains a block (i.e., string) of characters rather than just 
one character. Therefore, the single character error detection function (hereafter, 
refer to as a single detection) needs to be extended to a block error detection function 
(hereafter, refer to as a whole detection). In order for a block to be valid, all its 
characters are required to be valid. Any single invalid character invalids the entire 
block and a failed reconstruction is resulted by the first unsuccessful single 
verification. Therefore, the undetected error rate of a whole detection is calculated by 
multiplying those of single verifications. 
Let E denote the undetected error rate of the verification of an entire result and La 
be the number of invalid characters in the result. We have 
Instead of specifying e for each individual character, the user now specifies E as 
the undetected error rate for the entire result. It is thai up to the client program to 
automatically calculate e. Since the relationship between e and E is exponential, a 
slight modification of e can significantly change E. Even a user requires a highly 
effective error detection function by asking E to be 0.05. Assuming La is 100, setting 
£ to be 0.95 is sufficient to satisfy E. Recall that the computational range p is 
inversely proportional to £ A slight increase of p can largely improve tiie fault 
detection capability of the scheme at a whole. 
Implications of the E r r o r Detection Function 
This error detection function does not rely on any unproven cryptographic premise, 
such as, intractability of factorisation of big primes and on the availability tamper-
proof hardware (e.g. secure co-processors). 
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3.3.5 Two Result Verification Algorithms 
The section presents two result verification algorithms: one for the pATIR scheme 
and the other for the dATIR scheme. Both algorithms are used to identify correct 
results and eliminate incorrect ones. They are both built on the error detection 
function and the result reconstruction algorithm presented in the previous sections. 
The result verification algorithms are executed by the client after executing the query 
algorithm. 
Figure 3-4 presents the probabiUstic result verification algorithm. After sending 
queries, the client waits for the availability of at least t + 1 answers returned fi-om the 
servers (line 3). This algorithm stops whenever a valid result becomes available. In 
the normal circumstance, the algorithm only performs the reconstruction algorithm 
(line 5) once. In the worse case (i.e. the occurrence of t corrupted answers), the 
algorithm executes the while loop times. This is the situation where corrupted 
reconstructions but no valid result is found, that implies there are more than t 
answers are used in every result reconstruction except the last one. The while loop 
stops at another two situations as well. First, when the algorithm attempts all 
^ k ^ 
f + 1 
corrupted answers available (line 10). Second, there are more than t crashed servers. 
In this case, the timeout limit (line 9) is exceeded. Neither of these situations may 
occur in our system because of the assumptions set out in the system model of the 
scheme (i.e. the upper bound of / i s i). 
Figure 3-5 presents the deterministic result verification algorithm. When the 
algorithm is executed, there are two possibilities: i) all k answers become available 
within the known time bound; and ii) only a part of the k answers become available 
within the known time bound. Possibility i) occurs when every server is available. 
' k 
Possibility ii) occurs when there are crashed servers 
k \ 
results will be in the 
former situation whereas less than 
? + l 
in the latter. No matter which situation 
r+1 
actually occurs, the loop (Ime 11-16) iterates through all the reconstructed results in 
the set E to check whether they are identical. The identical result is deemed to be the 
final result and outputted to the user. In the most conditions (including the worse), 
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the algorithm executes the while loop 
k ^ 
times (line 5). But in the case that there 
are t crashed servers, the while loop is only executed once. The timeout checking 
(line 10) in this algorithm has a much important role than that of the probabilistic 
algorithm in the presence of crashed servers. It is used to prevent the algorithm halts 
for ever in the presence of even just one crashed servers. 
Clearly, the probabiUstic result verification algorithm is efficient than its 
deterministic counterpart in normal circumstances. Both algorithms, however, 
require an equal number of reconstructions in the worse case situation. 
A Probabilistic Result Verification Algorithm 
1. set counter = 0 
2. set-timeout-to local_clock + 2S 
3. wait-for at least t + 1 answers returned fi-om the servers 
f k \ 
4. while (counter < )do 
5. select and use a new group of t + \ available answers to reconstruct a 
result res 
6. set counter = counter +1 % increase the number of reconstructions % 
7. if (res e {0,1, . . . , X}) then exit loop 
8. check the availability of new answers 
9. on-timeout exit loop 
10. if (counter > 
r I. \ 
or timeout) then output "no result" % more than t 
corrupted answers or more than t crashed servers % 
11. else output rej: 
12. stop. 
Figure 3-4 A ProbabiUstic Result Verificatioii Algorithm 
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A Deterministic Result Verificatioii Algorithm 
Variables: success: Boolean 
1. setEi-0, success <- true, counter = 0 
2. set-timeout-to local_clock + 2S 
3. wait-for at least t + \ answers available 
4. while (true) do 
5. select and use a new group of t + I available answers to reconstruct a 
result res 
6. set counter = counter + 1 % increase the number of reconstructions % 
7. if (res e {0,1, ...,X}) then E <- {res} u E 
8. if (counter • 
( k \ 
) then exit loop 
t + \ 
9. check the availability of new answers 
10. on-timeout exit loop 
11. fori = l to |^do 
12. fory = 1 to l^l do 
13. if(ef !=e,)then 
14. set success <- false 
15. exit loop 
16. if (isuccess) then exit loop 
17. if (success) then output res 
18. else output "no result" 
19. stop. 
Figure 3-5 A Deterministic Result Verification Algorithm 
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3.3.6 Proofs for the A T I R Schemes 
After presenting all the algorithms, we are now ready to prove the properties of the 
ATIR schemes. 
We include the Lagrange Interpolation Theorem here because it plays an essential 
role in proving the properties of both ATIR schemes. For a proof, readers are 
referred to [LN97, pp. 28]. 
Theorem (Lagrange Interpolation Formula) 
For n > 0 and any field F, let ao, • •., a« be « + 1 distinct elements of F, and let BQ, 
Z>„ be n + 1 arbitrary elements of F. Then there exists exactly one polynomial 
/ i x ) G F[x\ of degree < n such thatX^ff) = K for i = 0, n. This polynomial is 
given by 
m = t,b;t[{a-a,rix-a,). 
/=o t=o 
In the following proofs, we use a special case of the Lagrange hiterpolation 
Formula by considering the field F be a finite prime field Zp. 
Before discussing the properties, we formally prove some technical lemmas 
about the answer fimction and the reconstruction fiinction. Lemma 3.3 shows that the 
answer fimction is effectively identical to the reconstruction fimction. Hence, they 
can be used interchangeably in proving the theoretical results. The Lemma 3.4 shows 
that the constant term of the reconstruction fimction is the intended result when the 
answers used for the reconstruction are correct. 
Lemma 3.3 Without loss of generality, let (wi, ai), ... , (w, +i, a, +i) be a set of 
correct point-value pairs, where mi, mt+ i are / + 1 distinct elements e Zp and 
a\, a< + 1 are correct answers. The answer fimction is identical to the 
reconstruction fimction. And the degree of the answer fiinction A{z) (or 9t(z)) is at 
most t. 
Proof. Since the answer fimction is identical for all servers, from its construction, we 
can view the values a\, a,+ i as the results of evaluating the fimction at points 
mi, m,+1 respectively. On the other hand, (mi, a\), ... , (m,+i, a,+i) are used as 
the inputs to the reconstruction fimction. Since mi, m, + i are ? + 1 distinct 
elements e Zp and a\, 1 e Zp, due to the Lagrange Interpolation Theorem, we 
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know that these t + I point-value pairs (mi, a i ) , . . . , (m, +1, at+1) uniquely determines 
a polynomial of degree at most t. Hence, the answer function is identical to the 
reconstruction function and its degree is at most /. Hence, this completes the proof. 
Q. E. D. 
Lemma 3.4 When a reconstruction function is created by / + 1 correct 
point-value pairs, the constant term of 9l(z), i.e., 91(0), is Xi. 
Proof. From Lemma 3.3, we know that ^(0) = 91(0). Therefore, it is sufficient to 
show that ^ (0) is x,. From the construction of the answer function, we know that 
^(0) = Sg,(0) • xj (mod/p) = X'O) • (mod/>). 
From the construction of the mapping function presented in Section 3.3.1, we 
know that when i j, = 0 and / =j, = 1. Therefore, we have ^ 4(0) = x,. This 
proves the Lemma. Q. E. D. 
Proofs for the p A T I R Scheme 
We are now ready to prove the properties of ATIR schemes. We first present the 
theoretical results about pATDR. schemes. 
Theorem 3.2 (pATIR Availability) The pATIR scheme satisfies the availability 
property. 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that the scheme guarantees the existence of t + \ 
correct answers despite attacks. According to the system model described in Section 
3.2.1, there are only up to / faulty servers in the system, k>t+\+f and / is bounded 
by t. Hence, the chent can receive at least / + 1 correct answers. Due to the 
synchronous setting of the system, the answers from these / + 1 servers are 
guaranteed to be received by the client within a knovra bounded time. By Lemma 3.4, 
we know that these answers can be used to reconstruct x,. 
Hence, the conclusion. Q. E. D. 
Theorem 3.3 (pATIR Privacy) The pATIR scheme satisfies the privacy property. 
Proof: According to the definition of the privacy property of a pATIR scheme, it is 
sufficient to show that the information of no more than t queries reveals nothing 
about i. That is, the joint distribution of t queries is independent of i . Recall that the 
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query functions are polynomials of degree at most t. According to the Lagrange 
Interpolation theorem, for a polynomial of degree at most t, t (or fewer) distinct 
point-value pairs indicate no information about the polynomial. Hence, fi-om t (or 
fewer) points, no information about its fi-ee term can be obtained either. Note that 
any of these polynomials can be the one that are used for generating tiie queries. Due 
to the assumption that there are no more than t curious servers who collude together, 
an attacker can at most collect the information about the polynomial at t points. 
Therefore, no information about i can be revealed from no more than / queries. 
Hence, the conclusion. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3.4 (pATIR Safety) The pATIR scheme satisfies the safety property. 
Proof. Lemma 3.2 indicates that there is only a small possibility e>0 that the error 
detection function fails to detect a corrupted (but valid) result. Additionally the 
probabilistic result verification algorithm presented in Figure 3.4 indicates that when 
the pATIR scheme outputs a result, there are only two possibilities: i) the result is 
correct; or ii) the result is valid but corrupted with a small probability e. Hence, the 
scheme outputs a correct result x, with a probability no less than 1 - e. Therefore, we 
have the conclusion. Q. E. D. 
Theorem 3.5 (pATIR Liveness) The pATIR scheme satisfies the liveness property. 
Proof: In order to prove the liveness property, it is sufficient to show that the 
probabilistic resuh verification algorithm stops. Theorem 3.2 indicates that the 
scheme guarantees the existence of at least one correct result. The existence of this 
result ensures that the algoritiim will stop. Hence, the conclusion. Q.E.D. 
Proofs for the d A T I R Scheme 
The dATIR scheme employs the same set of basic algorithms as the pATIR scheme 
but uses different result verification algorithms. Because the result verification is 
locally performed by the chent, the proofs of the availability and privacy properties 
of the dATIR scheme remain exactiy the same as with the pATIR scheme. The 
proofs of the safety and liveness properties of the dATER scheme, however, are 
different. 
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Theorem 3.6 (dATIR Availability) The dATIR scheme satisfies the availability 
property. 
Proof: Since this proof is exactly the same as the proof given for Theorem 3.2, the 
details are therefore omitted. 
Theorem 3.7 (dATIR Privacy) The dTIR scheme satisfies the privacy property. 
Proof Since this proof is exactly the same as the proof given for Theorem 3.3, the 
details are therefore omitted. 
Theorem 3.8 (dATIR Safety) The dTIR scheme satisfies the safety property. 
Proof. Since the error detection fimction may fail to detect vahd but corrupted results. 
At the end of the dATIR scheme, there is a chance that two or more distinct valid 
results are available. In this case, the scheme outputs no result to avoid outputting a 
corrupted result. On the other hand, after all the iterations, if all results are identical 
and valid, it must be a correct result. Therefore, the outputted result, if there is one, 
must be the intended one. Hence, the safety property is ensured. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3.9 (dATIR Liveness) The dATIR scheme satisfies the liveness property. 
Proof To prove the liveness of the scheme, it suffices to show that the deterministic 
result verification algorithm stops in the following situations: i) all answers are 
returned from the servers; and ii) only a part of the k answers are returned. In the first 
^ 
situation, the while loop stops at line 8 and results are reconstructed. This 
situation covers both normal circumstances and the circumstances that there are 
faulty (but not crashed) servers. All these results are subject to the second loop (line 
11-16), which stops after ^ loops in the worse case. The second situation occurs 
in the presence of at least one crashed server. This also includes the situation that 
some answers used for the reconstruction algorithm are corrupted. The algorithm 
stops when the algorithm timeouts (line 10). Again, all the results are subject to the 
second loop (line 11 - 16), which stops after loops in the worse case scenario. 
Hence, the conclusion. Q.E.D. 
Now, we have presented all the theoretical results of both ATIR schemes. 
However, the commimication complexity of both schemes is 0(n). In the next 
section, we reduce the communication complexity to 0(ri}'^) through a generic 
balancing technique which is first discussed in [CGKS95] and latter widely used in 
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seva-al other efforts, such as that presented in [CG97], to reduce the communication 
complexity of their schemes. 
3.3.7 CommMmacation Complexity 
The conmiunication complexity in both ATIR schemes is unbalanced. The client 
sends n logip bits to each server whereas the server replies with one single element 
with log'jp bits. A similar problem was first observed by Chor et. al. in [CGKS95] on 
PIR schemes. Note that the technique they proposed is based on the binary bit 
database model whereas ATIR schemes use a character string database model. This 
section shows how to apply a generic balancing technique presented in [CGKS95] to 
balance the bits exchanged between the client and the server. 
The generic balancing technique approaches this problem by partitioning the 
characters of the database into m blocks B\,..., Bm. Each block contains / characters. 
Without loss of generality, let use assume n = m-l. (the database is padded with 
dummy values when necessary.) Instead of applying tiie answer algorithm of an 
ATIR scheme to the entire database x, the algorithm is now repeatedly applied to 
each block. (In practice, this process can be done concurrently.) The index i is 
converted into an index i\ which is its relative position in the corresponding block. 
The new position is calculated by V = i (mod /)• That is, /' is now an element of the 
set {1, . . . , / } . The query functions are constructed using i ' as an input. As a result, a 
query consists of / elements. This query is repeatedly used by the algorithm on each 
block of the database. Consequently, instead of containing one element, an answer 
now consists of m elements, one for each block. The rest of the ATIR scheme 
remains the same. 
After using the balancing technique, the communication complexity of the ATIR 
schemes is brought down to 0(/i'^). hl-log^p bits are sent from the chent to the 
servers while hm-log^ bits are sent back from the servers. In total, there are 
log2p k'(m + t) bits exchanged between the client and the servers. When m = /, the 
communication complexity is 2-\o%}p-hn^'^. 
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3.4 Comparisons of A T I R with Existing P I R Schemes 
3.4.1 Comparing with Robust P I R Schemes 
The closest work related to ATIR is Beimel and Stahl's robust Private Information 
Retrieval (abbreviated rPIR henceforth) schemes, which were presented in [BS02]. 
Their schemes consider an active attack model and use Reed-Solomon Codes (RSC) 
[RS60, MS81] to identify correct results. The principle of RSC is based on majority 
voting techniques in fault tolerance. ATIR schemes differ from the rPIR schemes in 
several key aspects. Firstiy, the correctness condition for rPIR schemes \sk>3>t+ 1 
whereas that of ATIR schemes is A; > ^ + 1 + / where r > 1 and / < .^ hi order to 
tolerate up to /maliciously faulty servers where f<t, ATIR schemes use roughly 2/3 
servers that rPIR schemes need. In practice, the reduction of the number of replicated 
servers is significant because replication is costly. This is because their schemes only 
rely on majority voting to identify the correct results whereas ATIR schemes use 
probabilistic error detection to eliminate incorrect results, and rely on the result 
verification algorithms to identify the correct ones. 
In rPIR schemes with a crash failure model, the answers from any k out of / 
servers are sufficient to reconstruct a result and up to t servers are allowed to collude 
with each other. Such schemes are called f-private k-ovA-of-l robust PIR schemes, 
where l>k,t>\ and k>t+ I, and the communication complexity of these schemes 
k 
is 0{-j • M"* • / • log/). In particular, under the same model, the authors also constiiict 
2-out-of-/ robust PIR schemes with 0(n^'^ log I) communication complexity. But no 
communication is allowed among the servers. 
In ATIR schemes with a crash failure model, the answers from any t+ I outofk 
servers can be used to reconstruct a correct result, provided that the number of 
colluding servers is bounded by t, there are up to / crashed servers, and k>t+f+ 1. 
These ATIR schemes have an 0(n^'^) conmiunication complexity. 
In a malicious failure model, two types of Byzantine rPIR schemes are constructed. 
If no communication is allowed among the servers, a ^-Byzantine robust k-out-of-l 
PIR scheme is presented with an 0(A: /j"'-*'^-' / log/) communication complexity, 
wh&Let<lk/3i,t>l,l>k. 
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However, the assxmiption that there is no communication among compromised 
servers (still in the malicious failure model) is not realistic. Therefore, the authors 
fijTther present a ^ -private and r-Byzantine robust k-out-of-l PIR scheme which allows 
the rPIR schemes to tolerate any collusion of up to t servers and up to t Byzantine 
faulty servers. The commimication complexity of the -^private and f-Byzantine rPIR 
k I 
schemes is 0{—n'^**" ""^  • / • log/) commvinication complexity, where t < k/3, t > 1, 
and l>k.]n particular, when t is one, the communication complexity of these rPIR 
4 
schemes become 0(— • w • / • log/), which is a trivial result in terms of communication 
complexity. Therefore, in order to obtain non-trivial communication complexity, at 
least five servers (when t=l) have to be used and the corresponding communication 
complexity is (9(^ «' / log/) [Bei04]. In order to achieve 0(/i''^) communication 
complexity, these schemes requke at least seven servers. 
Under the malicious failvire model, ATIR schemes achieve better communication 
complexity while requiring fewer servers. In particular, we construct -^private and 
^-malicious ATIR schemes which allow up to any t servers to collude together and 
tolerate up to / maliciously faulty servers, provided that k>t+f+ \,t>l, and f<t. 
The communication complexity of our ATIR schemes is 0(«'^^). For example, to 
tolerate two maliciously faulty servers and having an 0(/i'^ )^ commimication 
complexity, ATIR schemes require at least five servers whereas rPIR schemes 
require seven. 
3.4.2 Comparing with Hardware-based P I R Schemes 
With the use of secure co-processors, hardware-based PIR (hPER.) schemes can 
reduce both computation and communication costs incurred by other PIR schemes. 
Since hPIR does not take server faults into account, we consider a special case of 
ATIR where there is no faulty servers in the system, i.e. / = 0. In this case, ATIR is 
reduced to a normal PIR and ATIR can only offer privacy protection for users. 
In hPIR schemes, secure co-processors are installed on a PIR server, and are 
treated as black boxes within which all PIR operations are performed. Each co-
processor is assumed to have established a secure channel with a user, for example, 
using encryption. All the traffic in and out of these secure co-processors passes 
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through these secure channels. Due to the use of encryption, the server cannot figure 
out any information (in a computational sense) of PIR queries and answers. Hence, 
the user's privacy is protected. 
Due to the use of encryption and secure co-processors, the communication 
complexity of all hPIR schemes is brought down to be constant (independent of the 
size of a database), i.e. 0(1). But the computation cost of some early hardware-based 
PIR schemes [SSOO, SSOl] is 0(«). Therefore, the subsequent work [AF02, IS03, 
Aso04] introduces advanced pre-processing techniques (i.e. periodical database 
shuffling) to reduce online computation time to be independent of database sizes, i.e., 
0(1). However, albeit a constant, the online computation time in these schemes 
grows linearly as the number of queries increases. Periodical shuffling and 
encryption operations are required to prepare databases for these hPIR schemes. 
Like the majority of PIR schemes, the computation complexity of ATIR schemes 
is 0(M), i.e. the computation time of ATER grows linearly as the number of records 
involved increases. In terms of online computation costs, ATIR is much worse than 
hPIR. However, ATIR does not require any database pre-processing and the database 
in ATIR is available all the time. 
Whereas as shown in [IS03, Aso04], hPIR schemes have exceedingly high pre-
processing costs (in the order of hours in the best algorithm known so far [Aso04]). 
That is due to the algorithmic cost of performing periodical shuffling. Siace this is a 
mandatory process for privacy concerns, it can cause performance and deployment 
concerns in practice. Currentiy, even using the best shufflmg algorithm, the 
computation complexity of shuffling is 0(n'^) [Aso04] which is verified 
experimentally. 
However, ATIR relies on k (> 2) repUcated servers and restiicts the 
communication among servers to provide privacy protection whereas hPIR only 
requires one single server to achieve the goal. 
The communication complexity of both ATIR schemes is 0{n^'\ However, 
unlike hPIR, ATIR require neither encryption nor secure hardware to support privacy 
protection. In summary, we believe that ATIR is appealing because it demands fewer 
configurations on and makes fewer assumptions about on the execution environment. 
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Limitations of Hardware-based P I R Schemes 
Here, we discuss the limitations of hPIR schemes in details. hPIR schemes impose 
sfrong trust assumptions on the deployment environment which significantly restiict 
tiie practicability of these schemes. 
Pre-processing, such as encryption and shuffling, is needed to prepare a database 
for hPIR operations. The database of an hPIR scheme is assumed to be encrypted to 
hide its content. That is because without encryption, the server can easily spot the 
identity of a record being retrieved. Periodical reshuffling is needed to randomise the 
positions of the records in the database. Otherwise, the access history can reveal 
some information about the intended record. Between two reshuffling operations, no 
database updates are allowed. As a whole, the encryption and shuffling requirements 
mean that hPIR schemes have to use dedicated databases which are maintained 
separately from normal databases. In theory, this is feasible. But in reality, it is 
doubtful whether a service provider will provide such setting just for the sake of the 
privacy of users. 
A trusted copy of the encryption and shuffling algorithm implementations is 
needed to be installed on secure co-processors before any hPIR schemes start. The 
conmiunication channels, between secure co-processors and clients, are needed to be 
encrypted to prevent privacy violation from the servers and the communication 
channels. 
3.4.3 A Summary of Comparison Results 
So far, we have presented ATIR schemes and compared them with relevant PIR 
schemes. Table 3-1 presents a comparison between ATIR schemes and two other 
most relevant PIR schemes (i.e. rPIR and hPIR). The downloading solution discussed 
in section 3.2.4 is abbreviated as the dl-PIR in the table. Columns three, four, and 
five represent the communication complexity, the worse case reconstiuction times, 
and the computation complexity of these schemes, respectively. 
67 
CHAPTER THREE. ATTACK-TOLERANT INFORMATION RETRIEVAL 
Table 3-1A Comparison of PIR Schemes 
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We have presented the construction and theoretical results of two ATIR schemes and 
compared them with relevant PIR schemes. In order to fully understand the strength 
and limitations of these schemes and the impUcations of our results, we discuss some 
relevant issues of ATIR in a wider context. 
3.5.1 Validity of A T I R System Assumptions 
We now examine the three assumptions made in the ATIR system model in turn. The 
first two assumptions place a bound on the mraiber of curious servers and the number 
of faulty servers. To realise these assumptions, it is important to apply the design 
diversity approach [AK84] in various stage of system design and implementation. 
Otherwise, an attacker can easily exploit a common vulnerabiUty of all servers to 
compromise the entire system. Consequently, the scheme will be of little use if such 
vulnerability can be easily found and exploited. For example, diverse operating 
systems (Linux and Windows) and programming languages (e.g. Java and C) can be 
used for the implementation. We can also choose from a wide range of readily 
available commercial database engines (e.g. MySQL and Microsoft SQL Server) for 
the servers. All these countermeasures may help to reduce the overall vulnerability of 
the system by incorporating diversity into the system implementation. So long as all 
the implementations conform to a well-defined set of protocol interfaces (which we 
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shall describe in the next chapter), the problem of communicating among diverse 
implementations can be resolved. 
The third assumption is about the trustworthiness of the cUent throughout the 
lifetime of the system. For example, this assumption can be realised by requiring the 
user to choose a personal computer (i.e. a client) which the user has fiiU control of 
and to ensure the authenticity of the software installed on this computer. 
3,5.2 Comparison with Existing Secure and Fault Tolerant Schemes 
We now compare ATIR with three latest developed secure and fault tolerant 
algorithms/systems. These systems are BFT [CasOl, CL99], COCA [ZSR02], and 
SINTRA [CP02] and they share many similarities with ATIR. For example, all these 
systems use repHcated servers, are based on the active attack model and provide 
correct services so long as no more than a threshold number of servers are corrupted. 
But they also differ from ATIR in several important aspects. All these systems 
rely on an external trusted party (e.g. a system operator) to setup the systems. In 
particular, distributing security keys (e.g. authentication keys, encryption keys, 
signing keys) is mandatory to be performed by a trusted operator. However, the 
purpose of employing such a trusted party is different in these systems. BFT is a 
generic fault tolerant algorithm. The use of security keys in BFT is for enabling 
authentication among participants and providing secure communication within the 
system (thus thwarting eavesdroppers, for example). The current ATIR system model 
assumes authenticated but not secure communication links. When authentication is 
needed in ATIR, authentication mechanisms can be added into ATIR as BFT does. 
However, messages fransmitted over the communication links are not required to be 
encrypted in ATIR. 
In COCA and SINTRA, the role of the trusted party is more essential than that in 
BFT. COCA and SINTRA are application specific systems: COCA aims to provide 
an online certification authority whereas the goal of SINTRA is to enable secure 
DNS. Apart from demanding authenticated and secure communication among 
participants, the services in COCA and SINTRA require tiie protection of the service 
signing key, such as the signing key of a certification authority. Both systems use 
some variants of secret sharing (discussed in Section 2.5.2) to split a signing key and 
distribute the shares of the secret. Proactive security (discussed in Section 2.5.4) with 
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the use of secure co-processors is also employed to enable regular refi-eshment of the 
key. Therefore, in both systems, the trusted operator is also responsible to distribute 
the initial shares of the key. 
In contrast, no trusted operators are required to initialise an ATIR system. No 
secure co-processors are needed during the operation stage of an ATIR system either. 
Finally, none of the three systems provide fault-tolerant privacy protection as 
ATIR does. When a server is compromised by an attacker, users' privacy is violated 
in all three systems. On the contrary, ATER provides privacy protection even in the 
presence of active attacks. 
ATIR provides a new way of detecting and tolerating malicious attacks without 
relying on trusted third parties during the setup and operation stages of an ATIR 
system. However, the semantic of ATIR is much weaker than all three systems. 
ATIR only provides read-only operations whereas they offer both read and 
write/update operations. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presents two ATIR schemes for performing database queries in a 
synchronous distributed network environment. These schemes protect the privacy of 
users and ensure the correctness of results even in the presence of malicious attacks. 
We tackle the ATIR problem through three closely linked techniques: privacy 
protection, error detection and attack tolerance. By hiding the intention of retrieval 
operations, the privacy of users can be protected. Hence, the risk of targeted attacks 
can be reduced. Through restricting the range of valid results, errors may be detected 
and corrupted servers may therefore be identified. Finally, attack tolerance is 
achieved through the introduction of a form of redundancy - rephcation, a classic 
and well-known fault tolerance technique for tolerating faults. As a whole, all three 
techniques complement to each other and together they provide a solution for the 
ATIR problem. 
Together with a thorough description of the formal database model, and a list of 
assumptions used in the ATIR system model, detailed constructions of ATIR 
schemes are first presented. This is followed by a presentation of the basic 
algorithms of ATIR schemes and a detailed characterisation of their fault tolerance 
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conditions. We then describe the rationale for introducing a probabilistic error 
detection function that is followed by a detailed description of the principle, 
calculation, extensions, and implications of the error detection function. Two result 
verification algorithms are then derived: one for probabilistic ATIR and the other for 
deterministic ATIR. The properties of both ATIR schemes are proved and the 
communication complexity these schemes are reduced to 0(n'^). ATIR is then 
compared with relevant PIR efforts to reveal the strengths and limitations of ATIR. 
Finally, we place ATIR in a wider context by discussing the vaUdity of the 
assumptions made in the ATIR system model and fiirther examining the relationship 
between ATIR and other state-of-the-art secure and fault tolerant systems. 
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Chapter 4 System Architecture and 
Implementatioii 
In the preceding chapters we have presented the theory to model the ATIR problem 
and to construct ATIR schemes. This chapter describes a system architecture to 
realise the ATIR schemes based on realistic databases. We also discuss the design 
decisions and implementation issues that arise during system implementation. 
PIR can be viewed as a special case of ATIR in that there is no faxilty server in the 
system. We have also implemented the polynomial-interpolation based PIR schemes 
presented in [CGKS95]. Since the PIR implementation is very similar to the ATIR 
implementation, only some distinct details of the former are included. 
4.1 System Architecture 
At the basic level, an ATIR system can be viewed as a data query service with 
additional security and fault tolerance supports. 
To distinguish ATIR services from the conventional data query services, such as 
database queries, we illustrate the logical relationship of the layers of the ATIR 
system in Figure 4-1. However, it is important to note that ATIR only supports read-
only operations and an ATIR query has a much restricted SQL syntax than general 
SQL statements. In particular, ATIR users are assumed to know the index 
information about the records in a database. (Section 4.3.1 discusses some possible 
solutions of relaxing this assumption.) 
At the basic design level, an ATIR system follows the conventional client-server 
architecture consisting of a cUent and a server. At the top layer, a user program 
interacts with database services through the Data Query Protocol (DQP). The DQP 
protocol is simply an abstracted representation of ATIR query operations that can be 
invoked by the user. Ideally, apart from specifying their security and fault tolerance 
requirements, users should not need to worry about the underlying protocol 
complexity of ATIR systems. To facilitate this need, a set of standardised (i.e.. 
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following conventional fiinction calls in UNIX/LINUX) interfaces is designed to 
accommodate a range of such requirements. The system also provides a set of default 
settings to ease the pain of comphcated configuration. 
User Program 












ATIR Client ATIR Server 
Figure 4-1 The ATIR System and Network Layers 
ATIR clients and servers commimicate via the ATIR protocol, which specifies 
the format and types of the data contained in the ATIR queries and answers. We shall 
give fiirther details of the ATIR protocol in the later section of this chapter. The 
ATIR protocol sits on top of the TCP/IP communication channels. 
In the system, there are two types of Application Program Interfaces (APIs): one 
for the client and one for the server. The ATIR client interface API defines the type 
and format of the input that the system takes fi-om the user and the result that the 
system outputs to the user. The server interface API specifies the type and format of 
the information that it passes to and obtains from the normal data services, such as 
databases or data directories. Commonly, a query for these services is required to 
follow specific protocols and tiirough dedicated data engines or database drivers. The 
server API interface ensures that the queries created by the ATIR server conform to 
these protocols and support seamless integration with backend data services. 
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Figure 4-2 An ATIR System Architecture in a Replication Setting 
As shown in Figure 4-2, an ATIR system is conceptually divided into a number 
of components by their functionalities. On the client side, we have the following 
components: client daemon, query manager, result manager, and index resolver. On 
the other hand, the server side components are server daemon, view manager, and 
answer manager. Some of the components are integrated with the others to avoid the 
unnecessary complications in real implementation. For example, the result manager 
is implemented as a major part of the client program in the current implementation. 
ATIR is implemented as a stand-alone library and can be utilised through 
invoking an ATIR library function. The implementation is currently supported under 
the Linux environment. The current design, however, can be easily ported to 
different platforms (e.g., WESfDOWS) with little or no modifications. Meanwhile, the 
modular design may help to ease the effort of porting the ATIR library to Windows 
operating system as well. The ATIR library provides simple APIs and gives the user 
(e.g. a program) to choose whether to utilise ATIR service with integrated security 
and fault tolerance features. We have also implemented a simplified version of ATIR 
database service in Java to demonstrate the portability of the implementation. 
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The user invokes the ATIR service through an ATIR function call which connects 
the user with the cUent daemon tired, which is a central processing program for 
coordinating the tasks of the client side, tired first decides whether it needs to 
perform the Index Resolve Protocol (IRP) to obtain the index of an intended data 
item fi-om the index resolver. If it does, it resolves the index. Together with the index 
and other information it already acquires fi-om the user, tired creates a request and 
forwards it to the query manager qm through the Query Protocol (QP). When the QP 
protocol completes, tired obtains a reply (in the form of a tuple) from qm which 
contains k ATIR queries, one per server. The queries are sent to the ATIR servers 
appropriately via the ATIR Protocol {ATIRP) over point-to-point TCP channels. 
The ATIR server daemon tirsd forwards ATIR queries to a view manager vm via 
the View Protocol (VP). The vm converts the ATIR queries into the appropriate 
format that is accepted for performing the Data Access Protocol (DAP) on the data 
repository on the servers. When the VP protocol completes, tirsd obtains a tuple that 
consists of the inputs for tiie answer computation. In summary, vm polls the 
information from the data repository according to the ATIR queries and forwards 
such information to the answer manager am via the answer protocol (AP). am is 
responsible for the server side computation of the ATIR scheme, am produces an 
answer which is sent back to tired, again, over the point-to-point TCP chaimels. 
Upon receiving answers, tired forwards them to the result manager rm via the 
Result Protocol (RP). When the RP is completed, the intended result is returned to 
the Mser via tired. This completes the ATIR function call. 
4.2 Design Issues 
4.2.1 The Character-String Database Model 
Why Character String Model? 
This section describes why and how to extend the existing bit-string database model 
to character-string database model. In the original PIR database model, each database 
is modelled as a binary bit string where each bit is an absfraction of a data item on 
the server. To implement PIR schemes for real applications, we need to extend the 
model and map the abstracted notation to reality. In the real world, the smallest unit 
of a data item is commonly represented as a single byte character. Most commercial 
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database engine, such as MySQL [MySQL04] database server and JDBC [JDBC04] 
database APIs, provide methods to retrieve data (items) as character strings. In our 
current implementation, each character is associated with an extended ASCII code 
and is uniquely associated with a decimal integer in the interval [0,255]. 
Having described the rationale for a character-string database model, the next 
section explains how to associate a character with a unique element of a finite field 
so that it can be used for the PIR/ATIR computations. First, we show how to 
associate characters with field elements of finite prime fields. We then describe how 
to associate characters with field elements of GF(256). The former is applicable for 
our ATIR implementation whereas the latter one is for the PER. implementation only. 
Characters, Prime Fields, and ATIR 
This section shows the association of characters with field elements in finite prime 
fields Zp, where is a prime number and p > 255. In the current implementation, 
each character can be uniquely associated with a smallest possible element in the 
chosen prime field. For instance, the character 'A' is associated with the integer 65 in 
the prime field GF(331). 
Prime fields, however, are not necessarily for implementing PIR due to the 
performance concerns. Since there are 256 characters, ideally, the computation 
should be done with all these characters. Besides, the elements in GF(257) consume 
more memory spaces and communication bandwidth which can be a concern when 
measuring the message sizes exchanged among the client and the servers. The 
smallest possible prime field that can accommodate all 256 characters is GF(151) 
which is ttie set {0,1,2, . . . , 256}. There is one extra element, i.e., 256, which cannot 
be associated with any character. 
Althougji we can use GF(257) for PIR operations, however, GF(257) is not 
necessary for the PIR implementation because of the extra overheads that may be 
introduced by the extra element. It requires 2-byte integers to represent the field 
elements in GF(257) and only 1-byte integer for GF(256). That is, from a theoretical 
point of view, using GF(251) doubles the communication bandwidtii and storage 
space. 
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This suggests that the PIR implementation may only needs a finite field which 
can just accommodate all 256 elements. Fortunately, we do have such a finite field 
GF(256) which has 256 elements. 
Characters, GF(256), and PIR 
Before going any fiirther to explain how to associate the single byte characters with 
field elements of GF(256), we need some brief background in finite fields. From 
finite field theory [LN97], we know the following: 
GF(256) = Z2[x]lm{x\ 
where Ziix] are polynomials over the finite field Zi [LN97 pp. 20, Chi79 pp. 125], 
m{x) is a degree-8 irreducible polynomial [LN97, pp.91] in Z2[x\. The equation 
means that GF(256) is associated with polynomials over finite field Z2 and the 
degree of the polynomials is no more than seven. (Readers are referred to, for 
example, [Chi79, pp. 172, pp. 185 and LN97] for details of congruence classes 
modulo a polynomial) 
Note that there are many degree-8 irreducible polynomials in Z2[x] [LN97, pp. 
553] that can be chosen for constructing GF(256). In the current implementation, the 
modulus is: 
m{x) = + x' + + + :^ + \, 
where x, a formal symbol, is an indeterminant of the polynomial. 
One way of thinking of the elements of GF(256) is to view them as polynomials 
in X with co-efficiencies in Z2 of degree < 7 and there are 256 (there are eight 
coefficiencies and therefore 2^  possibilities) such polynomials. The operations of 
these elements are just like the operations of polynomials (for example, see 
[Chi79, pp. 125]. Addition and subtraction are done by bit-wise exclusive-or of the 
corresponding coefGciencies. To get the product again as a polynomial of degree < 7, 
vise the equation x^ = x' + x^ + x^ + x^ + ^ + 1. Also, each element has a 
multiplicative inverse so that we can do division over the field as well. Notice that 
there are eight co-efficiencies of these polynomials and each of them is a bit. When 
putting these bits together and ordering from the leading co-efficient to the constant 
co-efficient, a binary nimiber vmiquely corresponding to a decimal integer in the 
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interval [0, 255] can be obtained. In that way, a field element can be uniquely 
associated with a character and vice versa. 
We slightly modify (i.e., getting rid of the namespace) the GF(256) 
implementation from Wei Dai's Crypto library [Dai04] for our wse. 
4.2.2 Core Components 
We have implemented ATIR as an ANSI C [Ker88] Ubrary with simple interfaces for 
secure and fault tolerant database access. In this section, we will describe the 
interfaces and protocols involved in an ATIR function call. 
The A T I R APIs 
Figure 4-3 shows the main APIs of ATIR client and server. On the client side, there 
are two major function calls. User programs can invoke ATIR client tired by 
calling the function tir_subinit_query with two parameters. 
tir_sumit_queryO will perform three tasks: initialise the system, construct 
queries, and proceed the first attempt to send queries to the rephcas. 
C l i e n t : 
i n t t ir_submit_query(char * c o n f i g _ f i l e , char *query_time); 
i n t t i r_ge t_resu l t (char *resul t , char *resul t_t ime); 
Server: 
i n t t i r_execute ( i n t connfd, char *dbhost, char *dbusr, char 
*dbpass); 
Figure 4-3 The ATIR Library Main APIs 
The conf i g _ f i l e parameter is a pointer to the configuration file to initialise 
ATIR clients and contains two types of information: the user's ATIR requirements 
and authentication information. The user's requirements are used to generate queries 
and include the following: number of calculation records numcalrecs, imdetected 
error rate e, range of valid data data_range, minimvim number of correct replicas k, 
and maximum number of faulty replicas / Note that numcalrecs is both the 
number of query elements sent to the server and the size of each block on the server 
side. The authentication information is used for establishing TCP connections with 
remote servers and includes the following: the IP addresses of ATIR servers, the 
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service port, database, table, and data item. The configuration file also contains the 
following specific information about the intended database, table, and data item with 
a pair of usemame and password to enable the servers to enforce access control. 
Currently, the library rehes on the access control mechanisms provided by the 
servers. 
The second parameter is a value-result argument [Ste98, pp. 65] which is a string 
pointer for storing the time taken to bootsfrap the system from the configuration file, 
for preparing and sending queries. When the fimction returns, guerY_time stores 
tiie actual timing measurements. 
Followed by calling tir_sul3mit_query fiinction, the user program should call 
the fiinction t i r _ g e t _ r e s u l t to obtain results. The first parameter result is also a 
value-result argument which provides a storage space for storing the result 
reconstructed by the system. Similarly, the resul t_t ime parameter is used to 
return the time taken for reconstructing results. t i r_ge t_ resu l tO conducts three 
tasks: i) continuing to estabUsh the socket connections with the servers i f they 
haven't been done, ii) sending queries and wait for the answers to return, and iii) 
reconstructing results and determine when to stop the reconstruction process. 
On the server side, the main computation is triggered by the server daemon calling 
the fimction t i r_execute with four parameters: the descriptor for an established 
socket, the database host name (in case the database server is separated from the 
ATIR server), and the usemame-password pair for accessing the database. In the 
current implementation, the ATIR server is multi-threaded. A new and separated 
thread is created to deal with the each client's ATIR request. A server assigns a new 
socket descriptor to each new connection which is stored in the parameter connf d. 
To ensure the service availability, three other parameters (i.e. dbhost, dbusr, 
dbpass) are also provided for authenticating legitimate users and identifying 
spurious ones. 
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Query Manager 
This section describes how to prepare the query messages using the ATIR query 
protocol. The fimctionalities of the query manager include the following five tasks: 
1) Generate a random record set for the server side computation; 
2) Determine the order of the finite field; 
3) Generate the query polynomials; 
4) Set distinct evaluation points for the polynomials; and finally 
5) Put all the information together to create the query elements for each replica. 
Based upon the i d e n t i f i e r passed by the cUent daemon and the 
nxiincalrecs setting, the query manager determines the record set by randomly 
selecting two integers in tendedindex and in tendedblock from the interval 
[1, numcalrecs]. The size (number of records) of each block is niomcalrecs. 
The index of the first record f i r s t r e e is calculated as follows: 
blocks = intendedblock - 1; 
f i r s t r e c = i d e n t i f i e r - intendedindex + 1 + blocks*numcalrecs; 
The index of the last record l i is calculated as follows. 
blocks = numcalrecs - intendedblock + 1; 
l i = i d e n t i f i e r - intendedindex + blocks * numcalrecs; 
The selection should make sure that the index of the first and the last record of the 
sever side computation are within the interval [1, n], where n is the total number of 
records in the database. That is, f i r s t r e c should be no less than 1 and 
l a s t index should be no greater than n. 
Only transmitting the index of the first record rather than the indexes of all records 
significantly saves the commxinication cost. With the index of the first record, the 
server program derives other indexes on the server side. That is straightforward since 
the block size is fixed. 
When the query protocol finishes, the query message for each replica is ready to 
be sent by the client daemon. The size of an index is different from the size of a 
query or an answer element. An index is a fixed-size (i.e., 8-bit) character whereas 
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the size of query and answer elements varies according to the size of the finite field 
that are chosen by the user. 
Client Daemon and Result Manager 
Logically, the client daemon is separated firom the result manager. In the 
implementation, they physically coexist within one single program. That is because 
witii the use of non-blocking I/O sockets, the coimection operation returns 
immediately and informs the program that the operation cannot finish immediately. 
The client program can proceed to perform other operations and come back later. 
Apart fi-om coordinating the index resolver and query manager, tired'^ other tasks 
are to send queries and reconstruct results. Since ATIR clients connect to the servers 
through one-to-one commtmication chaimels, concurrent but separated socket 
connections are required between a client and each of the server to which it connects. 
We rely on TCP sockets to provide reliable conmiunication. 
There are two design alternatives for implementing multiple concurrent 
connections with servers: a multithreaded client with each thread dealing with a TCP 
connection with a server or a single-threaded cUent with non-blocking I/O processing. 
Our previous PIR/ATIR system implementation used the first approach with the Java 
programming language whereas our current implementation adopts the second 
approach using the C programming language. We presented the experimental results 
of the PIR/ATIR Java implementations in [YXB02a, YXB02b]. Compared with the 
second approach, the first one, however, is rather inefficient because of the use of 
blocking I/O and a polling model [Ste98 pp. 145]. The client daemon sits in a loop, 
which checks the availabiHty of answers in the threads. This is often considered to be 
a waste of CPU time. Strictly speaking, it is not a proper approach for ATIR 
implementation because of its sequential checking metiiod to poll the information of 
the threads. Before the system starts, it is unknown that which set of servers will first 
return answers. 
Our current implementation xjses the single-threaded approach to avoid the 
application level compUcation introduced by coordinating multiple concurrent 
threads and to reduce thread overhead. As shown in the next chapter, the C 
implementation of ATIR performs well. Indeed, non-blocking I/O processing has 
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been well documented to outperform thread processing. (See, for example, [Ste98, pp. 
409], [KG02], and [Wel02]). 
The client program follows an event-driven architecture by using the s e l e c t 
function call to wait for answers to arrive or for timeout to be reached. We follow a 
similar approach used by Stevens in [Ste98, Chapter 15] to design the main logic of 
the non-blocking I/O processing. The client side sockets are all set to be non-
blocking so that the system can effectively manage the socket connections and 
send/recv buffers. Generally speaking, blocking sockets will wait until the condition 
to be tine while non-blocking sockets rely on the underlying system mechanisms to 
handle the concurrent events. 
Specifically, we use non-blocking connect operations to attempt the first socket 
connection with each of the servers. Often, the first connection attempt will not be 
successful immediately. This may be caused by the slow response of servers and the 
delay of network transmissions. Since the system uses a non-blocking I/O, the socket 
will return immediately and report the error status (i.e. socket connection in process). 
Of course, the socket status will be checked later to check whether the connection 
has been estabHshed. By exploiting non-blocking I/O in our system, the impact 
caused by exceptional slow servers can be largely reduced and therefore the overall 
system performance may be improved. As demonstrated in ovir performance in the 
next chapter, this approach is can be very effective for dealing with slow or unstable 
network connections with remote servers. 
Each replica is associated with a flag which can be in one of the statuses of the 
following set: 
{connec t ing , r ead ing , done, f a i l e d } . 
After the first socket connection attempts, the socket status of all servers is set to 
be connect ing. The first two statuses mean tiiat the server is still interacting with 
the server. Once the connection is established, the client sends the corresponding 
query message immediately. Otherwise, the connection is failed and the server status 
is marked as failed. 
Each socket has a pair of read/write descriptors that are used to examine whether 
the sockets are ready to read or write. When a non-blocking socket connection is 
established, the cUent sends the corresponding query to the respective server while 
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setting the read descriptor of this socket to be on and changing the server status to 
reading. The failvire of the first non-blocking socket connection attempt does not 
mean that the server is not available. It may be the case that the server response or 
the network connection is slow. Therefore, the connection will be attempted later. In 
the meanwhile, the server status is set to be connect ing and both read and write 
descriptor for this socket are set to be on. 
Since we are using non-blocking sockets, there can be data available from any 
socket at any time. The data on TCP sockets is fransmitted as segments which can 
arrive in one-go or separately. It is up to the xmderlying TCP mechanism to 
dynamically handle the fransmission. Therefore, it is mandatory to ensure that the 
cUent keeps checking the socket until no more data is available to read. For a large 
trunk of data that are transmitted in several TCP segments, the underlying socket 
handles the actual data amount transmitted in each segment despite the total number 
of bytes sent out by the server. Each time, a newly arrived message segment is 
appended to the end of the current answer buffer. Once the nvimber of ready sockets 
exceeds the threshold limit, the reconstruction fimction will start to reconstruct 
results. 
Server Daemon, View IVIanager, Answer Manager 
The server daemon is implemented as pre-threaded servers to handle multiple chents' 
concurrent connections due to its good performance over non pre-threaded servers 
[Ste98]. By creating a pool of threaded when a server starts, it reduces the time taken 
to deal with each connection as the server can just reuse the existing threads without 
creating new ones, mutex is used to control concurrent access to critical regions and 
variables, for example, the acceptQ fiinction. Once a new thread is created to 
handle the client's connection, the program control is handed over to the fimction 
tirexecuteO, which has a loop to produce the answer for each block repeatedly. 
For each block, the view manager does three tasks. First, it constructs a SQL 
statement based on numcalrec and f i r s t r e c parameters obtained from the 
received query stiucture. It then proceeds to execute the SQL statement and 
fransform the SQL results into a computable format. 
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4.2.3 Message Formats 
With the tase of non-blocking I/O operations, however, we do need to pay some extra 
attention to socket buffer management. In our case, we have paid particular attention 
to the format of the query and answer messages to tune for better communication 
complexity. Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-5 shows the message formats in our current 
implementation. There are two types of messages exchanged over the 
communication channels in ATIR. A message fi-om the client to servers is called a 
query and a message on the reverse direction is an answer. The major content of 
query messages is query elements whereas the major content of answer messages is 
answer elements. In general, we refer to the major content as elements. 
These formats only specify the maximum communication capabiUty of ATIR 
messages. Each message contains two parts: a fixed-length header and a non-fixed 
length data. The length of headers is fixed no matter how much data items to be 
retrieved. The actual size of messages transmitted over the network varies mainly 
due to the size of contents (i.e., actual queries and answers). The following specifies 
the meanings of each part. 
o cM: an 2-byte integer which specifies the cUent id (currently unused) 
o gfforder: set the order of the finite field 
o mimcalrec: number of records in a block 
o ftrstrec: the index of the first record 
o dbmffo: the name of the intended database, table, usemame and password 
o content: query elements 
An answer message contains two sections: len and content, len is the total 
number of elements in each block and elen^, where y = 1, 2, f len and f len is 
the number of fields in a block, len and elen^ has the following relationship: 
len = ^slsfij . 
y=l ,2 Jlen 
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(fixed-length) Header (non-fixed length) Data 
8 bytes 60 bytes up to 4,028 bytes 
old gforder numcalrec firstrec dbinfo content 
element^ element^ elementnu^cairec 
Figure 4-4 Message Format for Queries 
(fixed-length) Header 
2 bytes 
(non-fixed length) Data 
up to 4,094 bytes 





. eleng elen,ien 
field. i fields fieldfien 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
element, elementj elementeienz 
Figure 4-5 Message Format for Answers 
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4.2.4 Optimizations 
This section describes three optimisations used in the PIR/ATIR C implementation. 
Structure optimisations 
The first optimisation only applies to the PIR implementation and reduces the 
communication cost by half, comparing to that of the ATIR implementation. This 
reduction is significant for PIR requests which require high privacy protection. 
In PIR, the elements in query and answer messages are 1-byte integers/characters, 
which are enough to accommodate all the characters that could appear on the server 
side computation. Therefore, these elements are sufficient to cover all the field 
elements that are required for PIR computations. However, ATIR has to use two-byte 
integers due to the fault tolerance requirement. Excluding the constant 
communication overheads imposed by the message headers, this technique reduces 
the communication by half 
Probabilistic Reconstruction for ATIR 
This optimisation speeds up the reconstruction process of ATIR. Instead of waiting 
for the finish of the deterministic reconstruction, the probabiUstic reconstruction 
stops when the first valid result is obtained. With the use of the pATIR, the 
reconstruction time can be reduced significantly in the normal situation. For example, 
with the use of three servers, the reconstruction time of pATIR is 1/3 of that of 
dATIR in normal circumstances. 
MySQL InitiaUsation 
In the current implementation, MySQL server side initialisation performs once 
before the block processing. This is an alternative to initialise MySQL connections 
for each block. This saving increases as the number of blocks grows. For example, 
when numtok = 100, i.e., there are 100 blocks, the total processing time is reduced 
from 0.277 second to 0.246 second. In this case, the optimisation saves 11% of the 
total processing time of ATIR. 
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4.3 Implementation Issues 
4.3.1 Circumventing the Index Knowledge Assumption 
There are several inherent stumbling blocks that preclude the practical ATIR 
implementations. As noted by an early paper [CGN97], all known PIR schemes 
require the user to know exactly the physical index of the intended record in a 
database. This assumption suffers from the following limitations: i) the physical 
index of records changes all the time, and it is difficult to keep users updated with the 
latest changes; i i ) the implementation of indexing mechanisms varies from system to 
system. In most of the cases, user applications cannot directly access this information. 
Often, this information is transparent to the user applications. The implementation of 
ATIR schemes also faces this problem. 
We can relax this assumption by associating each entry in the database with a 
unique numerical identifier, and introducing an identifier resolution protocol to 
extend the ATIR service from hiding the index of an intended data item to hiding the 
keyword of the data item. 
When the user supplies the keyword of an entity, the ATIR service wi l l query a 
directory service with the keyword and returns two pieces of information to the user: 
the identifier of the keyword and the total number of identifiers in the directory. 
Currently, our implementation only supports an one-to-one mapping relationship 
between a keyword and an identifier. 
This adaptation removes the index knowledge assumption and paves the way for 
integrating ATIR service in real applications. In practice, the physical index of the 
data item in databases can be substituted with the identifier information. An identifier 
is a label that identifies a person or an entity. Examples of identifiers include primary 
keys of databases, names of objects in an object-orientation programming, and the 
newly proposed permanent identifier for public key certificates [PG04]. Identifiers 
are usually required to be unique to ensure the one-to-one mapping relationship 
between an identifier and a subject entity. 
We assume that this mapping relationship is published correctly by service 
providers and stored in a trusted public directory. By searching the public directory 
using a subject name, we can resolve the identifier of an entity and then use it to 
retrieve the corresponding data item. This is through the use of the Identifier 
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Resolution Protocol that returns a unique identifier corresponding to the inputted 
keyword. 
4.3.2 FulHength Processing versus View Processing 
The server side computation of PIR schemes can be classified as: pre-processing and 
online processing. Both computations process the entire database on each individual 
server. We call it fiiU-length (pre-/online) processing. Only one of them wil l be 
chosen for any specific PER. scheme. The pre-processing aims to reduce the cost of 
online processing by changing the data to a specific format. This approach is used 
by [IS03], which reduces the cost of online processing to a constant. In terms of 
online processing, this is optimal although it is at the cost of fiill-length pre-
processing. Without pre-processing, online processing needs to compute over an 
entire database. 
The full-length processing over the entire database guarantees the perfect privacy 
property in PIR schemes, i.e., each record has an equal probability of being the one a 
user wants. For example, i f the processing is over a 100-record database, each record 
has 1/100 chance being the one wanted. Although the fiiU-length processing is secure, 
i t is costly and not flexible. Generally speaking, the level of privacy protection is 
proportional to the number of records involved in the server side computation. In 
other words, the chance of successfiil privacy violation by a server is inversely 
proportional to the number of records involved in the server side computation. This 
is a trade-off between computation cost and privacy. A better strategy is to let the 
user decide the amount of time for processing, and correspondingly, the level of 
privacy protection an ATIR service can provide. For example, by specifying the 
number of records the user wishes to compute over, a xxser can choose the level of 
privacy protection s/he can get. 
4,4 Summary 
This chapter first presents the architectural design of our ATIR system and the 
character-string database model used in the ATIR system implementation. We then 
describe the design details of the major components and present the message formats 
used in the ATIR system. A number of optimisation techniques used in the 
implementation of ATIR are briefly described. That is followed by some discussion 
on the important implementation issues of the ATIR system. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Evaluation 
This chapter presents the experimental studies of ATIR systems. We first derive an 
analytic model for the performance of an ATIR service and then derive performance 
model parameters. We validate the model by showing that it accurately predicts the 
performance results gathered in the experimental studies. The model can also be used 
to predict the performance of the system in different settings. 
We fijrther examine the impacts of varying the major parameter, such as view 
sizes and resuU sizes, on the Total Time for Processing (TTP) of ATIR in fault-free 
situations. To xmderstand the source of performance bottleneck of both services, we 
also examine the contributions of each component to the TTP. 
Finally, we investigate the behaviours of the ATIR system in the presence of 
simulated faults. We focus on the impacts of these faults to the TTPs of ATIR and 
discuss the implications of the experimental results. This chapter also compares the 
performance of ATIR with that of PIR and the downloading solution. 
5.1 Performance Models 
This section investigates the major factors that make an impact on the ATIR system 
performance. We present a complete analytic model for the ATIR implementation to 
analyse the costs imposed by various operations in the system. Performance models 
are useful for xmderstanding and explaining performance results. We can use these 
models for identifying the major sources of performance bottlenecks and verify the 
importance of theoretical concerns. These models are also useful for predicting the 
performance of the ATIR system in a different setting. The analytic model consists 
of a number of component models where each of them models an individual function 
of the system. 
5.1.1 Preliminaries 
The following notations are used in the performance models throughout this chapter. 
A symbol with / as its subscript means that it is a fixed cost incurred for performing 
an operation, that is, tiiis cost is independent of the input of a function. A symbol 
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with a as its subscript means that it is an additional cost incurred per unit. A unit can 
be a byte, an element, or a record. An element is either a single-byte integer or a two-
byte integer. An element is used in both computational and storage contexts. The 
element size, denoted by es, is defined as the number of bytes in an element. 
A result is the parts of a record that a user wants to retrieve. The result size, 
denoted by rs, is defined as the original number of elements in a result. By trimming 
off the empty spaces at the end of a result, an optimised result size, denoted by ors, is 
obtained. 
A query message contains a fixed-sized query header and query elements. The 
number of query elements in the message is defined as query size, denoted by qs. 
The query message size is the total number of bytes in a query message. 
An answer message consists of a fibted-sized answer header and answer elements. 
The number of answer elements in the message is defined as answer size, denoted by 
as. The answer message size is the total number of bytes in an answer message. 
The size of a message, denoted by mess, is the total number of bytes in a query 
and an answer message. 
A view is a collective representation of the data sets involved in the server side 
computation. A view size, denoted by vs, is defined as the total number of records 
involved. Table 5-1 offers a list of the notations for the variables described. 
Table 5-1 Notations for Performance Models 
Variables Name Unit Description 
es element size bytes number of bytes in an element 
qs query size element number of elements in a query, exclusive of a 
fixed-sized query header 
as answer size element number of elements in an answer, exclusive 
of a fixed-sized answer header 
rs result size element number of elements in a result 
mess message size byte number of bytes in a message 
vs view size record number of records in a view 
ors optimised result 
size 
element number of elements in a result after trimming 
off the spaces at the end 
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In the ATIR implementation, these variables have the following relationships: 
as = qs xrs 
mess = (qs + as) xes 
vs = (qsf 
5.1.2 Performance Modelling 
The overall performance of an ATIR service is characterised by TTP - the time taken 
from the system starting to process an ATIR configuration file until the system 
obtaining a result. TTP can be divided into three processing time as follows: client 
side, server side, and commvmication. 
On the client side, the major components of TTP include: system initialisation, 
query message preparation, and result reconstruction/verification. On the server side, 
the major components of TTP are: view creation, and answer message preparation. 
To help our presentation, let us first give a list of the short forms for timing variables 
and their corresponding meanings. 
T I S : time taken to initialise the system, (a constant cost) 
T P Q : time taken to prepare query messages, including headers. 
T R V : time taken to reconstruct and verify results. 
TCV: time taken to create views. 
T P A : time taken to prepare answer messages, including headers. 
T T Q M : time taken to fransmit a query message. 
T T A M : time taken to transmit an answer message. 
We fijrther infroduce the following timing variables to represent the sums of the 
above timing components: 
T S P : server processing time. 
T C O M M : communication time of an ATIR service. 
T S R : server response time. 
91 
CHAPTER FIVE. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
They have the following relationships: 
TSP = TCV +TPA 
TCOMM = TTQM + TTAM 
The client also spends time to perform the following regular tasks: establishing 
and closing TCP cormections, method invocations, memory management, 
establishing and releasing MySQL server connections, and garbage collections. We 
refer them as the time taken to do miscellaneous tasks, denoted by TMIS. 
Figure 5-1 shows a timing diagram which illustrates the relationships among these 
variables. (For clarity, TMIS is not presented in the diagram.) The shadow boxes 
represent the participants of an ATIR service. Each participant is associated with an 
execution line from top to bottom. To simplify the presentation, the diagram assumes 
that the client concurrently sends the query messages to tiie servers respectively and 
the servers receive them at the same point along the time line. A similar situation is 
also assumed for the answer messages. In reality, many non-system factors may have 
various degrees of impacts on message arrivals. Network load, system load, and 
system management tasks are the typical factors. 
The TTP of ATIR is given by the following formula: 
TTP = TIS + TPQ + TCOMM + TCV + TPA + TRV 
In the remaining presentation of this section, we shall focus on these components: 
TPQ, TPA, TCOMM, TCV, TRV, and finally TTP. The communication cost in 
ATIR is quantified through two models: a message model (TCOMM-1) and a 
communication cost model (TCOMM-2). Message sizes and actual communication 
costs are the major concerns in PIR and ATIR research. TCOMM-1 represents the 
bandwidth consumption of ATIR whereas TCOMM-2 characterises the performance 
overhead of message transmission. 
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Figure 5-1 A Timing Diagram for ATIR Services 
Message Preparation (TPQ and TPA) 
We first derive a model for calculating TPQ. The computation is modelled as a linear 
fimction of query size as follows. 
TVQiqs) = Q M f + Q M a x qs 
QMfis a fixed cost of computing a query which contains zero query elements and 
is measured in microseconds. QMa is an additional cost of computing each query 
element and is measured in microseconds per element. 
We then derive an answer model for calculating TPA which is modelled as a 
linear function of view size and result size. 
TPA(ys, rs) = TPAf+ TPAa xvsxrs 
where vs is the view size and rs is the result size. 
TPAf is a fixed cost of computing an answer message which contains zero 
elements and is measured in microseconds. T P A a is an additional cost of computing 
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with each element and is measured in microseconds per element, vs x rs is the 
number of elements in an answer. 
Commumication Model 1: Message Model (TCOMM-1) 
We first derive a message model which calculates message sizes based on query 
sizes, result sizes, and element sizes. Message sizes correspond to the bandwidth 
consumption of ATIR services. Since message sizes are independent of any specific 
network infi-astructure, it is usefiil to analysis them when communication cost is 
discussed. 
Between a cUent and a server, the total message size transmitted, denoted by tms, 
is the sum of the size of a query message and an answer message. We have the 
following formula which calculates the total number of elements exchanged between 
a client and a server: 
tms (qs, ors, es) = qh + ah + qsx (es + ors x es) 
where qh is the size of a query message and ah is the size of an answer message. 
Alternatively, the above formula can be revised as a parameter of vs as follows: 
tms (qs, ors, es) = qh + ah + v j * ^ x (es + ors x es) 
In PIR, each element is represented by a one-byte integer and thus the tms of PIR 
is also the number of bytes exchanged between a client and a server. In ATIR, each 
element is represented by a two-byte integer and thus the number of bytes exchanged 
between a client and a server doubles the above tms. 
Communication Model 2: Communication Cost Model (TCOMM-2) 
We now derive the second communication model (TCOMM-2) to model the actual 
communication cost of transmitting the messages in the ATIR system. This second 
communication model is based on the first communication model (TCOMM-1) 
because it relies on the first model to calculate the size of a message. The second 
model separates the host processing overhead fi-om the actual network 
communication overhead. The separation enables us to predict the performance of 
the system in a different network setting, such as the Internet. Since our 
implementation uses TCP connections for message transmission, our discussion 
focuses on TCP. 
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The communication model of an ATER systan consists of two parts: the model of 
host processing and the model of network processing. The former model aims to 
model host processing time whereas the latter models network communication time. 
The communication costs in both models are modelled as a linear flinction of the 
variable tms. For the host-processing model, there are two parameters: a fixed cost Hf 
of processing zero byte data and an additional cost Ha of processing an extra byte. 
For the network-processing model, there are also two parameters: a fixed cost A^of 
transmitting zero byte data and an additional cost Na of transmitting one-byte data. Hf 
and Nf are measured in microseconds whereas Ha and Na are measured in 
microseconds per byte. Therefore, TCOMM is calculated as follows: 
TCOMM (tms) = Hf+ 2 x i / ^ x (tms) + Nf+ Na x (tms) 
View Creation (TCV) 
This section presents a model for computing TCV, i.e. the time taken to get records 
from databases and transform them into a view. Again, the model consists of two 
components: a fixed overhead TCVf of performing the transformation and an 
additional cost TCVa of fransforming an element. TCVf is measured in microseconds 
and TCVa is measured in microseconds per element. The input to the model is view 
size and result size. TCV is modelled as follows. 
TCV(vs, rs) = TCVf+ TCVa xvsxrs 
Result Reconstruction and Verification (TRV) 
This section describes a model for computing TRV, i.e., tiie time taken to reconstiiict 
a result. The TRV model consists of two components: a fixed cost TRVf of 
reconstructing and verifying a record and an additional cost TRVa of reconstiiicting 
and verifying an element. The model is as follows: 
TRV(ors) = TRVf + TRVaXors 
TRVf is measured in microseconds and TRVa is measured in microseconds per 
element. Each reconstructed element is subject to verification. Therefore, TRV can 
be further divided into two sub-components: the time taken to reconstruct a result 
and the time taken to verify a result. 
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In theory, it is necessary to separate TVER from TREC because there is one of the 
major differences between PIR and ATIR. However, as we shall show in the 
experimental studies, the separation is not necessary because of the cost of verifying 
a result in TTP is effectively negligible. Therefore, we only present one combined 
model for the result reconstruction and verification. 
Total Processing Time (TTP) 
Putting all these models together, we have the following formula for computing the 
TTP of an ATIR service. 
TTPatii(e5, vs, rs, ors) = TIS + T?Qiqs) + TCOMM(gs, ors, es) + TCV(vs, rs) + 
TPA(v5, rs) + TRV(ora) + TMIS 
5.2 Experimental Setting 
Unless otherwise stated, the experimental settings described in this section apply to 
all experiments presented in this chapter. 
5.2.1 Experimental Objectives 
In this thesis, there are four goals of conducting our experimental studies: 
• Deriving the analytic model of the performance of an ATIR service; 
• Quantify the cost of providing privacy protection; 
• Investigating the cost of dealing with attacks in ATIR; 
• Comparing the experimental results of ATIR with SQL queries and PIR. 
5.2.2 Experimental Environment 
Our experiments use a set of identical DELL machines with the following 
specifications: Dell Precision 650 workstation with Dual Intel Xeon 3.06GHz hyper-
threaded, 1 GB RAM, 36GB Fujitsu MAS3367NP SCSI hard drive, and 3COM 
3c905C NIC. They are interconnected through a Cisco switch which has the 
following specifications: Cisco Catalyst 2924 (model: WS-C2924C-XL-A). The 
switch has twenty-two 10/lOOBaseTX ports and two lOOBaseFX ports. 
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A l l machines run Redhat Linux release 9 (Shrike) and the kernel version is 2.4.26. 
The kernel is compiled with smp' support. The specifications of the major software 
packages are described as follows. The version of MySQL is 11.18 with distribution 
3.23.58 for redhat-linux-gnu (1386). A l l the programs used in the experiments are 
compiled with GCC 3.2.2. 
Three machines are used as servers in all ATIR experiments. Two machines are 
used as servers in all PIR experiments whereas one machine is used as a server to 
perform SQL queries. One client machine is used in all the experiments presented in 
this chapter. 
The database (precisely the database table) used in the experiments contains over 
44,000 records where each record contains 880 bytes. Apart fi-om otherwise specified, 
the default size of a result in the experiments is 10 bytes. 
Unless stated otherwise, the finite field for ATIR computation is GF(257) and the 
finite field for PIR computation is GF(256). 
Again, unless stated explicitly, we use a simple (single factor) linear regression 
method to compute the model parameters in all the experimental studies. 
Due to the resource restriction, the network is not an entirely private closed 
network. For system administration purposes, there are regular synchronisation jobs 
running on the machines which are beyond our control. That means there may be a 
small amount of bursting trafiBc in the network which may have unpredictable 
impacts on system measurements. However, as any random factors, such as tasks 
running by operating systems, we tiy to minimize such unpredictable impacts 
through conducing repeated experiments, excluding outiiers, and using statistical 
methods to justify the accuracy and validity of the experimental results. 
It is, however, observed that some outside factors do have an impact on the 
performance of our experiments. For example, the first execution of any program 
often experiences exceedingly high (twice or three times more than usual) 
performance overhead. We believe it is due to the context switching management 
performed by the operating system. Another such outside impact occurs with the use 
of MySQL database services, on top of which the system is built. It is observed that 
' smp: shared memory multiprocessor 
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the time taken to establish a connection with a MySQL server at the first time is two 
or three times of that in the subsequent establishment. The exact cause of this 
phenomenon is not clear. Since this does have a direct impact on our system 
performance, we repeat all experiments eleven times and eliminate the first result. 
5.2.3 Primitive Component Model Parameters 
Concerns of Deriving the Communication Cost Model 
Host processing and network processing are two major sources of TCP performance 
overheads. Previous studies (e.g. [CJRS89]) have shown that host processing can 
impose noticeable overheads on the overall TCP performance. Here, a host is defined 
as the computers at the end points of a network. Host processing is mainly software 
overheads and includes, for example, the costs of running TCP program on the 
computers (i.e., at the application layer), and the costs of moving bytes in the 
memory (i.e. between user address space and system address space and between 
network interfaces to system address space). 
A network encompasses both intermediate processing nodes (e.g. routers) and 
communication links. Network processing overheads include the costs that arise fi-om 
processing the packets on intermediate notes and communication links. Separating 
host processing fi-om network processing gives us a better insight on the real source 
of the communication costs of TCP. Furthermore, the separation can help us to 
predict the performance in a different network environment with other settings. 
As similarly assumed in other commxmication experiments (e.g. [KROl]), we 
make a number of assumptions to simpUfy the measuring task. Using these 
assiraiptions keeps the thesis in focus. With respect to the communication model, our 
goal in this thesis is to model the communication cost of the system m action. It is 
not our goal to develop a generic methodology to model the communication of the 
TCP/IP protocols. In a network environment, the communication latency would 
depend on several parameters, such as reti-ansmission, flow conti-ol policies of the 
TCP protocol, buffer sizes of senders and receivers, the communication distance, 
bandwidth availability, traffic intensity, and the mraiber of intermediate hops in the 
network communication path. 
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We assume that all the communication channels in our system are dedicated and 
the bandwidth availability is the same. We also assume that the network has no 
congestion, and packages are neither lost nor corrupted so that the TCP protocol wi l l 
not refransmit packets. From the statistics data collected, this assumption seems to be 
valid for our experiments due to the fact that it is a closed and dedicated network 
envirorunent. 
Host Processing Time 
We need to run two batches of experiments because our communication model 
(TCOMM-2) separates the host processing from network communication. Host 
Processing Time (HPT) is the time taken to process a message on a single computer. 
Network Commimication Time (NCT) is the time taken to fransmit a message by a 
network from one computer to another computer. Round Trip Time (RTT) is the 
double of the sum of HPT and NCT. It should be noted that most RTT measurements 
in the literatures do not distinguish HPT and NCT from RTT. In our studies, however, 
the separation provides us with a way to predict the communication overhead that 
may exhibit by the system in a different network setting. 
The first batch of experiments aims to measure HPT. That is, the client and the 
server reside on the same computer. Therefore, the measured host processing 
overhead is the sum of the following two costs: the cost of segmenting and copying 
the messages from the client (program) address space to the system address space 
and the cost of reassembling and copying the messages from the system address 
space back to the chent address space. Essentially, the host processing cost is the cost 
of going through the TCP protocol stacks (TCP/IP). 
To measure HPT, we resort to the loopback address (or interface) [Ste94]. A 
loopback address specifically refers to the local host IP address 127.0.0.1. Any 
messages send to this address wil l be routed back to the originated source. The 
roundtrip time obtained through a loopback address is, therefore, the cost incurred by 
tiie software processing on a single computer. Table 5-2 shows the measured 
roundtiip and one-way HPT. One-way HPT is half of the roundtiip HPT. Based on 
the measured data, we compute the parameters HfZtmdi Ha, which are shown in Table 
5-3. The parameter is calculated based on the one-way HPT. 
99 
CHAPTER FIVE. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION 
Figure 5-2 plots the measured and predicted one-way HPT against various 
message sizes. The predicated values match with the measured values with a high co-
efficient of determination (98.37%). That means the prediction is accurate. 
Table 5-2 Measured Host Processing Time Ois) 
Messs^ e 
(bytes) 
size Roundtrip (us) One--way(|ls) Std. 
Dev. 
100 29.60 14.8 2% 
200 30.40 152 5% 
300 31.10 15.55 2% 
400 30.90 15.45 5% 
500 3U0 15.6 3% 
600 31.50 15.75 4% 
700 3220 16.1 2% 
800 32.90 16.45 4% 
900 33.80 16.9 2% 
1000 33.60 16.8 3% 
1100 34.30 17.15 4% 
1200 34.80 17.4 2% 
1300 35.30 17.65 3% 
1400 35.30 17.65 5% 
1448 35.80 17.9 3% 
Table 5-3 Parameters of One-way HPT 
Parameter Value Description 
Hf 14.629 s^ A fixed overhead of transmittir^ messages of any si2e through the loopback interface 
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When the system is deployed in a different network enviroimient, the potential 
impact of the network environment becomes a dominant factor on the stability of 
TTP. I f the same set of machines is used for the new deployment, the HPTs wil l 
remain the same since they are independent of the xmderlying network infi-astructure. 
Network Communication Time 
The second batch of experiments aims to investigate the relationship between NCT 
and message sizes. NCT is obtained through subtracting HPT firom RTT. Table 5-4 
shows the measured RTTs and calculated one-way NCT obtained through 
experimenting with two separated computers. The second colimm (i.e., RTT) is the 
time taken to send the messages back and forth between the computers. The third 
column (i.e., Std. Dev.) is the standard deviation, which is the variance of the ten 
observations fi-om the averaged RTT. The last column is the one-way NCT which is 
the time taken to transmit the messages fi"om the client to the server, which is half of 
the difference between the RTT and four times of the corresponding one-way HPT. 
Based on the measured data, we compute the parameters A/-and Ng, which are shown 
in Table 5-5. 
Table 5-4 Measured Romidtrip Time and One-way Communication Time 
Messs^e size RTr(Ms) Std One-way 
(bytes) Dev. NCr(jis) 
100 497 1.64% 219 
200 556 0.66% 248 
300 629 0.25% 283 
400 612 0.47% 275 
500 690 0.49% 314 
600 687 0.36% 312 
700 746 026% 341 
800 788 0.42% 361 
900 837 0.70% 385 
1000 875 0.66% 404 
1100 938 0.46% 435 
1200 982 0.40% 456 
1300 999 0.00% 464 
1400 1037.4 0.25% 483 
1448 1047.7 0.31% 488 
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Table 5-5 Parameters of One-way Network Communication Time 
Parameter Value Description 
Nf 205.36 i^s 
A fixed overhead of transmitting messages of any size 
through the network (one-byte) 
Na 0.19978 ^s/byte 
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Figure 5-3 Measured and Predicted One-way Communication 
Table 5-6 Protocol Constants 
Name Value Description 
TSQL-INIT 238^18 time taken to establish a connection with a local MySQL server 
TIS (ATIR) 74 |xs time taken to initialise the ATIR system 
Figure 5-3 plots the one-way NCT between two computers in our network. The 
predicted values match with the measured values with a high co-efficient of 
determination (99.09%) 
Constants 
Table 5-6 shows the protocols constants for all the experiments. These values are 
used to produce to predict TTPs in the subsequent sections. 
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5.3 A T I R Experiments in a Faialt-free Emvnrommemt 
This section first derives the component parameters for the ATIR models and then 
investigates the impacts of varying view size, result size, undetected error rate on the 
TTP of ATIR and the proportions of each component in the TTP of ATIR. We also 
investigate the impact of using a deterministic ATIR (dATIR) to the system 
performance. Unless mentioned explicitly, an ATIR scheme refers to a probabilistic 
ATIR scheme. We further present the experimental results of ATIR performance in 
the presence of various simulated faults. 
5.3.1 ATIR Component Model Parameters 
Message Preparation 
We use a simple linear regression model to find out the parameters TPQf and TPQa 
in the query model and TPAf and TPAa in the answer model. Table 5-7 shows the 
parameters obtained through using the regression (least square) method. 
To verify the query model, we run ten independent experiments varying the query 
size fi-om 10 elements to 100 elements which are then used to compute fi-om 100 to 
10,000 records on the server side. Each experiment involved a different-sized query 
message, hi each series, each experiment is consecutively repeated eleven times. 
Figure 5-4 shows the measured and predicted TPQ as the query sizes increase. 
Each diamond point is the average value of five runs. Apart fi-om the first series of 
experiments, the TPQ time for the overall experiments is fairiy stable. The standard 
deviation of the averaged values of the first experiment is 7% whereas that of the rest 
of the experiments is below 5%. The model is also accurate. The co-efficient of 
determination is 97.5%, The high co-efficient of determination means that the model 
matches with the measured data. 
Table 5-7 Message Preparation Parameters (ATIR) 
Parameter Value Description 
TPQf 9.09194 us A fbffid oveiiiead of computing query mess^ es of any size 
TPQa 0.7231 us/element Additional cost per element in a query message 
TPAf A fixed overiiead of computing answer mess^ es of any size 
T P A . 0.9246 |js/element Additional cost per element in an ansAver message 
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To verify the answer model, we also log TPA in the above experiments on the 
server side. Corresponding to the query size from 10 to 100 elements, the view size 
ranges from 100 to 10,000 records. Figure 5-5 plots the measured and predicted TPA 
against the view sizes. The co-efficient of determination of the experiments is over 
99.99%. This means that our model is accurate. 
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Figure 5-5 Measured and Predicted TPA vs. View Sizes 
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Communication 
As explained in Chapter 4, it is sufficient and necessary for the ATIR 
implementation to use a 2-byte integer to represent an element. Table 5-8 shows the 
relationship among message sizes, query sizes, view sizes and the total 
communication time for transmitting the messages. The original result size is 10 
bytes and the optimised result size is 6 bytes. Since the answer size is determined by 
the optimised result size, we simply assume that the result size is 6 bytes per block. 
In order to understand the table, let us take the first row as an example to explain 
the meanings of these figures. In this row, an APIR query computes over 100 records. 
Therefore, the query contains 10 elements with 2 bytes each and the answer contains 
10 blocks. The query message size is 120 bytes, which is the sum of a 100-byte 
query header and 20-byte query elements. The answer message size is 122, which is 
the sum of a 2-byte header and 120-byte (i.e., 12 bytes/block x 10 blocks) answer 
elements. Using the commimication parameters derived in Section 5.2.3, we can 
obtain the total communication time as follows. 
2*14.629 + 205.36 + 242 x (2*0.002252 + 0.19978) = 284.054 |is 
It is important to note that the total message size of ATIR is solely determined by 
the view size. The deployment in a different network environment will only have an 
impact on the total communication time, not the total message size. 
View Creation 
To verify the model, we use the linear regression method to calculate the parameters 
TCV/ and TCV^ which are shown in Table 5-9. Figure 5-6 plots the predicted and 
measured costs of TCV against view sizes. The model is accurate because the co-
efficiency of determination is 99.97%. 
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Table 5-8 Query Sizes, View Sizes, Message Sizes and Communication Time of ATIR 
Query Size View Size Bsent Brecv Total Message Total Comm. 
(elements) (records) (bytes) (bytes) Size (bytes) Time (|is) 
10 100 120 122 242 284 
20 400 140 242 382 313 
30 900 160 362 522 341 
40 1600 180 482 662 370 
50 2500 200 602 802 398 
60 3600 220 722 942 427 
70 4900 240 842 1082 456 
80 6400 260 962 1222 484 
90 8100 280 1082 1362 513 
100 10000 300 1202 1502 541 
Table 5-9 Parameters of TCV 
Patameter Value Description 
TCV/ 153 \xs A fixed overhead of performing DB transformation operations 
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Figure 5-6 Measured and Predicated TCV vs. View Size 
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Figure 5-8 Measure and Predicted TTPs of pATIR 
Table 5-10 Reconstruction and Verification (ATIR): parameters 
Parameter Valxie Description 
TRVf 20.753 |J5 A fixed oveiliead of reconstructic^  any nxunber of elements 
TRVa 0.34111 us/byte An additional cost per record of reconstructii^ an byte 
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Reconstruction 
To verify the model derived for reconstructing results (i.e. TRV), we use a linear 
regression model on the data to determine the regression parameters which are 
shown in Table 5-10. Figure 5-7 shows the time taken to reconstruct and verify the 
results against the increased (optimised) result sizes. The predicted values match well 
with the measurements. The co-efficient of determination is 98%. 
5.3.2 Varying View Sizes 
Figure 5-8 shows the measured and predicted TTPs of pATIR against view sizes. 
The predicted values are calculated following the performance models presented in 
Section 5.1. The values of each component are calculated through the use of 
primitive performance model parameters presented in Section 5.2.3 and the ATIR 
component model parameters presented in Section 5.3.1. 
The view size used in an ATIR service is an indication of the level of privacy 
protection achieved. In the service, a user only needs one record in the view. As the 
view size grows, the protection of the user's privacy increases. That is because the 
view size directly reflects the number of records involved in the server side 
computation. As the number of records involved in an ATIR computation grows, the 
server has less information about the actual record that the user is interested in. 
The TTPs clearly increase linearly as the view sizes increase. The figure shows 
that there is little difference between the prediction and the measurements of TTPs of 
ATIR. The co-efficient of determination is 99.96%. As the prediction for the TTPs of 
APIR, the relative prediction error of pATIR quickly converges to the X aixs as the 
view sizes increase, which is shown in Figure 5-9. That indicates that the accuracy of 
the prediction of TTPs of ATIR increases as the size of a view involved in the server 
side computation increases. 
108 















(1 2,600 4,( 00 8.( 00 10. DOO 12, 
/ 1 J 1 
• 
of ' 1 1 




view size (records) 
Figure 5-9 Relative Prediction Error of tlie TTPs of pATIR 
5.3.3 Varying Result Sizes 
This section investigates the impact of varying result sizes on the TTPs of pATIR. In 
the previous experiments, we fix the result size to be 10 bytes. With the use of 
optimisation techniques, the actual result size reduces 6 bytes (because the spaces at 
the end of tiie fields are trimmed). Figure 5-10 shows the impact of increased result 
sizes on the TTP of pATIR for varied result sizes and view sizes. In total, the figure 
plots ten different view sizes along with varied result sizes. 
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Figure 5-10 Measured TTPs of pATIR vs. Original Result Sizes 
As the result sizes increases, so does the amovmt of data set involved in the server 
side computation. The trend shown in the figure clearly confirms the results obtained 
in Section 5.3.2 that TTPs grow linearly as the amount of data set involved in the 
server side computation increases. However, for small view sizes, such increment is 
not as significant as that of large view sizes. 
When the result size hits 70 bytes, the TTPs of all view sizes exhibits a sudden 
increase (ranging fi-om 1.2% of view size of 100 records to 4.7% of view size of 
10,000 records) but returns to a linear trend when it reaches the result size of 80 
bytes. It is independent of the actual sizes of data sets and clearly only relates to this 
particular result size. After tracking down the proportion of the time taken by each 
component of the system, we find that the symptom is caused by server side 
computation rather than client side computation. In particular, the sudden increase of 
TPA (the time taken to prepare answers) causes the sudden increase of TTPs of the 
result size of 70 bytes. From the process of tracking down the problem, we believe 
that there are two possible sources which may cause this problem. First, it may be 
due to an implementation bug of the ATIR system. Second, it may also be a problem 
caused by the underlying operating system. However, the exact cause is still under 
investigation. 
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5.3.4 Varying Undetected Error Rates 
The order of finite fields, i.e., p, in pATIR determines the fault tolerance capability 
of an ATIR scheme and is inversely proportional to the Undetected Error Rate 
(UER). UER is specified by a user and is the level of errors that the user wishes to 
tolerate. In the current implementation, UER is specified at a character level rather 
than a result level. For example, i f we retrieve one result which contains one 
character and the UER is 0.30, there is 30% chance that the reconstructed result (in 
this case, one character) is valid but not correct. 
When a result contains more characters, the overall UER is the multiplication of 
the UER of each tampered character in the result. For example, i f four characters in a 
result is tampered and the UER for each character is 30%, the UER for the 
reconstructed result is 0.0081 = (30%)'*, which means that the reconstructed result 
has only 0.81% chance to be a valid but incorrect one. In terms of fault tolerance, this 
implies that the more characters of a result being tampered, the easier for the system 
to detect the corrupted result. This is, however, a theoretical explanation. 
Table 5-11 shows the relationship between UER and the size of the finite prime 
fields that are used in the experiments of this section. The calculation is based on the 
following settings: the valid range of reconstructed characters is the integers in the 
interval of [0, 255] and the number of replicas is three, which tolerates one faulty 
server. This value of k, we beUeve, is expected to be sufficient for most real 
applications because, with more replicas, the configurations and resource 
consumptions may become excess for real world applications. 
Each element of a finite field in our ATIR implementation is represented by a two-
byte unsigned integer, whose range is fi'om 0 to 65,535. This range is sufficient to 
cover the most stiingent fatolt tolerance requirement that our system designs for. For 
example, when the UER is 0.01 (that is, there is only 1% chance that a reconstinicted 
character is valid but not correct), the corresponding size of a finite field is 25523. 
Figure 5-11 illusti-ates the trend of TTPs of ATIR with increased view sizes with 
varying undetected error rates. For a given view size, the figure clearly suggests that 
the variance of UER has little impact on the TTPs of ATIR. The implication of this 
outcome is significant because it suggests that we can have a higher-level fault 
tolerance without compromising performance. 
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Table 5-11 The Mapping between UER and p 
UER 0.01 0.1 02 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
P 25523 2557 1277 853 641 521 431 367 331 293 257 
ie=0.01 ae^O.IO •e=0.20 De^ O.SO •e=0.40 •e=0.50 1 6=0.60 @e=0.7 •e=0.8 16=0.9 Qe=1.00 
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Figure 5-11 TTPs of pATIR witli Varying Undetected Error Rates 
It should be pointed out that the variance of UER only change the time taken to 
perform certain ATIR operations (e.g. query preparation and answer calculation) 
while the time taken to do other operations, such as TCV, remain the same. From an 
operating system's point of view, a finite field operation involves two unsigned 
16-bit integers, which is true despite the actual values of these integers. Furthermore, 
the number of operations does not change as a result of varied UER. Therefore, the 
size of a finite field has no influence on the time taken to do the operation. 
Although the figure (5-11) suggest there is not much difference between the TTP 
of the system with different UERs, the variance of UER does makes an impact on 
certain components of TTP. A closer examination of the component values reveals 
that the TRV (i.e., reconstruction and verification) cost is inversely proportional to 
UER. The smaller UER is the longer TRV takes. It is because with the finite fields 
use prime numbers, rather than 257, as its order (i.e., size), the time taken to perform 
field operations (in particular, reverse operations) is higher than using the field 
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GF(257). This is an implementation specific issue because we store the 
corresponding reverse element in the memory for each element in the field GF(257). 
However, with a larger prime field, the system has to perform the reverse calculation 
on the fly and the time taken to perform such computation is inversely proportional 
to the size of the field. The bigger the size the longer it takes. Note that bigger finite 
field sizes correspond to smaller UER. But because TCV is a small portion of TTP 
and due to the scale of the figure, such difference is masked by the figure. 
5.3.5 Performance Proportion of Each Component 
To identify the major sources of performance overheads, this section describes how 
each component contribute to the overall TTPs of ATIR for fixed result size 10 bytes. 
Figure 5-12 shows the proportion of each component of ATIR in the TTP as the view 
sizes increase. In particular, the proportion of the time taken for server side 
computation (i.e., TPV and TPA) quickly becomes the dominator factor of the TTPs. 
As the view sizes increase, it is also clear that the proportion of commimication time 
rapidly reduces from 23.27% (view size = 1 record and data size = 0.01 KB) to 
1.40% (view size = 1,600 records and data size = 16 KB). 
The figure also shows us that TRV vanishes quickly as the view size increases. 
When the view size is one record, TRV takes up 1.97% of the TTP time. When the 
view size becomes 10,000 records, the proportion drops to 0.02%. Although the data 
in the figure uses a fixed result size, it does give us a clear implication of how TRV 
compares to TTP as the view sizes increase. 
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Figure 5-12 Performance Proportion of Eacli Component in TTP of ATIR 
5.3.6 Performance of Deterministic ATIR 
So far, we have been focused on the probabilistic ATIR. This section compares the 
TTPs of a deterministic ATIR (dATIR) and a probabiHstic ATIR (pATIR). dATIR 
ensures that the delivered result is 100% to be the correct one whereas pATIR only 
offers a probabiHstic guarantee of the safety property. Both ATIR implementations 
differ in the way that the reconstruction and verification algorithm is implemented. 
pATIR stops and returns a result once it finds a valid result whereas dATIR 
reconstructs all the possibilities of results and determines whether there is a correct 
result. When distinct valid results are more than one, dATIR aborts and reports a 
failtire. Since the system can reconstruct at least one correct result, i f only one result 
remains, it must be the correct one. In terms of number of reconstruction attempts 
needed, dATIR represents the worse case scenario of pATIR. So, clearly, the TRV of 
dATIR is longer than that of pATIR. But as we have shown in the previous section 
the proportion of TRV in TTP of pATIR is small. 
We conduct ten series of independent dATIR experiments as follows. The view 
sizes in the series increment from 100 to 10,000 records. In each series, we vary the 
resuh sizes from 10 to 100 bytes in each test. Each test is repeated eleven times and 
the first resuh is ignored. Each value reported is the average of ten tests. At the end, 
we have 100 measurements for the ten series of experiments. 
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Figure 5-13 compares the pATIR with the dATIR when data sizes involved in the 
server side computation are small, that is, the data sizes range from 1,000 bytes to 
10,000 bytes. Figure 5-14 does the same comparison with large data sizes (from 
100KB to 1MB). Overall, the dATIR adds some performance overhead to the TTP 
time. Over 96% of the observed dATIR TTP measurements are larger than that of 
pATIR, which suggests that dATIR does have some performance overhead, 
comparing with pATIR. The increments are, however, not the same for all 
experiments. As shown in these figures, the increments of dATIR are much 
significant (as high as 13.43% for 1,000 bytes data) for small data sizes than those 
for large data sizes (consistently lower than 0.8% when data sizes are IK bytes to I M 
bytes). This is mainly because of the scale of the measurements. For small data sizes, 
the increments are compared with small quantities (several milHseconds) of TTPs. 
For large data sizes, the increments are compared with large quantities (several 
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Figure 5-13 dATIR vs. pATIR (Small Data Sizes) 
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Figure 5-14 dATIR vs pATIR (Large Data Sizes) 
5 .4 A T I R Experiments in a Simulated Faulty Environment 
This section describes ATIR performance in the presence of the following simulated 
faults: crash faults and malicious faults. 
5.4.1 ATIR Performance in the Presence of Crash Faults 
In this experiment, one of the three servers is shut down and only two servers 
provide ATIR services. Figure 5-15 compares the TTPs of ATIR in normal and crash 
failure situations when the result size is set to be 10 bytes. It is clear that the 
occurrence of crash faults has little impact on the measured TTPs of the ATIR 
system. In some cases, such as when the view size is 8,100 records, the observed 
TTP in the presence of crash failures is even lower than that of ATIR in normal 
situations. It is because the system adapts to the situation and uses the answers fi-om 
the available servers to reconstruct the resuh. The server fault was detected by the 
socket coimection operation of the client program and therefore the result fi-om this 
particular server will not be waited for. Since the machines are identical and any two 
servers are sufficient to reconstruct a result, the unavailability of one server does not 
have much influence on the TTP of the system. We expect this situation remains for 
other result sizes. 
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Figure 5-15 ATIR in Normal vs. Craslied Situations 
5.4.2 ATIR Performance in the Presence of Malicious Faults 
Having shown that the system maintains good performance in the presence of crash 
failures, we now investigate the performance and behaviours of the system when 
malicious faults occur. As a security system, what we really concern with is how an 
attacker can effectively attack the system. Any system is built on assumptions and 
therefore, invalidating assumptions is one of the effective ways of compromising the 
system. However, such information is often not readily available. For a system that 
implements a new security scheme, such as o\irs, it is important to ensure that we 
know the weakness of the system. 
In fact, the behaviours of malicious attackers are hard to determine and difficult to 
predict. Therefore, the most important thing we need to make sure when it comes to 
simulating malicious faults and experimenting with the system in such situations is to 
ensure that tiie simulation is fair. That is, we are not choosing an attack sti-ategy that 
is in our favour. In other words, we shall identify the types of attacks that our system 
is susceptible to. Once we have this information, the attack simulation should be 
based on such attacks to experiment with the system. That is effectively how it works 
in real world. Once an attacker finds out an effective attack strategy that can be taken 
advantage of, it is certain that the new sti-ategy will be used rather than relying on 
any exiting ones. 
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Simulating Malicious Failures 
Our system is most susceptible to malicious value faults, in which one or more 
compromised servers deliver purposefixlly manipulated answer(s). We simulate this 
type of attacks by randomly flipping the characters in an answer right before it is 
returned to the client. 
The simulation has two purposes. First, we need to find out the optimal value for 
achieving a required level of security through experiments. To our system, that 
means how to set the UER parameter for given a user security requirement. Second, 
since the system performance in normal situations is already known, it is mandatory 
to find out whether the performance will degrade as a result of such attacks. 
In the experiments, we do not single out the time taken to do the simulation since 
it is negligible. It only adds several microseconds to the TTP of the system. To 
simulate the attacks, we add no more than 10 lines of code into the client program 
and add one line of code into the server program. Hence, the impact of injecting the 
faults can be ignored. 
To avoid over simplifying the possible attacker behaviours, we need to answer 
two fiirther questions as follows: 
• What is the best sti-ategy for an attacker to attack the ATIR system? As 
indicated in Section 3.3.4, we know that the more characters being changed the 
easier for the client to detect the corrupted result. Is this true for the real 
experiments? 
• To what extent, the TTPs of ATIR will degrade in the presence of maUcious 
attacks. 
Finding out the Actual Undetected Error Rates 
To address the first question, five series of experiments, with different number (i.e., 
one to five) of characters being randomly flipped just before an answer is returned, 
were conducted. Each series of experiment contains 19 tests in which the undetected 
error rate starts from 0.01, 0.02 to 0.10 and then 0.20 to 1.00. In each test, we varied 
tiie view sizes from 100 to 10,000 records. Each test is repeated eleven times and the 
first result is ignored. In each test, we log down tiie following information: TTP and 
UER. 
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Since there is only one out of three servers that involves in the simulated attacks, 
the client wil l have sufficient correct answers to reconstruct a valid and correct result. 
The most dangerous situation is that the client delivers valid but incorrect results. 
Therefore, we search through the log and identify the maximum undetected error rate 
with which no valid but incorrect results are observed. 
Figure 5-16 shows the relationship between the required (maximum) undetected 
error rates and the number of characters that are randomly flipped on the server side. 
The picture tells us that the required UER increases as the number of flipped 
characters increases. That means when an attacker modifies more characters, a large 
UER is good enough to detect invalid results and identify the correct ones. In other 
words, it is easier for the client program to detect the occurrence of attacks when 
more characters are manipulated even with large UERs. Therefore, this provides an 
affirmative answer to our first question, that is, the best strategy an attacker should 
follow is to modify as few characters as possible. Otherwise, the client can easily 
detect the occurrences of attacks even with large UERs. 
On the other hand, this figure also reveals that when the number of flipped 
characters exceeds a certain level, in this case, four characters, a same level of 
undetected error rates are sufficient to detect all the errors. This provides an 
affirmative answer to our first question arise in the last section. That is, the more 
characters an attacker tampers, the easier the ATIR system detects the occurrence of 
tampering. Therefore, in order to conceal the act of attacking the system, the best 
strategy an attacker should take is to tamper with fewer characters. 
TTPs in the Presence of Malicious Attacks 
To answer the second question, we need to go back to the fundamentals of our 
scheme. We now describe how much extra time is required for the system to deal 
with the value attacks. Figure 5-17 compares the TTPs of tiie system in normal 
situations and in the presence of (simulated) malicious attacks with varied view sizes. 
Six groups of experiments with a different number of flipped characters are 
performed and each colunm in the figure represents the results obtained for each 
group of experiment. For example, "e=0.01-normal" means that no character is 
flipped and they are the experiments conducted in a normal situation. "e=0.01-lchar" 
means that one character is randomly flipped to simulate value attacks on the system. 
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In all experiments, the undetected error rate is set to be 0.01. The figure suggests that 
there is little difference between the TTPs in the different situations. Effectively, that 
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Figure 5-17 T I P of pATIR in Normal and Malicious Faults 
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Figure 5-18 TTPs of PIR-256, pATIR-257, and SQL 
5.5 Performance Comparisons among SQL Query, PIR and ATIR 
In this section, we compare the TTPs of using three query services: SQL, PIR, and 
ATIR to retrieve data from remote server (s). A normal SQL query with varied view 
sizes is executed between two separated computers in the same network environment 
to download the given amoimt of data. Therefore, in this experiment, the use of SQL 
queries is equivalent to the use of downloading to provide privacy protection. 
Figure 5-18 compares the TTPs of using ATIR, PIR and SQL technologies to 
query remote databases. The sizes of data sets involved in the queries range from 
100KB to 1 MB. 
Firstly, the TTPs of all services increase linearly as the data size increases. The 
increment rates, however, are significantly different. Compared with querying 
100KB data, it is observed that it costs 85%, 132%, and 20% more for ATIR, PIR, 
and SQL services to query 1MB data, respectively. 
Secondly, ATIR consistently shows a better performance than that of PIR in all 
these experiments. As the data size grows, the superiority becomes even obvious. For 
example, when the data size is 1MB, it takes the ATIR implementation 24% less 
TTP time to complete the operation comparing with using the PIR implementation. It 
is clearly not a coincident event that can be caused by (random) system errors 
because of the consistency shown in the figure. It is due to the different 
computational operations reqmred by PIR and ATIR schemes and the 
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implementations of finite field operations, which subsequently lead to different 
implementation strategies used in the systems. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, PIR 
uses a finite power field GF(256) for computation whereas ATIR uses a finite prime 
field GF(257). Putting it simply, the calculation operations (in particular, reverse 
operations) in GF(257) takes less steps than those in GF(256). This is the major 
reason for the better performance of ATIR over PIR in all tiiese experiments. 
Finally, the observed TTPs of both PIR and ATIR are all well under 0.5 second 
for data sets of sizes ranging fi^om 100KB to 1 MB. These results make both 
technologies appealing for real applications. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter first derives performance models to model the major components of an 
ATIR system. These models are then used to predict the TTP of ATIR. We show that 
the component prediction models are accurate since the predicated results match well 
with the measurements. Most predictions achieve a h i ^ co-efficient of determination, 
often above 97%. We also show that the communication overhead plays a negligible 
part of the overall TTPs in ATIR. 
We then present significant experimental studies to evaluate the performance of 
the implemented ATIR system in normal and simulated faulty enviroiraients. In 
particular, the experiments examine the impacts of varying the parameters of ATIR 
on the system performance. We further study the performance contributions of each 
major component of an ATIR system and compare the performance between pATIR 
and dATIR. 
The effectiveness of attack tolerance capability of ATIR schemes is evaluated by 
simulating various attacks on servers. The major experimental results reveal the 
following: i) crash faults make little impact on the performance of an ATIR system; 
and ii) the system performance maintains at the same level even in the presence of 
simulated malicious attacks. 
Finally, we compare the performance among SQL, PIR and ATIR and observe 
that the TTP of PIR increases most significantly as the sizes of data sets grow. We 
also show that the TTPs of both PIR and ATIR are well under half a second for 
performing the operations over data sets of sizes up to 1 MB. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future 
Work 
Our fast-growing reliance on online query services demands an appropriate level of 
privacy protection as well as highly available service provision. These problems are 
often treated separately. The prevalence of malicious attacks on online services calls 
for a balanced solution to satisfy both requirements. This thesis has developed new 
ATIR schemes for performing certain database queries privately and correctiy 
despite the occurrence of attacks, has addressed the problem of privacy protection as 
well as service provision for certain types of database query applications, has 
explored the practical ways for designing and implementing ATIR systems, and has 
presented significant evaluation results for demonstrating the effectiveness and 
practicability of the implemented ATIR systems. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.1, we summarize the main 
contributions made by this thesis to the following three areas of research: PIR, 
security, and fault tolerance. At the same time, we also revisit the research challenges 
set out in Chapter One and spell out the results we have achieved in this thesis on 
tackling these challenges. The theoretical and practical results of ATIR spark a 
nxmiber of interesting research questions for future research, which are outiined and 
discussed in Section 6.2. Finally, Section 6.3 concludes the thesis. 
6.1 Main Contributions 
This thesis has demonstrated a systematic and sound approach for constructing ATIR 
schemes, implementing ATIR systems, and evaluating ATIR systems through 
extensive experiments. In this thesis, two advanced ATIR schemes are developed for 
performing certain database queries privately and correctly even in the presence of 
certain attacks. Compared with existing PIR schemes, ATIR works in a much more 
realistic setting by taking malicious attacks into account while maintaining a 
balanced level of communication efficiency. By enabling privacy protection and 
simultaneously achieving a high level of service provision, ATIR represents a new 
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approach for constructing secure and fault tolerant schemes and designing privacy-
preserving and highly available systems. In order to investigate the practicability of 
the schemes, ATIR has been evalxiated extensively through empirical studies in 
various conditions. Along with a revisit on the research challenges set out in Chapter 
One, we summarise the major results obtained by this thesis as follows: 
® A survey of the major techniques and the state of the practice systems of coping 
with attacks has been given to set the context of this thesis. In order to 
characterise the power of different types of attackers, two attack models are 
derived and their relationship is examined (Section 2.2). The characterisation is 
followed by a critical review of privacy protection techniques, PIR research, and 
attack tolerant techniques and systems (Section 2.3, 2.4, 2.5). In particular, some 
commonly used assumptions on design and implementation of attack tolerant 
systems are critically reviewed and examined (Section 2.5.5). 
9 ATIR is novel because it offers privacy protection for users as well as ensuring 
service availability even in the presence of malicious attacks. In particular, ATIR 
can tolerate any collusion o f up to t servers for privacy violation and up to / 
favdty (crashed or malicious) servers in a system with k replicated servers, 
provided that k>t+f+\ where t > 1 and f<>t. Albeit a specific type of privacy 
protection, none of existing fault tolerant systems provide such protection for 
users against colluded servers. (Section 3.3.2, 3,3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.6) 
® In contrast to other related approaches, ATIR relies on neither enforced trust 
assumptions, such as the use of tamper-resistant hardware and trusted third 
parties, nor an increased number of replicated servers. While the best solution 
known so far requires k {>'it + \) replicated servers to cope with t malicious 
servers and any collusion of up to t servers, with an 0(rF^) communication 
complexity, ATIR uses fewer servers with a much improved communication cost, 
0{n') (where n is the size of a database managed by a server). (Section 3.3.7, 3.4) 
In particular, this contribution answers three research challenges -
Communicatioii Complexity, Trust Assumptions, and Use of Replication - set 
out in Chapter One. 
• This thesis provides the details of integrating and implementing ATIR on realistic 
database systems. Specifically, we describe the ATIR system architecture and 
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show how to realise the character database model of ATIR on realistic databases 
for ATIR computations (Section 4.2.1). This paves the way for practically 
implementing ATIR as a real service. Since PIR can be viewed as a special case 
of ATIR in that there is no faulty server in the system. The ATIR implementation 
described in this thesis also demonstrates a purely software based approach for 
implementing FIR systems on realistic databases (Chapter 4). In particular, this 
contribution answers Hie research challenge - Implementation - set out in 
Chapter One. 
• Although the processing costs of FIR schemes is envisaged to be exceedingly 
high, this thesis, for the first time, shows that no pre-processing or shuffling is 
needed for ATIR systems and the experimental results reveal that ATIR performs 
well. In a LAN environment, it takes well imder half a second to use an ATIR 
service for the calculations over data sets of size up to 1MB (Section 5.5). The 
performance of the ATIR systems remains at the same level, even with tiie 
occurrence of server crashes and malicious attacks. (Section 5.4) In particular, 
this contribution answers the research challenge - Processing Costs - set out in 
Chapter One. 
6.2 Future Research Directions 
6.2.1 Reducing Computation Complexity 
In order to protect the user's privacy, ATIR involves a large quantity of computation 
(e.g. in the order of n). In practice, it may be difficult to find a service provider who 
is willingly to allocate such a level of computation resources for the privacy and 
result availability of users. Hence, an interesting and important future work is to 
reduce the processing costs of servers and provide a negotiation mechanism between 
a chent and service providers to choose the level of resources they wish to assign to 
perform ATIR operations. 
Instead of purely hardware-based or purely software implementations, a 
combination of secure hardware and software processing may reduce the overall 
computation costs. Only security-sensitive operations are performed inside the piece 
of secure hardware, just like some existing secure and fault tolerant systems BFT 
[CasOl], COCA [ZhouOl]. The installation of multiple secure co-processors may 
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also achieve load balancing and consequently improve overall performance of an 
ATIR system. 
6.2.2 Reducing Communication Complexity 
Currently, the communication complexity of ATIR schemes is independent of the 
number of rephcas used. The construction of existing PIR schemes show that this 
problem may be resolvable with the use of recursive techniques. For example, 
several PIR schemes (e.g. [Amb97] and [BIKR02]) apply recursion to achieve lower 
communication complexity in a repUcation setting. 
In [IK99], Ishai and Kushilevitz present PIR schemes with 0(^n''^^*"'^) 
communication complexity using rephcation-based secret sharing techniques 
[ISN87]. It remains unclear whether the same technique can be applied to our ATIR 
schemes to achieve lower communication complexity. 
At the time tiiis thesis is written, despite the improvement on the asymptotical 
commxmication complexity of PIR schemes, the communication complexity of 
2-server PIR schemes remains the same, i.e. 0{n^'^) as the result obtained by the 
seminal paper [CGKS95]. Several techniques (e.g. covering codes in [CGKS95], 
recursion in [Amb97], and emulation techniques in [IK99]) are used to achieve that 
commxmication complexity. It wil l be interesting to explore these techniques for 
further reducing the communication complexity of both PIR and ATIR schemes. 
6.2.3 The Importance of Design Diversity and Assumptions 
The bounded numbers of curious and faulty servers are of little meaning i f common-
mode failures [AK84] occur in the ATIR system, because an attacker can easily 
exploit a common vulnerability in all servers to compromise the entire system. 
Traditionally, design diversity [AK84], data diversity [AK88, TMB80], and 
environment diversity approaches [HK93] have often been considered to cope with 
such failures. 
It would be helpful to reduce the overall vulnerability of the system by 
incorporating these design diversity approaches into the system design and 
implementation. For example, in our systems, diverse operating systems (Linux and 
Windows) and programming languages (e.g. Java and C) can be used for the 
implementation. We can also choose from a wide range of readily available 
commercial database engines (e.g. MySQL and Microsoft SQL Server) to integrate 
126 
CHAPTER SIX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
with servers. In fact, apart fi-om the C implementation, ATIR systems have a 
demonstration version which is implemented in Java. Both implementations conform 
to the same interface and design but with different implementation strategies (the C 
implementation integrates with MySQL C APIs whereas the Java implementation 
uses the JDBC Driver for MySQL.). 
6.2.4 Esplorimg Other AppMcatioms 
We have shown that the ATIR system performs well for certain database queries in 
normal as well as simulated faulty cases. The next task for this research is to find a 
wider range of applications that can take advantage of this technology. It would be 
appealing to adapt and incorporate the existing implementations with other 
applications, such as certification authority, public data repository, and patent query 
services. Among them, certification authorities are the most interesting because they 
offer an infi-astractural security service underpinning most distributed systems. Due 
to the increasing popularity of large scale distiibuted systems, the use of certificates 
has become popular. Hence, privacy-preserving, secure and fault-tolerant online 
certification authorities wi l l be of real interest in practice. The Cornell Online 
Certification Authority (COCA) [ZSR02] is a latest effort along this direction. But 
COCA doesn't provide any privacy protection for users in the presence of malicious 
attacks. Once a server is compromised, all the messages exchanged between the user 
and the servers are exposed to an attacker. 
A further question is to investigate whether there are any other domains that ATIR 
can be used. One of the fimdamental difficulties of adapting ATIR to other 
appropriate domains is the restricted semantics of the ATIR operations, as discussed 
in Section 4.1 and 4.3.1. 
6.2.5 Befemdimg against Demial-OIF-Service Attacks 
To some extent, ATIR has an inherent capability to deal with Denial-Of-Service 
(DOS) attacks. Servers that are compromised by DOS attacks respond slower flian 
the normal servers do. Due to the adaptive nature of our scheme, the client program 
in ATIR simply ignores the slow servers and use the answers from the good servers 
to reconstruct results, assuming good servers perform as good as they do in normal 
situations. However, it is important to incorporate design diversity into various stages 
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of system design, as discussed in Section 6.2.3. Otherwise, attackers can easily 
exploit tiie common vdnerabilities of an ATIR system and hack into the system. 
63 In Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have successfully demonstrated a systematic approach for 
investigating and studying the feasibility, usefuhiess, and practicability of ATIR - a 
privacy-preserving and fault tolerant mechanism for secure information retiieval. 
The soundness of the research conducted by this thesis is supported by the following: 
i) a significant literature survey on the state-of-the-art techniques and systems on 
privacy protection, PIR, and attack tolerance; ii) a detailed presentation of several 
ATIR schemes with complete characterisations of fault tolerance conditions and 
privacy protection properties; iii) analytical comparison of ATIR with relevant PIR 
efforts and critical examinations amongst ATIR and state-of-the-art secure and fault 
tolerant systems; and iv) an extensive experimental evaluation of ATIR systems in 
both normal and simulated faulty environments, with good performance results. 
As a whole, we have shown that ATIR offers an attiactive and practical solution 
for ever-increasing online information applications. We believe that many principles 
of ATIR may be extended to a wider range of application domains. As Avith any other 
research disciplines, there still remains much research to be done on deploying ATIR 




Attack An attack is an intentional fault aiming to violate the security properties of 
a service. There are two kinds of attacks: passive attacks and active attacks. Passive 
attacks seek to disclose confidential information whereas active attacks not only 
disclose confidential information but also disrupt services that are provided by a 
computer system. 
Attack Model An attack model is an absfaraction of all the types of attacks that are 
considered by a computer system. 
Attacker An attacker is a person or a computer program who carries out attacks 
against a computer system. 
Component is an entity of a system. 
Error An error is the part of a system state that is liable to lead to subsequent 
failures. 
Failure A failure is the manifestation of an error of a system. A system failure 
occurs when the delivered service deviates fi"om what a system is aimed at (e.g., 
specification). 
Fault A fault is the hypothesised cause of an error. 
Result A result is the intended data item (s) that a user wants to retrieve fi"om a 
database. For example, a result can be the parts of a record or an entire record stored 
in a database. 
View A view is a collective representation of all the records involved in the server 
side computation in an ATIR/PIR system. 
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